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Summary 
This thesis provides insights into approaches to regional peacebuilding with reference 
to the Mano Union River region of West Africa, comprising Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte 
d’Ivoire and Guinea. Using the case of the interrelated conflicts in these countries, 
particularly of regional fighters that fought in two or more countries, it investigates the 
constraints of conventional peacebuilding theory and practice in addressing regional 
conflict.  
Drawing largely on a constructivist International Relations approach, it argues that 
state-centred perspectives of conflict and peacebuilding, undertaken by institutions 
made rigid by ritualised practice, preclude an understanding of cross-border conflicts 
as localised conflicts, within the framing of a micro-region, and also block their 
effective engagement with the narratives articulated by combatants about their 
motivations for participating in cross-border conflict. Fieldwork was largely undertaken 
in Liberia, with the analysis supported by in-depth interviews and focus group 
discussions with regional combatants of Sierra Leonean, Liberian and Ivoirian descent, 
based in Liberia, as well as an institutional ethnography of United Nations peace 
operations, drawing on participant-observation, interviews and documentary analysis.  
The thesis demonstrates that while economic motivations feature prominently in 
regional combatants’ motivations, they also subscribe to other motives, in part 
mediated by socially constructed regional identities. These motives, however, receive 
limited or misguided attention from peacebuilding institutions, resulting in responses 
that are, in turn, limited in scope and effectiveness. A key lesson is the importance of 
understanding the opportunities and challenges arising from localised yet 
transnational imperatives that translate into violent cross-border movements in 
marginal border areas, to ensure adequate responses and sustain peace in the region 
in the long term. 
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1. Introduction: regional insecurity and peacebuilding in the 
Mano River Union 
1.1. Background and aims 
This thesis aims to contribute to the body of literature on regional conflict and 
peacebuilding, focusing on the interrelated conflicts in the Mano River Union1 (MRU) 
sub-region of West Africa, comprising Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire. 
Sierra Leone and Liberia became notorious in the 1990s and early 2000s as a result of 
the brutality that characterised their protracted conflicts, the interconnectedness of 
their civil wars, and the significant regional and international efforts to end the crises. 
As the two countries’ wars waned, Liberia’s neighbour Côte d’Ivoire fell into civil 
conflict, with Liberians and Sierra Leoneans fighting for the various sides. This thesis 
investigates the effectiveness of peacebuilding approaches in addressing the regional 
aspects of these countries’ conflicts. It does this particularly in the context of (ex-) 
combatants willing to cross borders to fight as evidenced, most recently, by the 
participation of up to 4,500 Liberian former combatants in the post-electoral violence 
experienced by Côte d’Ivoire from 2010–2011 (Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire 
2011c: 14). It thus examines the efficacy of regional peacebuilding efforts in relation to 
such movements, and the implications of the same for long-term peace and security in 
the sub-region. 
This thesis traces back to 2006 when I joined a team conducting a survey on ex-
combatant reintegration in Liberia for the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), 
similar to a research project undertaken by Humphreys and Weinstein in Sierra Leone 
in 2003 and captured in the paper, ‘What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants 
                                                          
 
1
 The Mano River Union (MRU) is an intergovernmental institution established in 1973 between Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, with Guinea joining in 1980. It is named after the Mano River, which originates in 
Guinea and forms a border between Liberia and Sierra Leone. Following a hiatus because of civil wars in 
Sierra Leone and Liberia, MRU was reactivated in 2004, with Côte d’Ivoire joining in April 2008. While 
the goal of the Union remains fostering economic cooperation among the countries, one of its priority 
goals is the coordination of ‘peacebuilding as the prerequisite to any development’ (MRU n.d.). 
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in Sierra Leone’ (Humphreys and Weinstein 2004). Amos, our key informant in 
Montserrado County, where the capital Monrovia is situated, happened to be a Sierra 
Leonean ex-combatant. As a Sierra Leonean, working with other Sierra Leoneans (who 
incidentally had been the national counterparts in the Humphreys and Weinstein 
study), I did not think too much about this at first. As the study progressed, however, I 
was struck by Amos’ ease of mobility, and the incredible access and authority he 
enjoyed throughout Montserrado. I wondered how it was that this twenty-something-
year-old Sierra Leonean had come to be so well known and, more so, respected by so 
many Liberian former fighters. On occasion, we were accompanied by a distant relative 
of one of the researchers, also a Sierra Leonean ex-combatant. During the fieldwork 
we noted several respondents reporting ‘other’ to the questions regarding their 
birthplace and where they were when the Liberian civil war started in 1989. While the 
survey was not designed to capture where those ‘others’ were born, some 
enumerators helpfully captured ‘Sierra Leone’, ‘Guinea’, and even ‘Ghana’ among the 
1,500-odd interviewees. It rapidly became clear that a minority of ex-combatants who 
were born and had lived and fought in other, mostly neighbouring countries continued 
to reside in Liberia.  
I never found out much more about Amos but I did learn that he was a former child 
soldier for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, and that he had 
crossed over to Liberia to fight with Charles Taylor’s forces in the early 2000s, as part 
of the notorious Small Boys Unit. He had sisters and other relatives in Sierra Leone but 
for whatever reason was reluctant to return, although he had no discernible 
employment opportunities in Liberia, beyond accompanying the multitude of 
researchers coming through this rich research field. His story led me to thinking about 
what had brought these Sierra Leoneans and nationals of other countries to Liberia, 
what caused them to remain several years after the wars in both Sierra Leone and 
Liberia had ended and, importantly, whether the extensive peacebuilding efforts 
ongoing both in Liberia and Sierra Leone had adequately addressed their needs. 
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The phenomenon of regional combatants provides a compelling case for considering 
the conflicts that engulfed Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire (and which 
occasionally spilled over into Guinea) as ‘regional’ conflicts. Some reasons for this 
phenomenon of ‘regional combatants’ have been suggested in the research. For 
instance, numerous researchers and evaluations have demonstrated the short-
comings of both Liberia and Sierra Leone’s disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration (DDR) programmes, as a contributing factor to incomplete 
demilitarisation (Benner et al. 2011; Bøås and Hatløy 2008; Humphreys and Weinstein 
2004; Utas 2003). Others elaborate on broken social networks and fear of reprisals, 
which discouraged some ex-combatants from returning home. Further, and most 
commonly, economic or mercenary motivations are cited, pointing to the promise of 
financial gain or reward by recruiters, against a backdrop of limited opportunities at 
home (Hoffman 2011a; Human Rights Watch 2005). 
These explanations require further interrogation, especially given the frequent cross-
border participation of easily mobilised former fighters in neighbouring countries’ 
conflicts, which reportedly persist, for instance at the Ivoirian–Liberian border. They 
also give rise to several questions: What are the implications of the exportation of 
violence away from home soil? What types of justifications do regional fighters 
produce for the exportation of this violence? Given the arguably holistic DDR 
programmes in Liberia and neighbouring Sierra Leone, coupled with active or recently 
concluded United Nations-led peace operations, what were the shortcomings of these 
programmes that caused a significant minority to ‘opt out’? How appropriate have 
regional peacebuilding efforts been, especially considering the ongoing fragility of this 
West African sub-region, and what are their prospects for sustaining regional peace?  
These questions form the basis of this thesis. In something of a departure from other 
studies on this topic, it combines an analysis of ex-combatants’ motivations with an 
institutional analysis of policy responses and frameworks of international and regional 
collaboration, with the aim of informing long-term peacebuilding policies in the West 
African sub-region and beyond. As such, the thesis hopes to provide an entry point for 
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post-conflict regional stability initiatives to engage more meaningfully with ongoing 
regional security concerns embodied by non-state actors such as regional combatants, 
which are, among other outcomes, hampering regional integration and development 
efforts. While the thesis focuses on fighters from Liberia, Sierra Leone, and to a lesser 
extent Côte d’Ivoire, the research was primarily undertaken in Liberia, which could be 
considered as the catalyst for conflict in the West African sub-region (International 
Crisis Group 2003b, 2002).  
The remainder of this chapter frames the thesis. Section 1.2 provides an overview of 
the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire, emphasising their regional 
nature, and highlighting the regional and international efforts that brought the wars to 
an end internally, even as regional dimensions persisted. Section 1.3 provides an 
overview of cross-border combatant movement in relation to the regionalisation of 
conflict. Section 1.4 elaborates on my research questions, while Section 1.5 provides 
an outline of the remainder of the thesis. 
1.2. A region at war 
1.2.1. Liberia 
Liberia’s war began in December 1989, when the National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL) entered Liberia’s Nimba County from neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire. It was led by 
Charles Taylor, an Americo-Liberian who had received military training in Libya, after 
the Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaoré introduced him to Libya’s Colonel Qadaffi, 
who had a history of supporting insurgencies in other West African countries, 
purportedly against puppet regimes of western imperialism. The invasion took place 
against a backdrop of severe economic difficulties, coinciding with the end of the Cold 
War, Liberia’s demotion as a key United States (US) strategic ally in Africa, and more 
stringent conditions tied to US aid. This situation heightened the decline that had 
begun in the 1970s, with the international oil crisis and political agitation against the 
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Americo-Liberian2 government of William Tolbert, which was overthrown in 1980 by 
Samuel Doe, an army officer from the Krahn ethnic group.  
Doe’s regime was no more democratic than his predecessor’s, and was plagued by 
gross economic mismanagement and the violent consolidation of power. Over time, 
Doe promoted fellow ethnic Krahns who came to dominate both the military and the 
political elite, resulting in tensions between Krahn and other ethnic groups in Liberia. 
His regime was characterised by wholesale pillaging of the country’s coffers: ‘By the 
end of his rule, Doe and his cronies had stolen a reported $300 million in public funds’ 
(Adebajo 2002c: 27). He also eliminated potential rivals and closed off peaceful 
avenues for dissent, garnering many enemies in the process. Student protests in 1984 
led to some deaths and he was reported to have killed more than 50 opponents by 
1985 (Adebajo 2002c: 28). In the aftermath of a 1985 coup attempt by Thomas 
Quiwonkpa, a former army commander, whose popularity had led to his exile in 1983, 
the Krahn-dominated Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) killed an estimated 3,000 Gios 
(Quiwonkpa’s ethnic group) and Manos in Nimba County (Adebajo 2002c: 30). After 
1985, Doe’s rule became even more absolute. Corruption increased, as did allegations 
of human rights abuses and ethnic polarisation. Doe was able to thwart coup attempts, 
in part with military support from the United States. Meanwhile, civil and political 
rights were trampled and standards of living plummeted.  
The roots of the 1989 invasion are said to have been planted in Quiwonkpa’s failed 
1985 coup and the subsequent massacre of Nimba County ‘citizens’. On 24 December 
1989 Charles Taylor led a small invasion numbering hundreds into Nimba County from 
neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire, with tacit support from the Ivoirian President, Félix 
                                                          
 
2
 From 1847 until April 1980, Liberian politics was dominated by Americo-Liberian settlers. These were 
former slaves from the United States and their ancestors. They created a one-party state, ruled by the 
True Whig Party (TWP). Although the constitution was modelled on that of the United States, the 
Americo-Liberian elite monopolised power and restricted the voting rights and privileges of the 
indigenous African population. In the 1970s a combination of the international economic crisis and 
domestic political agitation against the Americo-Liberian government of William Tolbert culminated in a 
coup on 12 April 1980 when Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe, an indigenous Liberian of Krahn ethnicity, 
seized power and formed the People’s Redemption Council (PRC). 
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Houphouët-Boigny. The NPFL mainly comprised and quickly absorbed disgruntled Gio 
soldiers and farmers mobilised in the aftermath of the 1985 attempted coup. To some 
extent, Houphouët-Boigny’s decision to support Taylor was personal: in addition to 
killing Tolbert and 13 of his senior officials in the 1980 coup, Doe’s regime later killed 
Tolbert’s son, who was married to Houphouët-Boigny’s adopted daughter (Adebajo 
2002c: 30).  
Fighters from other countries were involved from the outset. The NPFL was bolstered 
by Burkinabé soldiers, dissident Gambian soldiers and Sierra Leoneans, as well as other 
Liberians who had received ‘revolutionary’ training in Libya and Burkina Faso. Although 
they entered the country with a force numbering hundreds, by the end of May 1990 
the NPFL had an estimated 10,000 fighters (Adebajo 2002a). The group quickly overran 
the country and entered the capital Monrovia in July 1990. Embattled, Doe was forced 
to offer a ceasefire and was killed later in the year by Prince Johnson, a former ally of 
Taylor, who had broken off to form his own faction, the Independent National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (INPFL). 
Fearing the spillover effects of the Liberian conflict and the negative implications of 
regional insecurity on economic integration and development, the West Africa regional 
integration body, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), decided 
to intervene (this is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3). The next six years were 
characterised by numerous peace agreements, in which successive interim 
governments were set up, ceasefires declared, provisions made for disarming and 
demobilising troops, and democratic elections planned. By 1997, 13 peace agreements 
had been brokered by ECOMOG, with latter ones supported by the UN, but each was 
unsuccessful (Adebajo 2002a). 
In 1990, the main factions were the AFL, the NPFL and the INPFL. By 1991, they were 
joined by the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), a 
coalition of mainly Krahn and Mandingo fighters, including AFL soldiers, who had taken 
refuge in, and were subsequently armed by Sierra Leone. Doe’s regime had recruited 
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many Krahns to the army which, as noted above, had been responsible for the 
massacre of Gios in 1985 and were therefore a target for the NPFL. As prominent 
traders, Mandingos, many with family connections to neighbouring Guinea, had been 
courted as allies to the Doe government, which had enabled them to establish 
themselves in Nimba County, which borders Guinea, displacing indigenous Manos and 
Gios. They were thus also targets for the NPFL (Allouche et al. 2016). ULIMO was 
supported and trained by the Sierra Leonean and Guinean governments to counter the 
NPFL, which was making incursions into their territories and threatening to destabilise 
their governments. By 1995, splinter and locale-specific groups had also begun to 
appear, and by 1997, the conflict had more than 10 factions, each with a particular 
ethnic identity and grievance (Ofuatey-Kodjoe 2002). These included ULIMO-J and 
ULIMO-K, after ULIMO ‘split along ethnic lines, the Krahn-dominated ULIMO-J under 
Roosevelt Johnson, and the Mandingo-based ULIMO-K under Alhaji G.V. Kromah’ 
(Allouche et al. 2016: 12); the Liberia Peace Council (LPC), a proxy force for the AFL, 
concentrated in the southeast and predominantly Krahn; and the Lofa Defense Force 
(LDF), mainly drawn from the Lorma ethnic group who aimed to protect themselves 
from the Mandingo-dominated ULIMO-K, among others. 
Eventually, in 1996, a more definitive peace agreement was signed, supported by a 
joint ECOMOG/UN mission (UNOMIL) and Charles Taylor was elected Liberia’s 
President in 1997. The UN observer mission UNOMIL, which had been established in 
1993 to provide ‘good offices’ support to ECOWAS and the transitional government, 
withdrew shortly after, but hope that Charles Taylor’s election to the Liberian 
presidency would result in lasting peace faded as war broke out once more in 1999. 
Opposition to Taylor’s regime came first from Liberians Reunited for Reconciliation and 
Democracy (LURD), who launched their incursion in 1999 with support from Guinea. 
This was followed by the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), which 
launched its attack from Côte d’Ivoire, this time with backing from the new Ivoirian 
president Laurent Gbagbo. Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire’s support for these groups was 
partly in retaliation against Taylor’s support for rebel elements within their borders. 
LURD forces were also bolstered by former Sierra Leonean combatants, mostly from 
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civilian defence forces (CDF) that had fought against the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) rebel incursion in that country (see Section 1.2 below). 
Despite being supported by RUF elements under the leadership of Sam ‘Maskita’ 
Bockarie, the RUF’s military leader, it became clear that pro-Taylor forces were losing 
the war. With mounting international pressure, including the arrival of ECOMIL forces 
(an ECOWAS mission comprising Nigerian peacekeepers borrowed from the 
neighbouring UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL), Taylor was forced to 
step down as President in 2003 and go into exile in Nigeria. Highlighting his role as a 
regional warlord, Taylor was subsequently indicted for war crimes and tried in The 
Hague under the jurisdiction of the Special Court of Sierra Leone for his involvement in 
that country’s conflict, in relation to aiding the RUF to commit atrocities. He was 
convicted in 2012. 
Taylor’s resignation paved the way for a ceasefire in June 2003 and for LURD, MODEL 
and Taylor’s deputy to sign a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Accra, Ghana, 
on 18 August 2003. The CPA explicitly requested the UN to deploy an International 
Stabilization Force, with a mandate to observe and monitor the ceasefire, undertake 
DDR and weapons collection, coordinate and deliver humanitarian assistance, advise 
and support the Transitional Government, assist with security for elections and 
protection of civilians, and coordinate with ECOWAS, among other activities. 
In September 2003 the UN Security Council adopted resolution (S/Res) 1509 (2003), 
establishing the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), under a Chapter VII mandate, 
consisting of 15,000 troops, which was to take over from ECOWAS-led ECOMIL (UN 
peace operations’ mandates will be discussed further in Chapters 4 and 8). It was 
tasked with supporting the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement, including 
disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR); protecting UN 
staff, facilities and civilians; supporting humanitarian and human rights assistance; 
supporting security sector reform; and supporting the implementation of the peace 
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process, including the re-establishment of national authority throughout the country 
and preparing for elections in 2005. 
Importantly, and introducing language that would be repeated in future resolutions, 
the resolution highlighted the importance of a regional approach to security, noting 
that ‘lasting stability in Liberia will depend on peace in the sub-region’ and ‘the 
importance of cooperation among the countries of the sub-region to this end, as well 
as the need for coordination of United Nations efforts to contribute to the 
consolidation of peace and security in the sub-region’ (United Nations Security Council 
2003c: 2). 
UNMIL and other international partners helped the Liberian Government to disarm 
over 103,000 former combatants and associated women and children. The Mission 
also helped Liberia hold democratic elections in 2005, which produced Africa’s first 
democratically-elected female head of state, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. Peace has 
prevailed, with Johnson-Sirleaf winning a second term in office in 2011. Yet the peace 
dividend remains elusive for most of the population: poverty and corruption are rife; 
and progress on restorative justice and national reconciliation, as outlined as 
recommendations in an historic Truth and Reconciliation Commission report, remain 
unimplemented. Also, the limitations of post-conflict reintegration of ex-combatants 
were highlighted when the UN reported that about 4,500 Liberians were mobilised to 
participate in post-electoral violence in Côte d’Ivoire from 2010–2011 (Group of 
Experts on Côte d’Ivoire 2011c: 14). Nonetheless, UNMIL has been considered largely 
successful, and in December 2016, the UN Security Council extended its mandate for a 
final period until the end of March 2018, following presidential and legislative 
elections, scheduled for October 2017. 
1.2.2. Sierra Leone 
The Sierra Leone civil war started in 1991, when soldiers of the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) launched an attack from neighbouring Liberia, with the assistance of NPFL 
soldiers and mercenaries from Burkina Faso (Francis et al. 2005). While RUF leader 
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Foday Sankoh claimed that the rebels aimed only to overthrow the corrupt 
government, the war was waged mainly against civilians, with the RUF adding to their 
ranks by abducting children and using them as soldiers and labourers. In addition, they 
mainly targeted diamond-mining areas. 
In 1992, elements of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) staged a coup and established a new 
government under the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), headed by Captain 
Valentine Strasser. NPRC began to prosecute the war with greater fervour, supported 
by ULIMO, one of the factions involved in Liberia’s conflict. However, ‘capital-city 
priorities’ (Richards 1996: 10) began to take its leaders’ attention away from the war, 
and allowed ‘sobels’ – soldiers by day, rebels by night – at the warfront to also engage 
in looting villages, diamond mining and smuggling. Their behaviour against the people 
they were meant to be defending resulted in communities mobilising hunter militias 
(mostly derived from traditional hunting societies, also collectively known as Kamajors) 
and CDF to protect civilians from both the RUF and rogue army elements. Unable to 
depend on its national army, the government hired Executive Outcomes, a South 
African mercenary firm with mining interests to dislodge the rebels from diamond 
mining areas, in return for mining concessions. 
In 1995, the Strasser government moved towards reinstituting constitutional 
democracy and initiated peace talks with the rebels. Despite a ‘Palace Coup’ by Julius 
Maada Bio, elections went ahead as planned and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and the Sierra 
Leone People’s Party (SLPP) were voted into power in February 1996. Upon his 
installation as Head of State, Kabbah took over peace negotiations that had 
commenced in Côte d’Ivoire, although Sankoh questioned the legitimacy of the 
elections. In November 1996, pushed by international mediators, Sierra Leone 
government officials, RUF delegates and international representatives signed the 
Abidjan Accord. However, the agreement was stillborn, as the fighting continued 
unabated.  
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With Executive Outcomes gone (one of the conditions of the Accord), the government 
lost most of the ground it had gained prior to the peace agreements. In May 1997, 
elements of the army overthrew the Kabbah government, formed the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC), and invited the RUF into the capital Freetown to join 
their regime. Although ECOMOG drove the AFRC-RUF alliance out of Freetown in 
March 1998 and restored the Kabbah government to power, the alliance continued to 
control much of the country and launched an offensive against Freetown in January 
1999, with support from Charles Taylor, which was eventually repelled by ECOMOG 
and CDF. About 200 Nigerian soldiers had also been killed, and in 1999 newly elected 
President Obasanjo of Nigeria announced that given the material costs (he claimed 
ECOMOG was costing Nigeria an estimated US$1 million daily) and loss of Nigerian 
personnel, he would begin withdrawing Nigerian troops, who comprised the bulk of 
the force, from ECOMOG (Adebajo 2002). The announcement resulted in the 
international community pressuring the Sierra Leone government into a new round of 
negotiations.  
The resulting Lomé Peace Agreement, signed on 7 July 1999, granted the RUF blanket 
amnesty and a power-sharing arrangement. It also called for a ‘neutral’ peacekeeping 
force (Articles VXI and XIX of the Agreement), comprising UN and ECOMOG troops, 
that would be responsible for disarming combatants and disposing of or destroying 
weapons. In August, Obasanjo wrote to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, reiterating 
Nigeria’s intention to withdraw troops (Adebajo and Keen 2007). To fill the security 
vacuum, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1270 on 22 October 1999 
establishing the peacekeeping operation, United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL), with a ceiling of 6,000 military personnel, and replacing the observer 
mission (UNOMSIL) established the previous year. Among its mandated tasks were 
support for the implementation of the Lomé Agreement, assistance with DDR, support 
of UN civilian operations, and provision of support for elections, as requested. For the 
first time in UN peacekeeping history, the Security Council also invoked Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, allowing forces to take necessary action to ‘ensure the security and 
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freedom of movement of its personnel and . . . to afford protection to civilians under 
imminent threat of physical violence’ (Article 14). 
The Lomé agreement was marked by ‘widespread and serious’ violations (United 
Nations Security Council 2000a), including the abduction of 500 UNAMSIL 
peacekeepers by RUF soldiers in May 2000. After this particular incident, protestors 
demonstrated outside Sankoh’s Freetown residence, where his bodyguards opened 
fire on the crowd, killing some people. Sankoh fled but was arrested a few days later 
(he was later indicted by the Special Court of Sierra Leone for war crimes but died in 
2003 while awaiting trial). In the meantime, British troops arrived to evacuate their 
own and other foreign nationals, and an 800-strong contingent remained to support 
the UNAMSIL peacekeepers. Later that month UNAMSIL was increased to 13,000 
troops and in August 2000 the Security Council passed a resolution strengthening 
UNAMSIL’s ‘structure, capability, resources and mandate’. Following advocacy for a 
peace enforcement mandate under Chapter VII, the resolution authorised UNAMSIL to 
‘deter and, where necessary, decisively counter the threat of RUF attack by responding 
robustly to any hostile actions or threat of imminent and direct use of force’ (S/Res 
1313, United Nations Security Council 2000a), essentially authorising peacekeepers to 
fight the RUF. In March 2001, the Security Council increased UNAMSIL’s troop strength 
to 17,500 military personnel, at the time the largest UN peacekeeping deployment 
ever, in a country of about six million people. Disarmament began in earnest shortly 
thereafter, with UNAMSIL helping to disarm some 85,000 former combatants.  
Some RUF and CDF fighters crossed over to Liberia instead, however, and joined the 
fighting that had resumed there. Some fighters also later moved to fight in Côte 
d’Ivoire when war broke out in that country in 2002 (Human Rights Watch 2005; 
International Crisis Group 2002, 2003b). In line with its mandate, UNAMSIL also helped 
Sierra Leone hold democratic elections in May 2002, and supported the government to 
consolidate its authority over the entirety of the country. UN peacekeeping operations 
wrapped up in Sierra Leone in December 2005, with activities taken over by successor 
peace consolidation missions, first the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL, 
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up to 2008) then the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), 
which concluded its operations in March 2014. UN peace operations in Sierra Leone 
have been labelled a qualified success, despite their rocky start. Sierra Leone held its 
second round of post-conflict elections in August 2007, which saw a peaceful change in 
government from the incumbent SLPP, to the All People’s Congress (APC), which 
retained power following elections in 2012. 
1.2.3. Côte d’Ivoire 
In the 1990s, as war raged in neighbouring Liberia and nearby Sierra Leone, Côte 
d’Ivoire, the engine of development in that part of West Africa, partly driven by 
hundreds of thousands of labourers from neighbouring countries, seemed to have 
escaped the scourge of conflict, even as it hosted thousands of refugees from, and its 
government covertly supported various armed factions in, Liberia. In 1993, Félix 
Houphouët-Boigny, who had been President since the country’s independence in 1960, 
died. During his tenure he ‘pursued economic development based on a plantation 
agriculture system’ (Allouche et al. 2016: 8) that saw his country’s economy boom, and 
which attracted tens of thousands of labourers from neighbouring countries, such that 
an estimated 26 percent of the population was of foreign origin, particularly from 
Burkina Faso.3  
In the late 1990s, dangerous identity politics coalesced around a concept of Ivoirité (or 
Ivoirian-ness). This gave rise to discrimination against and the disenfranchisement of 
the multitude of ‘foreigners’, mostly originating from the Muslim north, and resulted in 
the barring of the main opposition candidate, Alassane Ouattara, who had been prime 
minister under Houphouët-Boigny, from standing in presidential elections in 1995 after 
a revision in the electoral code differentiated between those of ‘pure’ Ivoirian origin 
and those of ‘mixed’ heritage (International Crisis Group 2003a).4 Ouattara’s Rally of 
                                                          
 
3
 The 1998 census puts the number of Burkina Faso nationals resident in Côte d’Ivoire at over two 
million (International Crisis Group, 2011). 
4
 It was alleged that Ouattara’s mother was from Burkina Faso, and as such he was ineligible to run for 
office under the Ivoirité regulations. 
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the Republicans (RDR) and the other main opposition group, the Ivoirian Popular Front 
(FPI), boycotted the elections, which were won by Henri Konan Bédié, who as National 
Assembly President had succeeded Houphouët-Boigny as President instead of 
Ouattara. RDR drew support from predominantly Muslim ‘northerners’ with ties to 
Mali and Burkina Faso, while FPI was mainly supported by people from the West and 
Southwest of Côte d’Ivoire. Bédié’s Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) drew its 
support from the centre and east. 
Bédié was overthrown in a military coup in December 1999, and succeeded by General 
Robert Guéï. Immediately before elections in 2000, a new law was introduced, 
requiring both parents of a presidential candidate to be born within Côte d'Ivoire, 
again excluding Ouattara and leading RDR to boycott the elections. Laurent Gbagbo of 
the FPI claimed victory in the resulting elections, although he was only able to take 
office after popular protest removed Guéï from power. According to Allouche et al., 
‘[t]he conflict was sparked by a military uprising in September 2002 by some 800 
soldiers about to be decommissioned from the military. These were mainly soldiers 
from the north who joined the armed forces during [Guéï’s leadership], following the 
1999 coup’ (2016: 15). Armed men staged an unsuccessful attack on the headquarters 
of the paramilitary gendarmes in the commercial capital, Abidjan, and others took 
several hinterland towns such as Bouake, which had a significant weapons stockpile. 
They then ‘rapidly consolidated their control over the north, purportedly with support 
from Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaoré, who had also been hosting former 
soldiers that had lost favour during the Guéï’s junta’ (ibid.). Their principle claim 
related to definitions of who qualified as an Ivoirian citizen (and could thus stand as a 
Presidential candidate), voting rights, and representation in government. 
During the uprising, former president General Robert Guéï was killed in unclear 
circumstances, with the government of Laurent Gbagbo accusing him of leading the 
attempted coup. The violence spread rapidly, with dissident soldiers and rebels 
consolidating their hold over the largely Muslim north of the country as the Forces 
Nouvelles (FN). In the west, supporters of Guéï also marshalled themselves against 
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Gbagbo, with support from Liberia’s Charles Taylor. Taylor had been Guéï’s ally during 
his junta’s rule, and while in power, ‘Guéï, from the Yacouba ethnic group, had 
recruited fighters from neighbouring Liberia’s Gio people’ (Allouche et al. 2016: 15), 
who were ethnic ‘cousins’ of the Yacouba (and who, as discussed above, had formed 
the core of Charles Taylor’s NPFL in the early stages of Liberia’s civil conflict). After he 
left power his private forces included Liberian and Ivoirian soldiers who had trained in 
Liberia (International Crisis Group 2003a: 19).  
Taylor was also accused of directly supporting the establishment and operations of 
two rebel groups in western Côte d’Ivoire, the Ivoirian Popular Movement of the Great 
West (MPIGO) and the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP). Many Sierra Leonean 
(mostly RUF) fighters who had fled Sierra Leone to Liberia in 2000 with Samuel 
Bockarie, the RUF’s former military commander, and were under Charles Taylor’s 
protection, were also sent to fight in Côte d’Ivoire. Simultaneously Gbagbo, from the 
minority Bété ethnic group in the south-west, extensively recruited Liberian former 
combatants from counties bordering south-western Côte d’Ivoire and who fought 
under the banner ‘Lima militias’ (Human Rights Watch 2005), aligned with the 
Liberation Forces of the Far West (FLGO) and the Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire 
(FANCI). Many were recruited from MODEL, which the Ivoirian Government had 
allowed to recruit Liberian refugees on Ivoirian territory as well as to use the territory 
as a base from which to launch attacks against Taylor’s forces in Liberia. In exchange 
MODEL helped to combat the Ivoirian rebels. While ‘these fighters were perceived as 
being mostly from the Krahn ethnic group (traditional opponents of Taylor), with 
whose ethnic cousins the Ivoirian Guéré Gbagbo was aligned’ (Allouche et al. 2016: 15) 
(all being part of the wider Kru or Krou linguistic group), it was apparent that financial 
incentives played a significant part in their participation (Human Rights Watch 2005; 
Mahoney 2005).  
The first significant effort to bring an end to Côte d’Ivoire’s conflict was the signing of 
the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement by all Ivoirian political actors on 24 January 2003. The 
signatories promised to renounce violence, in advance of political reforms and the 
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organisation of free elections (Lamp and Trif 2009). The ceasefire agreement was 
jointly monitored by French and ECOWAS forces. Initially, instead of a UN peace 
mission, the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII and VIII of the UN Charter, 
formally authorised the ECOWAS and French peacekeeping operation in S/Res 1464 
(2003). Subsequently, by S/Res 1479, the Council established the United Nations 
Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI), a special political mission, to complement these 
efforts (United Nations Security Council 2003b).  
Under pressure from the international community, Taylor reduced his support for anti-
Government militias, but despite this and the establishment of MINUCI, fighting 
continued in Côte d’Ivoire, and the country effectively remained divided in two. 
Following continued violations of the ceasefire agreement, the Security Council, with 
S/Res 1528 of 27 February 2004, established the United Nations Operation in Côte 
d’Ivoire (UNOCI), with a military strength of 6,240 personnel, incorporating the 
ECOWAS troops (United Nations Security Council 2004a). The resolution called for 
UNOCI ‘to carry out its mandate in close liaison with the UN Missions in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, including especially in the prevention of movements of arms and 
combatants across shared borders and the implementation of disarmament and 
demobilization programmes’ (ibid.: 31). It mandated UNOCI to monitor the ceasefire 
and movements of armed groups; assist the government in disarmament, 
demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement; protect UN personnel, 
institutions and civilians; support humanitarian assistance; and support the 
implementation of the peace process, among other activities. 
Presidential elections, originally scheduled for 2005, were postponed until October 
2007. In March 2007, a more definitive peace agreement was signed between the 
Government and FN, and the FN political leader Guillaume Soro was appointed prime 
minister in early April, effectively bringing the war to an end. Thereafter, elections 
were again postponed several times until October 2010. The main contenders were 
Gbagbo, the incumbent, and Ouattara, who had finally been cleared to run. In the run-
off between Gbagbo and Ouattara, the head of the Independent Electoral Commission 
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(CEI) declared Ouattara the winner, with 54.1 percent of the vote (Zounmenou and 
Loua 2011). The ruling party, however, claimed fraud in the north, which was 
controlled by the pro-Ouattara Forces Nouvelles de Côte d’Ivoire (New Forces of Côte 
d’Ivoire, FNCI), and the Constitutional Council declared the results from the Northern 
Departments void, declaring Gbagbo the victor. The international community, 
however, recognised Ouattara as the winner, with the UN Security Council passing a 
resolution to this effect. Four months of severe clashes followed between pro-Gbagbo 
and pro-Ouattara supporters which, as noted above included Liberians. These only 
ended with the capture of Gbagbo in April 2011 by pro-Ouattara Forces républicaines 
de Côte d’Ivoire (Republican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire, FRCI), with heavy support from 
French UN troops. The crisis resulted in the exodus of over 200,000 Ivoirians, including 
suspected militias, to neighbouring Liberia. Most have returned to Côte d'Ivoire, 
however, with an estimated 29,505 refugees remaining in neighbouring countries by 
the end of March 2017 (UNHCR 2017). Further, the country held peaceful presidential 
elections in October 2015, which saw Ouattara returned to power with an 
overwhelming majority, although voter turnout was only about 50 percent. In April 
2016, the Security Council decided that UNOCI would cease operations in June 2017. 
The brief summaries of each country’s conflict highlight the interplay between the 
conflicts, and their increasingly regional nature as they wore on. Interestingly, this 
phenomenon was apparent even with the significant presence of regional and 
international peacekeepers and, in some cases, may have been exacerbated by their 
activities (such as the problematic implementation of DDR programmes). Against this 
backdrop it is imperative to understand how such levels of violence were mobilised 
and sustained across borders. The next section presents rough estimates of numbers 
and key periods of movement, and discusses the ‘problematic’ associated with such 
movements. 
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1.3. From national to cross-border combat 
With reference to Darfur, Central African Republic and Chad, Debos (2008: 225) 
highlights armed combatants, who ‘easily shift allegiance and cross borders to carry on 
with their “politico-military careers”’, as a structural characteristic of conflict in that 
sub-region, with major local and transnational implications. She argues that the 
trajectories of such fighters are crucial to understanding the crisis. The situation that 
arose in the 1990s and early 2000s, and which resurfaced during the Côte d’Ivoire 
post-electoral crisis of 2010–2011, highlights a similar trajectory in West Africa, and 
emphasises the propensity for dissident nationals and formerly mobilised fighters to 
be drawn into neighbouring countries’ conflicts (International Crisis Group 2003b, 
2002).  
Official documented figures on regional combatants in the Mano River sub-region are 
relatively small compared to total disarmament numbers. For instance, official DDR 
figures from Liberia list that in all 612 ex-combatants self-identified as foreign 
nationals (of about 103,000 total disarmed), with the largest groups comprising 308 
from Guinea and 242 from Sierra Leone (UNDDR 2006). However, Human Rights Watch 
(2005) research suggests that the numbers of Sierra Leonean fighters involved in 
Liberia’s war were much higher and that many registered for DDR as Liberians because 
they were afraid of being excluded from programmes. Similarly, in Côte d’Ivoire, 
Ivoirian President Gbagbo was able to deny the role of Liberians in his campaign 
against rebel groups because it was difficult to distinguish the French-speaking Liberian 
fighters from loyalist government forces (International Crisis Group 2003b). Indeed, 
the porous boundaries between the countries and familial ties across borders (Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire) undoubtedly facilitated this regional 
movement and recruitment of fighters. For instance, during the Ivoirian war (2002-
2006), many Liberians were recruited in Liberian towns that bordered Côte d’Ivoire, 
and issued with fake ID cards to facilitate their cross-border movement (Silberfein and 
Conteh 2006). 
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Human Rights Watch estimates that:  
at least five hundred NPFL and a similar number of ULIMO fighters took part in Sierra 
Leone’s armed conflict, while a combined force of at least one thousand RUF and 
Liberian government troops participated in the 2000–2001 cross-border attacks on 
Guinea. During the 2002–2003 armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, the number of Liberians 
fighting for the Ivorian government was estimated to be between 1,500 and 2,500, 
while close to one thousand were thought to have fought alongside Ivorian rebels. The 
1999–2003 Liberian war seems to have drawn in well over one thousand regional 
warriors, the vast majority of whom fought alongside the LURD. (Human Rights Watch 
2005: 13) 
The International Crisis Group estimates from various sources that ‘between 600 and 
2,000 RUF crossed into Liberia by the end of 2001, with active elements operating in 
Lofa County just across the border, rallying RUF combatants’ (International Crisis 
Group 2002: 6). Nilsson (2008) further notes that about 750 former CDF and 1,200 
former RUF fighters left Sierra Leone to participate in Liberia’s civil war. These are all 
conservative estimates; it is likely that actual figures of regional combatants run to the 
thousands. Indeed, as mentioned above, while a likely over-estimation, the UN cited a 
figure of 4,500 Liberian former combatants mobilised during the 2010–2011 Ivoirian 
crisis (see Table A1.1 in Annex 1). 
Cross-border fighting was not limited to Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. 
Although Guinea did not experience civil conflict while three of its neighbours were at 
war, a significant amount of recruitment – among dissident Guineans and in refugee 
camps – and fighting took place on its soil, between opposing Sierra Leonean and 
Liberian forces. Further, the Guinean authorities mobilised its armed forces against 
both the RUF and Charles Taylor, and provided extensive support to ULIMO, LURD and 
other Liberian groups. Since 2001, conditions in Guinea have remained politically 
unstable. This situation deteriorated after 2003 as LURD members with ethnic ties 
crossed into Guinea with their weapons to avoid disarmament. Lacking employment 
opportunities, some began to loot, harass, and generally create havoc and ethnic 
unrest in southeast Guinea (Silberfein and Conteh 2006). In 2004, Human Rights Watch 
interviewed Liberian and Sierra Leonean ex-combatants who claimed they had been 
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asked to join fighting missions in Guinea on behalf of both the government and 
insurgent groups during periods of instability, with reports of Liberian and Sierra 
Leonean ex-combatants pre-positioning themselves for possible combat in 2009, 
following the December 2008 coup.5 Further afield, in 2012 and 2013, there were 
rumours of recruitment taking place in Liberia for fighters to participate in the conflict 
in Mali. Although these cannot be substantiated, at least two of my respondents in 
2013 claimed that they, or ex-combatants they knew, had been approached to go to 
Mali. 
A striking feature of the main periods of these movements (late 1990s and early 2000s) 
is that they coincided with the scaling up of international peace operations in each of 
the three countries. It therefore appeared that the presence of UN peacekeepers was 
not sufficient to deter cross-border movements, and despite significant sub-regional 
involvement in addressing the contiguous conflicts, these were not significantly geared 
towards addressing the cross-border dynamics of combatant movements, even as UN 
sanctions and embargo regimes fought to halt timber, diamonds and guns from 
crossing borders and fuelling the regional conflict: indeed, much of the investigation 
into the regional dynamics of West African conflict have focused on the ‘big’ or ‘strong 
men’ behind this trade, such as Charles Taylor, and on the regional nature of the 
conflict as a consequence of ‘natural resource wars’, i.e. conflict enabled by a network 
of violence and exchange, of timber, diamonds, gold and weapons, for instance (Keen 
2000; Reno 2000).  
In contrast, this thesis explores the motivations of those individuals who exported 
their warcraft to their neighbours because, as others have noted, the need to deal with 
the threat posed by former fighters, who constitute a threat to durable peace, is 
considered paramount to long-term stability (Higate and Henry 2009; Nilsson 2008; 
Humphreys and Weinstein 2004). This thesis looks at the motivations behind these 
movements and their implications for long-term peace and stability in the region. In 
                                                          
 
5
 Reported by some ex-combatant interviewees as well as researchers based in Liberia at the time. 
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doing so, it hopes to contribute to the study of and mechanisms for addressing 
contagion conflicts that persist especially in ‘no-man’s land’ border areas in Africa and 
elsewhere.  
This thesis initially planned to consider three periods of movement: the start of the 
conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia in the early 1990s; the exodus of Sierra Leoneans 
to Liberia in the late 1990s and their participation in Liberia’s second phase of conflict 
from 1999; and the participation of Sierra Leoneans and Liberians from the start of the 
Ivoirian conflict in 2002. Just after I completed the pilot phase of my fieldwork in 2010, 
however, Côte d’Ivoire became embroiled in a post-electoral crisis that lasted six 
months from October 2010, which as noted above reportedly involved up to 4,500 
Liberians, some six years after Liberia completed its DDR programme and had even 
officially declared that its youthful participants in that country’s conflict should no 
longer be referred to as ‘ex-combatants’. The unfortunate turn of events gave added 
impetus and urgency to my study because, as the Panel of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire 
(2011a: 10) noted 
The reigniting of internal conflict in Côte d’Ivoire has already had an impact on 
neighbouring States and, by consequence, altered their relations with Ivorian parties. 
The Group is deeply concerned because the conflict has already reached a stage where 
some neighbouring countries, in efforts to protect their national interests, have lent 
assistance to parties in the conflict, including supplies of weapons and related materiel 
in violation of the arms embargo. The Group believes that, should hostilities gain in 
intensity and duration, their escalation into a regional conflict cannot be ruled out. 
 
The crisis also enabled me to consider the issues the thesis was concerned with, 
especially in relation to the peacebuilding responses of UN operations, ‘in real time’, 
particularly when, even after the post-electoral crisis was officially at an end with 
Ouattara’s assumption of the presidency, Côte d’Ivoire’s border region continued to be 
besieged by hit-and-run attacks that were apparently launched from Liberia and 
carried out by Liberian ex-combatants and Ivoirian militias residing Liberia. The Panel 
of Experts for Liberia mention notable cross-border attacks in September 2011, April 
2012, June 2012 (during which seven UNOCI peacekeepers were killed), August 2012, 
and March 2013 (Panel of Experts on Liberia 2013a, 2013b, 2012a, 2012b). While 
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cross-border attacks tapered off in 2014, there were still at least two in 2014, one in 
2015 and one in 2016 within 50 kilometres of the Liberian border, with Côte d’Ivoire 
continuing to presume that they were carried out by Ivoirian militias still residing in 
Liberia (a summary of these attacks, with further details of their impacts, is listed in 
Table A1.2 in Annex 1). Against this backdrop I now consider my research questions. 
1.4. Research questions 
As highlighted in the previous sections, I am interested in the extent to which 
international peacebuilding initiatives are able to address the regional dimensions of 
otherwise internal conflicts, and the factors that limit their effectiveness. As such, it 
may be appropriate to ask: what are the limitations of international peacebuilding 
approaches in addressing long term regional peace and security? Or, put more starkly: 
why did international peacebuilding initiatives fail to prevent regional conflict in West 
Africa? Within this subject, for reasons that will be elaborated in subsequent chapters, 
I am primarily concerned with why and how combatants’ motivations and mobilisation 
resulted in a situation wherein ex-combatants in one context became regional 
combatants in another, and the extent to which national and regional peacebuilding 
approaches have engaged with these motivations and mobilisations. Thus, the main 
question this thesis aims to address is: 
Why were international peacebuilding efforts ineffective in addressing the 
phenomenon of regional combatants, which contributed to the spread of regional 
conflict in the Mano River Union sub-region of West Africa? 
This raises the following sub-questions: 
1. What are regional combatants’ motivations for moving to participate in 
neighbouring countries’ conflicts?  
 
23 
 
 
2. To what extent do peace operations and on-the-ground peacebuilders 
take into consideration these motivations when developing 
peacebuilding and regional stabilization strategies? What limits them 
from effectively considering these motivations? 
3. To what extent are the resulting strategies effective in promoting 
regional peacebuilding? 
1.5. Thesis structure 
This chapter has provided a background to the thesis, including the context of the 
‘regional’ conflicts encompassing Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. Academically, 
it contributes to the conflict and peace literature, particularly in relation to regional 
peacebuilding, and with the focus on regional ex-combatants, highlights the 
importance of adequately engaging sub-state actors in post-conflict peacebuilding. It is 
also fundamentally concerned with policy-making processes in international peace 
operations. The chapter has also introduced key concepts that will be explored in 
subsequent chapters – including ‘regional combatants’ and ‘regional security’ and 
‘regional peacebuilding’.  
Chapter 2 elaborates on the literature on combatant motivations. It draws on the 
‘causes of conflict’ literature to consider motivations along the greed–grievance 
spectrum, but notes the need to go beyond these in considering motivations for 
regional combat which, to date, have centred on financial incentives.  
Chapter 3 picks up on the concepts of regional peace and security, looking especially at 
the regional responses to the challenges posed by regional conflict, which served as 
the first efforts to contain the conflicts. It then turns to the theoretical approaches that 
have aimed to make sense of these interventions, highlighting their limitations in the 
context of peacebuilding. It draws on ‘new regionalisms’ approaches to emphasise the 
necessarily transnational, multi-layered nature of peace-making and peacebuilding.  
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Chapter 4 focuses on UN peacebuilding processes, which took over from regional 
peacekeeping efforts in West Africa, considering their evolution and maturation, 
including in West Africa, while pointing once again to the limitations of their 
theoretical underpinnings, especially for regional conflict. Based on the discussion in 
this and the preceding two chapters, Chapter 4 concludes with a presentation of a 
constructivist multi-layered framework that considers mechanisms for analysing the 
relationship between combatant motivations and peacebuilding practice, mediated by 
the regional context.  
Chapter 5 discusses the resulting research design that informed the study, as well as 
the methodology and methods applied, including institutional ethnography, in-depth 
interviews, focus group discussion and extensive participant-observation. It further 
highlights issues to do with reflexivity and ethics arising from undertaking an 
institutional ethnography of peacebuilding institutions from the position of being an 
employee of one such institution, and outlines the discourse analysis approach, 
encompassing both narrative and textual analysis, that was applied to analysing the 
research. 
Against this backdrop, Chapter 6 presents my data and discusses the findings from my 
research on regional combatants’ motivations and movements, relative to the 
literature, and how these were shaped and changed by moving to neighbouring 
countries to fight. In addition to analysing the extent to which prevailing theories 
about ex-combatants’ reasons for moving to fight are applicable to the ex-combatants 
interviewed for my thesis, I consider the ways in which their articulation of particular 
identities advances or constrains their interests.   
Chapter 7 situates the regional ex-combatant within the transnational environment of 
the borderland micro-region, building on the narratives discussed in the previous 
chapter. It considers how such narratives are given shape and further impetus through 
border communities’ interactions with a far-removed state, and begins to consider the 
implications of this for peacebuilding initiatives. 
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Chapter 8 considers institutional regional peacebuilding responses in the MRU. It takes 
as its starting point the multiple UN Security Council mandates for peace operations in 
the MRU countries, with a focus on their provisions for regional peacebuilding efforts. 
It considers how these mandates are decided, crafted and sustained, exploring the 
ways in which the disconnect between ‘Headquarters’ and ‘the field’ serves to 
constrain effective implementation on the ground, while at the same time 
demonstrating that this disconnect is more apparent than real, as the field has myriad 
mechanisms and avenues for influencing mandates, and room to manoeuvre to 
interpret mandates.  
This sets up the discussion in Chapter 9, which moves on to the on-the-ground 
implementation of these Security Council mandates, examining a range of UN and 
regional approaches in the region aimed at addressing the regional dynamics of 
conflicts in this West African sub-region, and contrasts these against the motivations 
elaborated on in Chapters 6 and 7, expanding on their limitations. 
Chapter 10 concludes the empirical section of my thesis with a consideration of 
national and bilateral approaches, levels of analysis that are not explicit in much of my 
discussion but cannot and should not be ignored. Often, however, these approaches 
are supported by the UN and regional actors, and as such suffer from many of the 
same constraints discussed in previous chapters. 
Chapter 11 brings together the different strands of my thesis. Recalling my conceptual 
framework set out in Chapter 4, it suggests some contributions to the literature and 
summarises the implications of my research for regional peacebuilding and peace-
making in the MRU region and beyond. The analysis demonstrates that while economic 
motivations feature prominently in regional ex-combatants’ motivations, other 
motives are also important but receive limited attention by peacebuilding institutions, 
resulting in responses that are limited in scope and effectiveness. A key lesson is the 
importance of understanding the opportunities that arise from transnational 
imperatives that translate into cross-border movements, thus opportunities to 
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reinforce a regionalism, and regional peacebuilding agenda, that work at both formal 
and informal levels. 
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2. (Whose) local perspectives matter: focusing on regional 
combatants and their motivations 
The previous chapter’s overview of the course and conclusion of conflicts in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire highlighted at least three inter-related issues. Firstly, it 
signposted the common problem of partially demobilised fighters with seemingly fluid 
loyalties available to fight in neighbouring countries. Secondly, it highlighted how the 
regional implications of the inter-connected conflicts necessitated sub-regional 
peacekeeping intervention. Thirdly, it emphasised the role of international (UN-led) 
actors in bringing each of the conflicts to a sustained conclusion, at least at national 
levels, and the subsequent peacebuilding efforts. The research questions are 
essentially an inquiry into the implications of these three issues for long-term peace 
and security in the sub-region. The next three chapters will focus on the literature and 
main concepts related to each of these areas, culminating in my proposed conceptual 
framework at the close of Chapter 4. In this chapter, Section 2.1 expands on 
combatants and ex-combatants as a focus for peacebuilding studies. Section 2.2 
elaborates on the literature regarding their motivations and mobilisation to violence. 
Section 2.3 problematises the preceding discussion, especially given the limited 
literature on motivations for moving to fight (Nilsson 2008: 12).  
2.1. Why ex-combatants? 6 
Weiss and Thakur observe that ‘[t]o build peace, we must understand the nature and 
causes of conflict’ (2010: 61). While they critique micro-theories that focus on 
individual behaviour as falling into a ‘trap of biological pessimism’ (ibid.), many studies 
on conflict and peace have advocated for a micro-level perspective, with particular 
focus on individual combatant motivations (Blattman and Miguel 2009; Arjona and 
Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2006; Humphreys and Weinstein 2004). 
                                                          
 
6
 I must note a definitional problem here, wherein some (particularly humanitarians) define an ex-
combatant as a person who has ‘genuinely and permanently’ renounced military activities/all former 
attributes of a combatant (UNHCR, 2006a: 17) but this clearly is not the case for the group that I am 
studying. The implications of this problematic will be taken up in the empirical chapters. 
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In post-conflict contexts, as ‘potential “spoilers”’ (Alden et al. 2011: 2), former fighters 
constitute a threat to durable peace, for instance by participating in organised violence 
as members of illegal armed groups, and undermining the legitimacy of post-conflict 
governments (Nilsson 2008; Humphreys and Weinstein 2004, 2008). Stedman et al. 
(2002: 109) note, ‘the demobilisation of soldiers and their reintegration into civilian life 
is the single most important sub-goal of peace implementation.’ These assertions 
demonstrate the importance of understanding what mobilised fighters in the first 
place, and the mechanisms that aid their demobilisation in peacetime (Alden et al. 
2011). The act of moving to fight – essentially voting against demobilisation with one’s 
feet – requires further interrogation. Is it indicative of the extent to which fighters’ 
socio-political and economic objectives have not been achieved? Or the extent to 
which peace negotiations and post-conflict arrangements, including disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes, have failed to cater to 
belligerents’ grievances? These are the questions this thesis attempts to answer. 
It is worthwhile to pause here and briefly consider DDR, which is the main conduit 
through which ex-combatants are supported to become active participants in the 
peace process and to reintegrate them socially and economically into society (United 
Nations 2014). As such, it is important to understand its underlying assumptions (Alden 
et al. 2011; Hutchful and Aning 2004). The main activities associated with DDR 
programmes include:  
disarmament . . . the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, 
ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons from combatants and often from 
the civilian population; demobilization . . . the formal and controlled discharge of 
active combatants from armed forces and groups, including a phase of ‘reinsertion’, 
which provides short-term assistance to ex-combatants; [and] reintegration . . . the 
process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable 
employment and income . . . a political, social and economic process with an open 
time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. (United Nations 
Peacekeeping n.d.) 
These interventions are aimed at addressing factors that motivated fighters in the first 
place, and creating a post-conflict environment that minimises these motivations.  
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Before turning to the literature, I close this section with a brief discussion of the notion 
of ‘combatant’. At its simplest, a ‘combatant’ is defined as all members of the armed 
forces, whether regular or irregular, of a party to the conflict, except medical and 
religious personnel (International Committee of the Red Cross n.d.). In terms of non-
state armed combatants, for the purposes of this thesis, the term includes a range of 
groups such as militias, who are defined by Alden et al. (2011: 4) as ‘a military force 
composed of civilians outside the state’s formal military structure’, which ‘apply 
violence in pursuit of their respective objectives . . . [and] publicly explain and defend 
their armed presence by the need for “self-defence” as understood by their own 
trajectory.’ This definition reflects, as reinforced by Hutchful and Aning (2004: 197) 
that ‘the distinction between combatants and civilians is unclear’ and as such, ‘there 
are no “fronts,” no “lines,” no “uniforms,” and “no formal hierarchies”’ which, as we 
will see in cross-border conflict, is particularly salient. 
Much of the discussion above and below also justifies a focus on a group that is 
variously termed as conflict entrepreneurs and intermediaries, that is, those people 
who mobilise combatants, fund conflicts or are the middlemen between the funders of 
conflicts and rank-and-file fighters. As discussed in Chapter 1, however, some of these 
groups have been extensively addressed in causes of (regional) war literature related 
to big man politics and natural resources conflict. While recognising the importance of 
these groups, I have chosen to focus mainly on the foot soldiers, in part as discussed in 
greater detail below, to interrogate the notion of combatants as passive subjects, 
rather than rational, active agents, which to my thinking largely constrains appropriate 
responses to the real threats they pose post-conflict. I thus now turn to the prevailing 
literature on their motivations. 
2.2. Greed and grievance as motivations 
Macroeconomic research on the causes of violent civil conflict has long highlighted the 
importance of economic incentives to fight. In the early 2000s this coalesced around 
the ‘greed over grievance model’ based on a panel dataset of wars between 1960 and 
1999 in 161 countries (Collier et al. 2004; Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 2000). Collier and 
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colleagues found that economic variables have a greater explanatory power for the 
causes of civil war than political and social variables related to grievances – or, as they 
put it, ‘the greed model considerably outperforms the grievance model’ (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2000: 1). This model asserts that ‘the cause of initial conflict is an economic 
calculus of relative military advantage, the government’s ability to finance defense 
expenditure, the scale of primary commodity exports, and the costs of rebel 
recruitment’ (2000: 13, emphasis mine). Collier et al. further found that the high 
incidence of civil wars in Africa was attributable to the continent’s poor economic 
performance, in both absolute and relative (to other regions) terms (Collier et al. 2004; 
Collier and Hoeffler 2002). Economic or selective incentives provide a critique of 
grievance and ideological imperatives that aid rebel recruitment, and instead 
emphasise the ‘logic’ of collective action, and the presence of selective incentives to 
stimulate rational individuals in an otherwise latent group to act collectively (Olson 
1971). The greed model also emphasises the political economy of conflict, which 
acknowledges the economic utility of violence (Keen 2000; Reno 2000). In relation to 
rebel groups, the argument has since been consolidated to mean the opportunities the 
group faces, disaggregated into financing (most commonly the appropriation of natural 
resources), recruitment (especially from the high proportion of young, unemployed 
males) and geographical safe havens (Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2009).  
Indeed, studies on the West African conflicts highlight some element of the ‘greed’ 
motive. For instance, Humphreys and Weinstein’s study (2004) indicates that across 
factions, material motivations mattered for the recruitment of fighters (for instance, 
RUF combatants were promised jobs, money, and women). They also find, however, 
that material benefits, both those promised and actually received, were typically just 
sufficient to satisfy basic needs: most fighters were not directly engaged in the 
lucrative natural resource trades and when the groups encountered valuable goods, 
they passed them on to their commanders. Further, the greed motive was not 
universal. For instance, the Civilian Defence Forces (CDF) helped to meet the basic 
needs of the members and provided increased security for their families but fighters 
were forbidden from taking valuable goods, and few expected material benefits 
(Humphreys and Weinstein 2004: 28–29). 
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In fact, both econometric research and anthropological empirical case study research, 
both focusing on the micro-level, have found that grievance arguments retain much 
currency (see Blattman and Miguel 2010; Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2007 for a review 
of such studies). De Koning (2007: 38) points to ‘strong political and social grievances 
. . . that provided important motives for violent struggle’ in relation to the rebel 
narratives in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. Similarly, Richards argues that the 
conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia may be attributed to grievances arising from social 
exclusion, which made youths in these countries particularly susceptible to militia 
recruitment. He considers that ‘social solidarity collapsed around a forced division of 
labour’ (2005: 285), with young people exploited for their labour through local 
marriage rules, exacerbated by their abandonment by the State. He suggests (as does 
Utas (2003), discussing Liberia) that the (largely rural) conflicts arose from failure to 
introduce agrarian reforms, which undermined interclass and intergenerational 
cohesion, led to frustrations around customary land and marriage law, and resulted in 
the agents of rebellion finding pliant material for insurgency (Richards 2005, 2003, 
1996). Richards further observes that the resulting lack of education and employment 
opportunities propelled disenfranchised and marginalised youths to join fledgling rebel 
groups, such as the RUF in Sierra Leone and NPRC in Liberia (Richards 2005). In line 
with Richard’s observation about the collapse of the social contract/institutional 
failure, Utas (2003) argues that the 1970s economic collapse in Liberia caused 
gerontocratic leadership to slide even further into the decline that had begun as a 
result of state-led modernisation projects. The war created alternative power 
structures, and participation in it provided children and youths with ‘unprecedented 
access to power and the trappings of modernity’ (Utas 2003: 116), and allowed them 
to attain adulthood through the possession of land, houses and wives. While invoking 
both relative deprivation and selective incentives in the form of private benefits as 
motivating factors in Liberia’s war, his principal thesis is that in Liberia, the 
marginalisation of young people is the central factor. Bøås and Hatløy (2008) also find 
that marginalisation and lack of societal opportunities were factors in Liberia. 
These arguments are not only made by anthropologists. For instance, Keen, a political 
economy analyst, underscores the need to investigate how greed generates grievance 
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and rebellion. Speaking specifically of Sierra Leone, he notes that the civil war ‘cannot 
really be understood without comprehending the deep sense of anger at lack of good 
government and educational opportunities (the significance of the latter suggesting a 
problem with taking lack of education as a proxy for greed rather than grievance)’ 
(Keen 2000: 35). He further argues that in Sierra Leone, young people fought because 
of political grievances. 
This discussion demonstrates that motivations are multiple and varied. Indeed, many 
studies have critiqued the ‘greed vs. grievance’ dichotomy itself and advocated for 
blurring the lines between the two approaches. Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2009) assert 
that Collier et al.’s emphasis of the poverty trap as a factor of greed is not intuitive, as 
relative deprivation and the grievance that arises from it can fuel internal violence. 
They argue that neither greed nor grievance alone is sufficient to explain the outbreak 
of violent conflict, which further requires institutional breakdown (the failure of the 
‘social contract’; Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2009: 102). Similarly, Richards (2005: 10) 
wonders why is it ‘‘greedy’ to want a basic education or job?’ and argues that when 
the variables are considered ‘political’ – for instance the combination of resource 
wealth with poverty and high unemployment – the distinction between greed and 
grievance disappear. Richards (2005) further argues that in African countries, in the 
absence of institutional contracts, social contracts in this context took the form of 
patrimonialism. He notes that the economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, which 
resulted in the downsizing of state institutions and the weakening of revenue-sharing 
arrangements between central governments and traditional authorities, led to the 
breakdown of these patrimonial networks, particularly in rural areas (ibid.), thus 
contributing to conflict.  
2.3. Moving beyond greed and grievance: other explanations for 
fighting in West Africa 
Overall, the rich literature on combatant motivations in West Africa (including 
Hoffman 2011a; Bøås and Hatløy 2008; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008, 2004; 
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Richards 2005; Ferme and Hoffman 2004; Utas 2003, among others)7 recognises the 
multiple and varied factors along the greed–grievance spectrum that influence 
individuals’ decisions to fight. But for some commentators this is not sufficient. 
Inasmuch as recognition of the greed–grievance spectrum reflects an increasingly 
comprehensive approach, they still demonstrate a preoccupation with binary greed–
grievance perspectives. African researchers particularly have critiqued this approach. 
For instance, Hutchful and Aning (2004: 204) observe that focus on material incentives 
in West Africa’s conflicts has prevented analysis and identification of true sources of 
vulnerability or resilience in a society. Further, they observe (2004: 198) that 
economistic rationales, having found resonance in ‘influential policy circles in which a 
nuanced understanding of African issues is important to informing policy debates and 
discussions’ continued to dominate responses. 
We are to further realise that these ‘conflicts are often intertwined with issues of 
political and economic marginalization, as well as social exclusion, identity, and 
citizenship’ (Hutchful and Aning 2004: 200). As such, Hutchful and Aning urge us to 
‘place greater emphasis on the psychological, cultural, and ideological mechanisms 
that bind or alienate youth and other critical groups from the community and from 
authority figures’ (2004: 204). 
Such perspectives are sadly lacking in literature on West African combatants. Where 
they stray beyond greed–grievance, they look at mobilisation through fear or threats. 
In Liberia and Sierra Leone particularly, much has been written about the forced 
conscription of children to the various fighting factions. Humphrey and Weinstein’s 
(2008) sample shows only 12 percent of the RUF joined voluntarily, despite otherwise 
reporting that they fought to express dissatisfaction, root out corruption and bring 
down the existing regime. While they acknowledge that abduction may be 
overrepresented because of self-reporting, ‘qualitative evidence suggests that the vast 
                                                          
 
7
 While this thesis is largely concerned with young males, it is important to recognise the excellent 
research on motivations among other groups. This includes Chris Coulter’s (2009) work on the 
experience of girls and women during Sierra Leone’s war, which provides excellent relevant insights on 
livelihood options in war and peace, and post-conflict kinship relations. It also includes Peters’ and 
Richards’ (1998) research demonstrating agency among child recruits in Sierra Leone. 
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majority of RUF combatants were abducted, with grievances, selective incentives, and 
social sanctions rendered largely irrelevant in the individual decision about whether to 
join’ (2008: 445). 
A few studies have moved beyond these motivations, emphasising their strategic 
nature. For instance, in Liberia most of Bøås and Hatløy’s (2008) interviewees cited 
security concerns – for themselves, their families and communities – rather than 
idleness, poverty or political reasons, when asked why they joined an armed faction. 
Their data indicates that relatively few combatants saw war as an ‘occupation’ or an 
opportunity to loot; rather, decisions to take up arms, including switching between 
different armed factions, were based on protecting themselves and their families, 
livelihoods, and local communities. Another take on this relates to coping and survival 
strategies, whereby a member of a household joined the occupying force as a way of 
safeguarding the family, or for securing access to hard-to-come-by provisions.  
These findings relate to studies on the costs of non-participation, which recognises 
that people will participate in a conflict to better manage the risks associated with 
conflict (Moore 1966; Scott 1976; Goodwin 2001; Mason and Krane 1989, referenced 
in Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). Such studies critique the selective incentives 
paradigm by arguing that at least in the short term, the public cost of non-participation 
overcomes the incentive to free-ride and compels individuals to participate (Kalyvas 
and Kocher 2007). Other studies have highlighted the relationship between poverty 
and conflict, including that high levels of poverty compel individuals to fight where 
they may gain more from being fighters (Justino 2009). 
This is reflected in some of Humphreys and Weinstein’s (2008) findings. They note 
their research finds evidence that ‘participation in a military faction does depend on an 
individual’s relative social and economic position, the costs and benefits of joining, and 
the social pressures that emanate from friends and community members’ (2008: 452). 
Similarly, in Sierra Leone, as homes were destroyed and families killed, young people 
joined the conflict in defence of their kin and their communities. Humphreys and 
Weinstein (2008: 437) note that many fighters joined the CDF to guard their 
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communities against the twin threats of the RUF and dissidents from the Sierra Leone 
Army (SLA). They further found that among the CDF, 77 percent of respondents 
reported being recruited by a friend, relative, or community leader, and typically 
joined units in which they had family members, friends, or members of their 
communities. Just 15 percent joined on their own. This pattern of recruitment was also 
found among the other two main actors in Sierra Leone’s conflict, the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), who were mostly 
recruited through relatives (Humphreys and Weinstein 2004). Despite this, they are 
still able to conclude that ‘the widespread assumption that individuals have agency in 
making choices about participation is empirically suspect’ (Humphreys and Weinstein 
2008: 437), with their sample demonstrating abduction as an essential recruitment 
strategy.  
Yet it is important to understand that combatants do have agency, as evidenced by 
various strategies applied in and subsequent to conflict. In relation to cross-border 
conflict, Ferme and Hoffman demonstrate this in their discussion on Kamajors’ 
engagement with humanitarian discourse and practice as they moved from Sierra 
Leone to Liberia. They argue that ‘once militias left their local functions of grassroots 
civil defence units and moved beyond the territories where they were recruited, they 
made strategic decisions in combat based on a selective interpretation of 
humanitarian discourse and practices’ (2004: 73). As Hoffman (2011a: xx) further 
notes, ‘fighters with the [MRU] region’s various militias are well aware of the impact 
their images have on a world audience and they use it to great effect.’ Hutchful and 
Aning also note that ‘self-serving ex post facto explanations of rebel groups can rarely 
be taken at face value’ (2004: 199). 
These examples illustrate that combatants can be more strategic (i.e. exercise control 
over the decisions they take) than they are given credit for, as their behaviour is often 
defined as tactical, i.e. narrow and opportunistic, oriented towards basic survival. 
Indeed, for Alden et al. ‘militias are lucid, rational actors operating within the 
international system’, where ‘[r]ationality must be understood as socially constructed 
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and an actor’s interests and behaviour are subject to socializing norms, and, as such, 
are fundamentally mutable’ (2011: 27, emphasis mine). 
Researchers have highlighted further motivating factors in other, arguably similar, 
contexts. One of these is ideology, often dismissed by international political economy 
adherents. Yet, Sanín and Wood (2014) argue that while predominant literature either 
dismisses ideology as a rhetorical device, reduces it to ‘some structural variable’, or 
argues that ‘their potential effects are overridden by situational logics’, ideology is 
important analytically in at least two ways: first, it socialises combatants into a 
coherent group, prioritises goals and coordinates external actors; secondly, some 
groups’ (or some individuals in a group’s) normative commitment to a particular 
ideology can constrain their strategic or otherwise rational choices (so they appear un-
strategic or irrational to external observers). Ideology is not much considered in the 
West African contexts although there is evidence that ideology initially served as a 
rallying point during the Sierra Leone conflict. 
Other discussions on mobilisation dwell on social identities and how these may be 
energised or manipulated towards violence. Black (2008) notes that groups formed on 
the basis of social identity ‘are always and everywhere the main constituents of 
political struggle. On occasion that struggle escalates . . . into a mutually destructive 
conflict’. He goes on to note: ‘It is widely recognized that some of the most recalcitrant 
of deep-rooted, fundamental conflicts are those between identity groups’ (2008: 149). 
Most recently, this has focused on religion, particularly as debates on religious Islamic 
radicalisation to violence have played out in popular media. Additionally, conflicts in 
other parts of Africa (particularly the Great Lakes region) have spawned a great volume 
of literature on the mobilisation and/or manipulation of ethnic identities to 
considerable violence, including across borders. This has been largely absent from 
analyses of West African conflicts, with the exception of Côte d’Ivoire (although 
Ganesen and Vines caution that the situation there constituted a ‘cynical exploitation 
of ethnicity’ (2004: 303)). In all three countries, however, this has been highlighted in 
the scant literature on motivations for moving to fight. For instance, of the CDF 
37 
 
 
 
fighters that moved from Sierra Leone to Liberia and Guinea to support the Liberians 
Reunited for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), Ferme and Hoffman note that  
These tended to be combatants with family ties on both sides of the border, or those 
who had previously spent time in Liberia working and/or fighting with one of the 
factions in the earlier Liberian civil war. Given the extensive networks of trade and 
migration (voluntary and forced) throughout the Mano River region, this amounted to 
a substantial number of young men who expressed some degree of personal 
connection to communities across the national borders—an identification underscored 
by ethnic and linguistic allegiances that do not map onto official state boundaries. 
(2004: 78) 
Similarly, those Liberians who fought for Gbagbo particularly (both in the early 2000s 
and in 2010–2011) were considered to be ethnically related to pro-Gbagbo 
communities in western Côte d’Ivoire (Panel of Experts on Liberia 2012b; Human 
Rights Watch 2005).  
Identities are not limited to religion or ethnicity. Focusing on post-conflict identities, 
Nilsson argues that ‘for demobilized fighters, the most salient identity is the group 
identity they share as members of an ex-combatant community’ (2008: 13), an 
association that offers both psychological and social benefits. He continues: 
this identity is partly a product of history, as the interpretation of the recent conflict 
and the violence committed can become part of the identity of opposing groups, and 
partly a result of interaction between ‘ingroup’ and ‘outgroup’ processes in the post-
war period . . . Ingroup processes refer to how individual former fighters strive to 
retain their factional identity, because membership in the ex-combatant community 
offers psychological and social benefits that are desirable. (Nilsson 2008: 13) 
This aspect highlights a critical dimension – that of the ‘group’, which, as Stewart 
notes, is important for individual welfare and social stability. She considers that group 
membership is an intrinsic part of human life, and hypothesises that an important 
factor that differentiates the violent from the peaceful is the existence of severe 
inequalities between culturally defined groups, which she defines as ‘horizontal 
inequalities’ (Stewart 2002: 3). 
Hoffman critiques identity-based explanations, however, arguing that ‘[a]n 
anthropology too wedded to the language of belonging, autochthony, and ethnicity 
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risks reproducing a very conservative mode of identity politics’ and cautioning that a 
preoccupation with ‘“African identities” often occludes [the capacity of youth] to live 
productively through the fractured, experimental, and decidedly unfixed nature of 
what it means to be African in the world today’ (2011a: xv). Nevertheless, he does 
acknowledge the importance of identity formation, however, and the fixing of meaning 
between self and other ‘in an uncertain and fractured world’ (ibid.: xiv) as crucial for 
understanding war today, particularly those efforts that debunk the primordialist 
narratives that dominate popular discussions in Africa. I subscribe to this perspective 
and further concur with Alden et al.’s assertion that it is important to understand 
armed groups (again in their case militias) as ‘lucid, rational players operating within 
the international system who can successfully politicize and instrumentalize identity 
cleavages, not only for the mobilization of fighters in particular and society in general, 
but also for the retention of their support base’ (2011: 25).  
This perspective is even more relevant in relation to motivations for moving to fight 
between African countries, which is highly underdeveloped (important exceptions 
include Hoffman 2011a; Guichaoua 2009; Nilsson 2008; Utas 2003), and where for 
many researching the Mano River conflicts, movement motivations are mainly limited 
to mercenary (economic/greed) incentives (for instance, see International Crisis Group 
2011, 2003a, 2003b, 2002; Silberfein and Conteh 2006; Human Rights Watch 2005; 
Global Witness 2003). Silberfein and Conteh, citing Utas (2003), note that ‘Many of 
these fighters were initially abducted, but as they face a postconflict future without 
skills, education, family support, or even normal social development, they perceive 
that they have few options other than to continue fighting’ (2006: 351). This factor is 
considered even more explicit in the case of child soldiers, who reportedly were re-
recruited to fight in Côte d’Ivoire, by both government and opposition forces. Writing 
of the MRU sub-region, Pugh et al., considered the MRU sub-region in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s as a ‘market for mercenaries’ (2004: 121). They account for the 
‘general attractions of mercenary work’ (ibid.: 122) as being the result of severe 
underdevelopment, problems with Sierra Leone’s DDR process, lack of alternative 
economic opportunities, widespread poverty, and unresolved land disputes. This 
language is not limited to MRU conflicts. Speaking of Central African Republic, Debos, 
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even while emphasising the importance of understanding the historic roots of 
combatant mobilisation, refers to regional fighters as ‘freelance military 
entrepreneurs’ (2008: 225) and ‘regional warriors’ (ibid.: 240), a term coined by 
Human Rights Watch (2005: 11) for West Africa’s regional combatants. 
Speaking of non-state armed groups generally, Henriksen and Vinci highlight three 
main fallacies that such analyses of non-state armed groups fall into:  
First, they essentialise fighter motivation, leaving an impression that any motivation 
springs from singular causes or reasons. For instance, combat motivation might be said 
to come down to greed or grievance. Second, they fail to recognise the polymorphous 
character of war, and how changing motivations affect the contexts in question. For 
example, the nature of a war may change over its course, for instance beginning for 
communitarian reasons but turning into a warlord, criminal enterprise, and this can 
change the nature of combat motivation. Finally, they confound agency and structure, 
fallaciously explaining motivation exclusively with reference to the context, or on the 
other hand, explaining the context exclusively with reference to fighter motivation. 
(2007: 87–88; emphasis in the original) 
In West Africa, the few studies that aim to avoid these pitfalls include Hoffman’s ‘War 
Machines’ thesis, yet even his anthropological study of MRU’s regional fighters 
prioritises an economic labour-based approach (Hoffman 2011a). Nilsson (2008), who 
uses the movement of Sierra Leonean combatants to Liberia as one of his case studies, 
also provides a useful departure. He proposes combining structural factors with actor-
oriented explanations from the causes-of-war literature, and analysing the interaction 
between the three clusters of factors: re-marginalisation of ex-combatants after the 
cessation of conflict; the presence of remobilisers with the resources, capacity and will 
to organise subsequent conflict; and relationships – or shared social and material 
bonds (social networks) (2008: 15–16). Notwithstanding, many researchers and 
practitioners continue to interpret these postures within a narrow, mostly mercenary, 
framework, a shortcoming that this thesis hopes to address, while aiming to contribute 
new perspectives on regional combatants’ motivations at the micro level. In 
considering this in relation to international peace operations, it adopts a constructivist 
international relations approach (elaborated at the end of Chapter 4), being 
particularly interested in the strategic and tactical application of narratives by regional 
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combatants, and, for reasons that will become apparent in the next two chapters, the 
response narratives and resulting practices of regional peacebuilding institutions. 
Another critique levelled at greed-grievance debates is that the regional dimension is 
hardly considered. As Pugh et al. note, ‘[r]egional dimensions hardly figure in the greed 
versus grievance debate, even though issues of local predation, distribution 
opportunities for resource exploitation, and borderland poverty and crime cannot be 
divorced from cross-border activities. However, there has been little attempt to 
incorporate the regional level in analyses of conflict – and even less in analyses of 
postconflict transformation’ (2004: 23). One of the main purposes of this thesis is to 
contribute to redressing this oversight. The following chapter thus elaborates on the 
regional dimension, highlighting the importance of non-state actors such as regional 
combatants in such discussions, as well as relevant approaches to aid in this exercise.
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3. Regional perspectives of peace and security 
Inasmuch as UN peace operations have come to dominate in West Africa, the first 
efforts to address the conflicts in the different countries were made at regional level. 
Investigation of this process reveals much about the situation today and the limitations 
of prevailing approaches to regional peacebuilding. Section 3.1 provides an overview 
of the peacekeeping interventions by the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), with Section 3.2 elaborating on its post-conflict contributions to 
maintaining peace and security. Section 3.3 considers the surprisingly scant theoretical 
underpinnings of these and subsequent interventions, with the exception of regional 
security/conflict complex theories, which helpfully point towards a social constructivist 
approach, but the application of which faces a myriad of problems in the West African 
context, stemming particularly from their focus on ‘security’ at the expense of ‘region’ 
and the absence of a focus on non-state actors. To redress this, Section 3.4 draws on 
new regionalism approaches to conflict and security, informed by political 
anthropology and social constructivist notions of borders and borderlands.  
3.1. From internal conflict to regional response: the role of 
ECOWAS 
In the 1990s the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, which lacked geo-political 
significance on the international landscape, were largely ignored by the wider 
international community. It was instead left to ECOWAS to try and bring about lasting 
peace and security in the two countries. The regional body was formed in 1975 with a 
focus on economic cooperation and integration as a means of facilitating growth and 
development in West Africa. While security was not considered a priority, in 1978 and 
1981, ECOWAS member states signed, respectively, the Protocol on Non-Aggression 
and the Protocol on Mutual Aid and Assistance for Defence. Importantly, the 1981 
Protocol included provisions for ECOWAS intervention in cases of internal armed 
conflicts within a member state engineered and supported actively from outside and 
which were likely to endanger the peace and security of the entire community 
(Adebajo 2002a, 2002c). It was, however, the rise of intra-state conflict in the late 
42 
 
 
 
1980s and early 1990s, first in Liberia and then in Sierra Leone, that turned ECOWAS’ 
attention towards regional security matters. 
In 1990, Liberian President Samuel Doe invoked the 1981 ECOWAS Protocol following 
the invasion of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) from neighbouring Côte 
d’Ivoire. Fearing the contagion effects of the Liberian conflict, ECOWAS established a 
Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to mediate the conflict and propose 
recommendations. The SMC proposed a peace plan, which included establishing a 
peacekeeping force. ECOWAS thus established the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG), a first for an African sub-regional body at the time. Led by Nigeria, 
ECOMOG arrived in Liberia in August 1990 and quickly became another faction in an 
already fractured landscape. While some commentators put the ECOWAS intervention 
in Liberia down to Nigeria’s hegemonic aspirations in the region, two other factors – 
humanitarian and regional security concerns – were also clearly relevant. Guinea and 
Sierra Leone were already hosting tens of thousands of Liberians seeking refuge from 
the war, and along with the Gambia, they also had dissident nationals fighting with the 
NPFL, so there was a real threat that NPFL success in Liberia could destabilise the 
governments in those countries, indeed as proved to be the case in Sierra Leone 
(Adebajo 2002c).  
Critiqued for its lack of neutrality, unpreparedness (including insufficient military 
intelligence, logistics, funding and equipment, and an unclear hierarchy of control and 
understanding of objectives), unprofessionalism and lack of a unified approach, both 
among ECOWAS countries, some of whose governments openly supported Taylor, and 
within ECOMOG, the peacekeeping body’s intervention in Liberia was ambiguous at 
best. The introduction of these troops into the Liberian conflict, and support for other 
fighting factions by both ECOMOG and neighbouring countries effectively resulted in a 
stalemate that kept Taylor at the negotiating table in the mid-1990s, but none of the 
agreements held and the country remained mired in conflict.  
Reasons for the failure of initial negotiations include stipulations that fighting factions 
could not participate in transitional governments or elections; Taylor’s suspicion of 
ECOMOG, which ensured lack of commitment to disarmament; the proliferation of 
fighting factions, some of which had been armed by ECOMOG against NPFL but which 
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subsequently became reluctant to give up control of territories from which they were 
exporting resources for personal profit; continued divisions within ECOWAS, and 
within ECOMOG about its mandate; and poor relations between Nigeria and western 
countries, particularly the United States, which ensured that adequate support for sub-
regional efforts to resolve the conflict was not forthcoming. Problematic too was the 
nature of the successive interim governments, essentially set up and guaranteed by 
ECOMOG. These governing bodies’ legitimacy was constantly called into question, and 
without an effective national army they were heavily reliant on ECOMOG for 
protection, and external guarantors for their longevity (Adebajo 2002c; Ofuatey-
Kodjoe 2002). Nevertheless, after seven years ECOMOG was able to disarm Liberia’s 
factions enough to organise elections in July 1997, in which fighting factions were 
allowed to participate, and which Charles Taylor won (Adebajo 2002b). 
At the start of its campaign in Liberia, ECOMOG used Sierra Leone as a staging post for 
its operations, and the country even contributed troops to the force. In the wake of 
the 1991 RUF invasion of Sierra Leone from Liberia, with support from Taylor, several 
hundred ECOMOG troops were deployed to assist Sierra Leone in defending its capital 
(Adebajo 2002a). But ECOMOG’s substantive involvement in Sierra Leone followed the 
May 1997 coup by the army junta, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). An 
alliance of ECOMOG/CDF troops was mobilised to recapture the capital Freetown and 
they returned the elected government to power in 1998. They also repelled the 
January 1999 invasion of Freetown by combined RUF and AFRC forces, but were 
unable to go any further. Still in control of large swathes of the country, during 
subsequent negotiations the rebels were bargaining from a position of strength, 
particularly from 1999, after Nigeria’s newly elected President Obasanjo announced he 
would be withdrawing Nigerian troops from Sierra Leone within months.  
Although some have argued that ECOMOG intervention and sloppy negotiating 
prolonged the conflict in Liberia and resulted in many civilian deaths in Sierra Leone, in 
both countries ECOMOG essentially served as a national armed force against rebel 
groups, when one did not exist in either country. It was a wholly West African 
enterprise, relying mostly on its own troops, money and military materiel, and 
represented the first time the UN sent military observers to support an already 
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established sub-regional force (Adebajo 2004). As the aspiring hegemon, Nigeria 
provided at least 80 percent of ECOMOG’s troops (which totalled 16,000 in Liberia and 
13,000 in Sierra Leone at their height) and 90 percent of its funding (Adebajo 2004). 
Further, leadership changes in the key nations, including the deaths of Houphouët-
Boigny in 1993 (who, as a Taylor supporter, opposed ECOMOG’s intervention in 
Liberia), and Nigeria’s Abacha in 1998 (whose poor domestic political record precluded 
western support to ECOMOG) led to greater peacekeeping collaboration between 
countries in the region. Francophone countries became more involved in brokering 
peace agreements, and, eventually, contributing troops. This, along with increased 
commitments from the wider international community to support ECOMOG, 
peacekeeping efforts and peacebuilding activities, all afforded ECOMOG the 
opportunity to contribute meaningfully to ending the conflicts, including securing 
Liberia once Taylor left power in 2003, with a 3,600-strong ECOWAS Mission in Liberia 
(ECOMIL). ECOWAS further demonstrated its commitment to regional peacebuilding 
by deploying troops to Guinea-Bissau in 1998–1999, and to Côte d’Ivoire in 2003 (as 
the ECOWAS Peace Force for Côte d’Ivoire, ECOFORCE), following the eruption of 
conflict in that country the previous year (although these were largely funded and 
equipped by France and other western nations).  
Despite moderate success, in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire it was apparent 
that ECOWAS did not have the capacity to bring the conflicts to a sustained end and 
build peace, resulting in western and UN peacekeeping intervention. The UN 
interventions, though superseding ECOWAS’ efforts, did not, however, mean the end 
of the ECOWAS experiment with fostering peace and security in the region. 
3.2. ECOWAS transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding 
ECOWAS’ peacekeeping efforts were increasingly accompanied by efforts to 
institutionalise peace and security considerations within ECOWAS. The earliest 
expression of this was the 1993 revision of the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty. This included a 
wide range of institutional reforms, covering law making, dispute settlement, 
jurisdictional reach and overall objectives; provisions for civil society and non-
governmental organisation (NGO) participation; strengthened sanctions for non-
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compliance; and an obligation for members to establish and strengthen collective 
security mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution (Kufuor 2006; Olonisakin 
and Levitt 1999). Article 58 related specifically to regional security, in which Member 
States agreed to co-operate to establish and strengthen appropriate mechanisms for 
the ‘timely prevention and resolution of intra-State and inter-State conflicts’, with 
provisions to establish joint commissions to address problems between states; 
encourage community-, town- and administrative-level exchanges; employ good 
offices to resolve disputes; organise regular meetings between relevant ministries; 
establish a regional peace and security observation system and peace-keeping as 
appropriate; and observe democratic elections, among others (ECOWAS 1993: 28). 
The 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security was developed to implement provisions of 
Article 58 of the revised treaty. The Mechanism moved ECOWAS from its earlier ad hoc 
approach to collective security towards a coherent and institutionalised framework for 
security cooperation in the sub-region (Abass 2000) and aimed to improve cooperation 
in conflict prevention, early warning, peacekeeping operations and control of cross-
border criminality, international terrorism and the proliferation of small arms 
(ECOWAS 1999). Provisions include the establishment of a Mediation and Security 
Council (to accelerate decision-making in crisis situations and implement provisions of 
the mechanism); a Defense and Security Commission (to advise the Mediation and 
Security Council on mandates, terms of reference and the appointment of force 
commanders, and to plan peacekeeping missions); and a Council of Elders (eminent 
personalities appointed to mediate conflicts and monitor elections, with up to 15 
members, one nominated by each state). Further provisions include an observation 
and monitoring centre (an early warning system); a peace and security observation 
mechanism; an African strategic and peace research group; the West Africa Network 
for Peacebuilding (WANEP), a network of peacebuilding civil society organisations; and 
peacekeeping forces where necessary. To this end the protocol called for the 
establishment of a standby force of brigade size, to which each member state has 
pledged a battalion. This force now acts under the African Union’s (AU) Africa Standby 
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Force architecture, and was deployed during the Mali crisis in 2012, in advance of the 
UN peacekeeping intervention.  
The Protocol further enables the Community to initiate measures without seeking 
authorisation from the AU or UN Security Council, with provisions for informing them 
of such decisions. Measures are put into effect at the request of the ECOWAS 
Authority of Heads of State, the Mediation and Security Council, a member state, the 
AU, the UN, or at the initiative of the Executive Secretary. It also authorises ECOWAS 
to support political processes needed to restore political authority when the powers of 
government are absent or eroded, and to support electoral processes. Further, joint 
local/national commissions can be created to address problems between neighbouring 
states (Adebajo 2002a: 147–151; Aning 2004; Aning and Bah 2009; Kufuor 2006). 
In addition to Mali, ECOWAS has invoked the Protocol in several other countries, 
including Togo and Guinea. According to Aning and Bah, 
ECOWAS’ key role in resolving the political crisis in Togo (2005) and Guinea (2007) was 
the most striking display of its ability to invoke its new instruments to deal with intra-
state conflicts before they erupt. Unlike Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, where ECOWAS 
intervened to deal with the aftermath of violence, its engagement in Togo and Guinea 
was credited for averting the eruption of further violence in both countries. (2009: 4) 
More recently, ECOWAS’ preventive diplomacy was also credited for peaceful transfers 
of power as a result of popular protest in Burkina Faso (2014), and preventive 
diplomacy in the Gambia (2017). The region has also experienced numerous successful 
elections with peaceful transitions of power (including in Sierra Leone and Nigeria). 
Beyond the 1999 Protocol, it is clear that security remains high on the regionalisation 
agenda, evidenced by the development and elaboration of frameworks and 
programmes such as the January 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), 
which prioritises transnational and cross-border initiatives for ‘natural resource 
governance, gender equality, humanitarian crisis prevention and preparedness, youth 
empowerment, and the fight against money laundering, drug and human trafficking 
and weapons proliferation’ (ECOWAS 2008: 32). Together with violent extremism, the 
latter three factors are considered key challenges for West African security in the 
present day, and separate optional protocols have additionally been developed to 
address these. Further, the various mechanisms recognise the increasingly important 
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role of West African non-state actors in peace and security, especially youth, women 
and civil society, particularly given the historically weak state structures involved. 
The preceding highlights the seemingly increasing impetus in ECOWAS as an institution 
for greater regional interaction, with its activities reflecting an ‘unprecedented’ 
emphasis on (regional) insecurity as a threat to states and a precondition of traditional 
development concerns (Bach 2004: 70). This move is not an isolated one, but rather 
one that is occurring within a broader framework of increasing regionalisation of 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding both in Africa and globally.  
ECPF now sits within the wider African Union’s African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA), which is ‘built around structures, objectives, principles and values, as well as 
decision-making processes relating to the prevention, management and resolution of 
crises and conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction and development in the continent’ 
(Kodjo 2012). On the other end of the scale, smaller regional bodies like Mano River 
Union (MRU) have developed strategies for the operationalisation of ECPF, such as the 
MRU Strategy for Cross-Border Security (2014). This will be discussed in greater detail 
in Chapter 7. The consideration of MRU is an important one, because similar to 
ECOWAS, its member states – Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire – have 
consciously sought to recast it as a security complex, in a context wherein ‘a distinctive 
territorial pattern of security interdependence . . . exist[s] that marks off the members 
of a security complex from other neighbouring states’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 14; see below 
for discussion on security complexes). Established prior to ECOWAS, MRU was also 
established as a regional economic integration entity but it barely functioned (Grant 
2008). Regardless, post-conflict, it has also focused on peace and security, in addition 
to economic development and social development imperatives.  
Despite this extension of peace and security initiatives, numerous constraints may be 
still highlighted in relation to ECOWAS and related sub-regional initiatives. These 
constraints include a preoccupation with physical security, despite an increasingly 
people-centred approach and a focus on youth and women; an incomplete 
understanding of human security, and how this relates to physical and material 
security; and a lack of understanding about how (or even whether) to engage with the 
more dynamic or informal manifestations of West African regionalisation. Overarching 
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these constraints is the reality of the weak governance and state institutions that are 
trying to concurrently drive the supposedly twin processes of regional security and 
regional economic integration, which remains relatively limited. Related to this last 
point, Adebajo (2004), among others, has critiqued ECOWAS-style regionalism for a 
variety of limitations: a lack of coherent national development paradigms and an 
integration culture; the proliferation of intergovernmental organisations (such as the 
MRU) that are not coordinated with ECOWAS or one another; member-states’ 
continued sacrifice of regional integration in the face of national crises; frequent 
political instability and conflict; the continued assertion of external influence and 
control (particularly France’s determination to maintain West Africa as a sphere of 
influence); and a lack of proactive leadership. More generally, Pugh et al. note that 
while regional organisations may possess local knowledge and have more of a vested 
interest than international agencies who may be ‘time-bound by exit strategies’ (2004: 
25), they may not be well-suited to conflict transformation because ‘they exhibit 
dissension, are partial, or lack organizational competence’ (ibid.), all concerns that may 
be ascribed to ECOWAS. 
These constraints notwithstanding, ECOWAS’ efforts have been strongly reinforced by 
the UN, including in the various UN Security Council resolutions establishing and 
renewing the mandates for UN peace operations in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL in 1999 
and successor missions), Liberia (UNMIL, 2003), and Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI, 2004). In the 
case of UNAMSIL and UNOCI this included, respectively, authorisation for ECOMOG 
support to UNAMSIL with DDR (S/Res 1270 (1999)), and authorisation for ECOWAS 
troops together with French troops to remain in Côte d’Ivoire (S/Res 1528 (2004a), 
once UNOCI was established. In all three countries, the UN peace operations were 
mandated to work closely with ECOWAS on a range of peacebuilding activities, 
including implementation of the peace agreements; restoration of state authority; 
holding free and fair elections; security sector reform; and the implementation of 
various ECOWAS resolutions, protocols and plans in support of peace and security 
discussed above, particularly the 1998 Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons 
(United Nations Security Council 2004a, 2004c, 2003c, 2003d). 
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ECOWAS’ experiments with peacekeeping in internal conflicts and post-conflict 
arrangements have been the topic of widespread study and evaluation. They have not, 
however, benefited from significant theorising about the nature of regional 
peacekeeping. Few exceptions include the conceptualisation of West Africa’s ‘security 
complex’ or ‘regional conflict complex’ (Adebajo and Rashid 2004: 5; Pugh et al. 2004). 
It is therefore worth spending some time on the basis of this conceptualisation and 
assessing its applicability for West Africa. 
3.3. Theoretical perspectives of regional conflict and peace: 
regional security complex theory and its discontents 
In various works, Adebajo refers to West Africa’s ‘security complex’ (Adebajo 2004). 
Indeed, as the previous sections show, ECOWAS has made an explicit effort to reinvent 
itself as a regional security complex (RSC), stemming from its efforts to incorporate the 
lessons from its peacebuilding initiatives in the 1990s into institutionalised 
mechanisms for conflict management and peacebuilding. Regional security complexes 
may be distinguished from the system level interplay of the global powers, whose 
capabilities enable them to transcend distance, and the subsystem level interplay of 
lesser powers whose main security environment is their local region (Buzan and 
Wæver 2003). Buzan et al. (1998: 11) assert that the ‘normal pattern of security 
interdependence in a geographically diverse, anarchic international system is one of 
regionally based clusters’, which they label security complexes. They define an RSC as 
‘a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns or both are so 
interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or 
resolved apart from one another’ (ibid.: 12). The flip side of this are ‘regional conflict 
complexes’ – ‘transnational conflicts that form mutually reinforcing linkages with each 
other throughout a region, making for more protracted and obdurate conflicts’ (Pugh 
et al. 2004: 24–25).  
Related to ECOWAS’ approach is Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), which 
explicitly addresses the relationships at and between the national, regional and 
international levels. It is a blend of materialist (neoliberal) and constructivist 
approaches, with Buzan et al. explicitly referencing the latter, in that it focuses on the 
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political processes by which security issues get constituted, and considers processes of 
securitisation to be open and subject to influence by a host of factors (Buzan and 
Wæver 2003). In this conceptualisation, ‘[s]ecurity’ is . . . a self-referential practice, 
because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily 
because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a 
threat’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 25). Thus its proponents assert that the way to study 
securitisation is to study discourse, noting however that a discourse that takes the 
form of presenting something as an existential threat (an object or ideal that is 
potentially harmful) to a referent object represents a securitising move, whereas the 
issue is only securitised if and when its audience accepts it as such. They refer to this 
process of securitisation as a ‘speech act’ (ibid.: 26) and note the possibility of studying 
who can ‘do’ or ‘speak’ security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions 
and with what effects (ibid.: 27).  
There are several advantages of considering regional conflict and security complexes, 
not least because most other types of conflict analysis and responses are mostly 
concerned with ‘the bounded state’ (Pugh et al. 2004: 23). Interestingly, however, 
RSCT proponents do not consider entities such as ECOWAS as true RSCs but rather as 
proto-complexes, noting that few African regions have typical security complex-type 
threats wherein states can and do threaten others (Buzan 2007: 127). Also, in their 
view, the weak structures characterising most West African states make it difficult for 
them to constitute a permanent RSC, and the influence of outside powers in the region 
is sufficiently strong to suppress the normal operation of security dynamics among 
local states (Buzan et al. 1998). As demonstrated above, ECOWAS’ effort to recast itself 
has not been straightforward, possibly as a consequence of these issues. 
RSCT has its own share of criticism, however. These include its static view of a region 
as ‘a spatially coherent territory composed of two or more states’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 
18–19). In this context, a region is no more than ‘a world of multiple units’ (ibid.) and 
regionalism is only interesting with regard to the ways in which the security logic of 
security sectors may or may not incline towards regionalisation (ibid.). As such, the 
regional aspect of the framework is severely under-theorised, with the focus being 
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squarely on security – security situations, security connectedness and security 
dilemmas (Buzan et al. 1998).  
Indeed, I would argue for a stronger conceptualisation of ‘region’ in this framework, 
wherein regionalism is understood as ‘a multidimensional form of integration which 
includes economic, political, social and cultural aspects and thus goes far beyond the 
goal of creating region-based free trade regimes or security alliances’ (Hettne, quoted 
in Bach 2004: 69). As Bach notes, regionalisation may be ad hoc or institutionalised. 
This suggests a need to move away from traditional regime-centred security towards 
more people-centred approaches (Aning 2004) that place additional emphasis on the 
pluralistic and informal nature of contemporary regionalisation and enable and justify 
a focus on regional non-state actors, such as ex-combatants, whether as existential 
threats, securitising agents or indeed referent objects.  
The balance of this chapter thus focuses on the conceptualisation of ‘region’ in relation 
to this thesis. It draws extensively on ‘new regionalisms’ approaches, which emphasise 
the role of non-state actors such as combatants as elaborated in the previous chapter, 
alongside national, regional and international actors.  
3.4. Towards a ‘new regionalisms’ approach to regional security 
In West Africa, like most of Africa, the carving out of territory during the colonial 
period created artificially drawn borders and fractured common kinship groups into 
different countries. While the region’s individual governments strive for a modern 
conceptualisation of the nation-state – including well-defined, exclusionary borders – 
they do this against a backdrop of poorly patrolled frontiers, ethnic loyalties that 
straddle multiple dividing lines, contested border areas, conflict, and informal regional 
strategies for survival. Concurrently, these same governments are involved in an 
ambitious exercise of integration which, as discussed above, has developed from 
economic concerns to address security issues as well. 
Grant and Söderbaum (2003: 1) place the study of regionalism within the context of 
(constructivist) international relations (IR) and international political economy (IPE) 
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and argue that in the same way as state-centric notions have been transcended in IR 
and IPE, so must regionalism take on a new framework and focus less on formal and 
inter-state regional frameworks. They differentiate between regionalism and 
regionalisation: conventional regionalism is a generic, broad term, which refers to a 
general phenomenon. It can be considered as a set of objectives defined for a regional 
project aimed at establishing and preserving national and regional security in the 
broad sense (Bøås 2003). It relates to ‘the idea, ideology, politics and goals that seek to 
transform a geographical area into a clearly identified social space’ (Grant and 
Söderbaum 2003: 1) and speaks to the construction of an identity, driven by formal 
arrangements that are institutional or state-centric but does not take into account the 
dynamic reality of regionalisation, often driven by non-state actors. Indeed, 
regionalisation by contrast implies a dynamic element that ‘can occur unintentionally, 
without actors necessarily being conscious of or dedicated to regionalism’ (ibid: 7), and 
is driven by a host of factors. For analytical purposes, therefore, we are urged to 
‘separate between a formal type of regionalisation, which is led, supported and 
facilitated by states, and an informal variant of regionalisation, which is created by 
non-state actors and operates in the nexuses between formal and informal political 
economies’ (Bøås et al 1999, quoted in Bøås 2003: 35). 
In Africa particularly, the ‘state-society nexus is based on multiple actors that are 
linked together in hybrid networks and coalitions, together creating a wide range of 
complex regionalization patterns on the continent’ (Grant and Söderbaum 2003: 1). 
Grant and Söderbaum (2003) elaborate on a ‘new regionalisms8 approach’ (NRA) that 
places additional emphasis on the pluralistic and informal nature of contemporary 
regionalisation. The macro (or institutional and state level) is important, but micro 
factors, including civil society and other citizen-centred factors, are also relevant. In 
their view regionalism should be considered as a ‘heterogeneous, comprehensive, 
multi-dimensional phenomenon, taking place in several sectors and often “pushed” . . . 
by a variety of actors (state, market and society)’ (Bøås 2003). It takes a reflectivist 
                                                          
 
8
 This is variously referred to as New Regionalisms and the New Regionalism approach. Here I have 
purposely used New Regionalisms, to emphasise the multiplicity of actors and impetuses are at work in 
West African regionalism. 
53 
 
 
 
approach, which considers regions as social constructions (Söderbaum and Taylor 
2008a: 20). 
Grant and Söderbaum’s understanding of NRA makes allowance for the fact that not all 
regionalisation is automatically beneficial or positive – it may be ‘conflictual, 
exploitative, reinforce a particular power relation or create other negative effects’ 
(Grant and Söderbaum 2003: 6–7). For instance, parallel or illegal cross-border 
transactions are an important source of income for parties involved and can further 
regionalisation, but the benefits only accrue to a few, rob governments of much 
needed revenue, and they can become dangerous and destabilising (Francis, 2001) – 
the cross-border trafficking of small arms for instance is a case in point (Murithi 2005). 
Such regional networks of greed and plunder (MacLean 2003) find a natural home in 
areas of conflict, benefiting from, and in some cases driving, insecurity and violence 
(Bach 2003; Ihederu 2003). Ihederu concludes that on the one hand, new actors, 
institutions and other forms of regional interaction support neo-liberal agendas, but, 
on the other hand, pressures from below ‘undermine the ideological and practical 
basis of the state and free market liberalism and, consequently, the very architecture 
of an integrated regional polity and economy’ (2003: 51). 
These definitions allow that regionalisation can be built through patterns of interaction 
that challenge both state territorial control and regional policies. This is not always to 
the detriment of state-led processes, however. Bach (2003) acknowledges the 
potential complementarities that non-state regionalisation can provide to state-led 
approaches. For Bach (2003:23), ‘In Africa, regionalization is powerfully shaped by the 
strategies of state and non-state agents; the latter… can ‘contribute to consolidate and 
enhance state-centric patterns of regionalisation’. Accordingly, non-state actors, or 
‘regionalisation from below’, can ‘complement, substitute or subvert the state’ 
(Ihederu 2003: 47). This perspective thus allows that those interactions that challenge 
state territorial control and regional agendas can, at the same time, bring about 
increasing regionalisation. An example of this are cross-border [ethnic and 
commercial] networks that simultaneously integrate West African peoples and may 
generate new forms of cultural identity, while constituting serious threats to the state 
and the creation of a free market society (Iheduru 2003:65). 
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Like Bach (2003: 23), I hypothesise that in sub-Saharan Africa, regionalisation, and by 
extension the prospects for regional peace and security, is powerfully shaped by the 
strategies of both state and non-state agents. Moreover, this process necessitates an 
understanding of the motivations of those who carry out the day-to-day activities that 
indicate greater regionalisation – the individuals and groups that manifest informal 
regionalisation but are not really studied as such.  
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to this area of investigation, and allow a 
more nuanced look at regionalisation by non-state actors (in this case regional 
combatants), the efforts of regional governance and peacebuilding (including state, 
regional and international approaches) to mitigate these, and the extent to which 
these mitigation measures have understood the regionalisation imperatives and 
potentials of such non-state actors. In so doing, the thesis does not automatically 
assume that regional combatant movements comprise ‘negative regionalisation’ and 
efforts to contain them ‘positive regionalisation’.  
While there is much in the new regionalisms approach that this thesis subscribes to I 
must note some points of departure. One is its close association with neo-
patrimonialism (Söderbaum and Taylor 2008). Neo-patrimonialism is concerned with 
informalised state and political power and the distribution of scarce resources through 
patronage networks. It combines, to various degrees, ‘differentiation and lack of 
separation between public and private spheres… privatised extraction and 
redistribution along regional, ethnic and family lines. Power is personal, business is 
politics, the state is both simultaneously strong and weak’ (Bøås 2003:32). 
While this is one useful lens, such an approach in the African context has the danger of 
falling back into the trap of focusing on state-centred approaches in that even while it 
highlights the informal nature of the state, it may obscure a focus on those who fall 
between the cracks and who are not able to benefit from neo-patrimonial networks, 
even as they manoeuvre to take advantage of regional opportunities to overcome this 
lack of access.  
Further, as noted above, NRA is closely associated with an IPE approach. Consequently, 
studies of regional conflict using this framework tend to focus on the political economy 
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of conflict. This includes, again as noted above, increasing cross-border [micro]-
regional flows of licit and illicit goods and persons (Grant 2008). Such approaches refer 
to a ‘new geography of conflict… in which resource flows rather than political or 
ideological divisions constitute the major fault lines’ (Grant, 2008:114). 
As valid as these views are, they result in a framing that is primarily in economic and 
fiscal terms – so even as they critique conventional regionalism and formal processes, 
studies about the relationship between regionalisation and conflict may also limit the 
debate to a focus on the dividend of insecurity and violence. In these renderings, the 
primary actors are warlords and others able to take advantage of war economies and 
border porosity to pursue their agendas. Although in opposition to the state, often, 
they display similarly predatory antics that characterise the neo-patrimonial state. In a 
way, as with the neo-patrimonialism lens, these debates remain state-centric, albeit 
concerned about its failure or deinstitutionalisation (Bach, 2003: 29). In contrast, I am 
most interested in an analysis that genuinely considers ‘regionalisation from below’, or 
‘regionalisation from the bottom’, as it were – that is, from the perspectives of those 
who day to day carry out the activities that indicate greater regionalisation. This could 
include citizens of one country who farm, school and access healthcare and markets in 
neighbouring countries; individual farmers who sell their rice to communities across 
the border; or cattle traders who herd their cattle to the closest major market, without 
regard for whether that market is within their own, or a neighbouring, country’s 
borders, all activities I observed during my fieldwork (see Chapters 7). Or, in the case I 
am proposing, fighters who export the craft they learnt at home to neighbouring 
countries as opportunities arise. In this context, regional combatants could therefore 
be considered as pressures ‘from below’ who, through their transnational movement 
on the one hand exhibit hyper-regional interaction, but on the other hand undermine 
state-led regionalism projects that seemingly require regional peace and stability. 
As Chapter 7 demonstrates, this approach is usefully applied in the context of 
borderlands and micro-regions which, as Söderbaum and Taylor (2008: 13) note, are 
increasingly cross-border in nature.  Micro-regions ‘represent the degrees of agency 
that Africans operationalise on a day-to-day basis. They can represent diverse 
strategies that non-state players utilise to survive in a difficult world’ (Söderbaum and 
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Taylor 2008: 13)). Similarly, borderlands literature expands on the agency of 
‘borderlanders’ (Donnan and Wilson 2010) who have ‘designed a range of ‘borderland 
tactics’ to provide the security they need to keep their border communities alive and 
well (ibid.: 16), recognising that their borderlands have ‘social, political, economic, 
cultural and territorial meanings’ unto themselves (ibid.: 9). As such, the anthropology 
of borderlands ‘is an anthropology of nations and states, among other social and 
political entities, as they are experienced at local levels. These experiences are very 
often indicative of highly contentious areas of identity, sovereignty and security that 
are of daily significance in the borderlands, but also have import elsewhere’ (Donnan 
and Wilson 2010: 13), requiring ongoing investigation of the ways in which ‘nations 
and states, governments and NGOs, and political and civil society negotiate their 
arrangements with each other’ (ibid.).  
This chapter began with an overview of regional entities’ efforts to address the 
conflicts in the MRU region, which they construed as a threat to their efforts to 
formalise regional integration. Post-conflict, peace and security issues have continued 
to dominate their regionalist agendas, with some (limited) recognition of the 
importance of informal regionalisation processes. At the same time, however, they 
have ceded the bulk of peacebuilding efforts to the larger international community, 
particularly the United Nations. This necessitates an exploration of the underlying 
theories of these peace efforts, the topic of the next chapter, which also begins to 
discuss their implications for regional peacebuilding, before bringing together the 
strands of literature examined from Chapters 2 to 4 in a multi-layered framework 
within which the thesis is set.  
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4. International and regional peacebuilding in practice and 
theory 
As noted in previous chapters UN peace operations became the main driving force of 
consolidating peace in the MRU countries, which showcased the increasingly expansive 
character of peace operations. This chapter examines the evolution of international 
peacekeeping into multidimensional peacebuilding alongside its theoretical 
frameworks (Section 4.1), and in relation to attendant peace operations; its prospects 
for engendering regional security (Section 4.2), and critiques on the same (Section 4.3). 
This represents the third ‘leg’ of my multi-layered approach, and as such the chapter 
discusses new directions for peacebuilding theory and analysis, culminating in the 
framework that guides the remainder of this thesis (Section 4.4).  
4.1. From ‘traditional’ peacekeeping to ‘multidimensional’ 
peacebuilding 
The United Nations (UN) has primary responsibility for maintaining global peace and 
security, and ‘peacekeeping’ has become one of its primary instruments for achieving 
this goal. The UN derives its peacekeeping9 mandate from the UN Charter: Chapter VI 
outlines mechanisms for the ‘pacific settlement of disputes’, while Chapter VII provides 
for armed response, including ‘action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of 
the peace, and acts of aggression’ (article 42 of the UN Charter, (The United Nations 
1945)). 
During the Cold War period, however, the UN was severely constrained in fulfilling its 
key functions, as the opposing Cold War superpowers, the United States and the Soviet 
Union, played out their rivalry in the chambers of the UN Security Council as two of its 
five permanent members, responsible for authorising UN armed engagement.10 
Between 1948, when the first peace operation, the United Nations Truce Supervision 
Organization (UNTSO), was established in the Middle East, and the eve of the end of 
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 As observers like to note, the term ‘peacekeeping’ it does not appear in the UN Charter, and 
conceptually falls somewhere in between Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter.  
10
 Chapter VII of the UN Charter requires a resolution to be carried without a veto from the five 
permanent members of Security Council. 
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the Cold War in 1987, the UN undertook just 1311 peacekeeping missions (Boutros-
Ghali 1992).  
Riding on a wave of optimism resulting from the end of the Cold War, in 1992 the 
Security Council tasked Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali with reviewing the 
way in which the UN’s capacity for preventive diplomacy, peace-making and 
peacekeeping could be strengthened within the framework and provisions of the UN 
Charter (Boothby and D’Angelo 2004; Boutros-Ghali 1992). This resulted in the report 
titled An Agenda for Peace. It defined five central aims of international action to 
prevent or control conflicts: early warning and preventative diplomacy; peace-making 
to resolve issues that led to conflict; peacekeeping to preserve peace where fighting 
has halted and implement peace agreements; peacebuilding assistance through 
rebuilding institutions and infrastructures; and addressing the deepest causes of 
conflict – economic despair, social justice and political oppression (Boutros-Ghali 
1992). It also asserted that the time for ‘absolute and exclusive sovereignty’ (Boutros-
Ghali 1992: 4) had passed, recommended the utilisation of ‘peace enforcement units’ 
in clearly defined circumstances, and emphasised cooperation with regional 
arrangements, as referenced in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Security Council Report 
2006). 
In the mid-1990s, however, UN peace operations faced severe criticism, both internally 
and externally. Member States resisted the expanded notion of peacekeeping as 
detailed in An Agenda for Peace, which required a varied, multifaceted response, with 
complex interventions aimed at addressing the root causes of conflict, and included 
deployment in internal conflicts where non-state groups had no interest or 
commitment to the goals of the UN or its peacekeeping missions. The failed 
peacekeeping intervention in Somalia, resulting in the UN’s withdrawal in 1993 after 
the deaths of Pakistani and American troops, and the UN’s failure to prevent the 
Rwanda genocide in 1994, subjected the UN to further criticism. Furthermore, the 
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 In contrast, between 1988 and 2015, the UN undertook a further 54 operations; in 2016 there were 
16 active operations, more than there were during the entire Cold War period. 
59 
 
 
 
UN’s ‘preventive diplomacy’ approach appeared to be failing as conflicts continued to 
rage in numerous regions and countries, including Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
Partly in response, in 2000 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan commissioned a high-
level international panel on UN peace operations to review and recommend changes 
to UN peacekeeping. The resulting Brahimi Report, named after the chairman of the 
panel, has had a profound effect on the way UN peacekeeping has operated since. It 
initiated major reforms that have enabled the surge in UN peace operations and 
subsequent UN reform (United Nations 2012). A fundamental premise was ensuring 
that UN peacekeeping forces were fit for purpose, including, if necessary, capacity for 
military units to defend themselves, other mission components, and their mission’s 
mandates. The report tasked the Secretariat with developing robust doctrine, and the 
Security Council with ensuring realistic mandates. It further recommended 
strengthened capacity for information management and strategic analysis; improved 
mission guidance and leadership; rapid deployment capacity (30 days for traditional 
and 90 days for complex peacekeeping operations) and on-call expertise; enhanced 
Headquarters capacity to plan and support peace operations; the establishment of 
Integrated Task Forces for mission planning and support; and adapting missions to the 
information age. 
Since then, the core functions of UN multidimensional peacekeeping have been 
articulated in a key guidance text, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles 
and Guidelines, or the ‘Capstone Doctrine’, published in 2008. This document regards 
peacekeeping as ‘a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where 
fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the 
peacemakers’ (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008: 19). It also 
distinguishes between ‘traditional’ peacekeeping operations, which are deployed as an 
interim measure to help manage a conflict and create conditions in which the 
negotiation of a lasting settlement can proceed (ibid.: 21), and a new generation of 
‘multidimensional’ peacekeeping operations, which are ‘typically deployed in the 
dangerous aftermath of a violent internal conflict and may employ a mix of military, 
police and civilian capabilities to support the implementation of a comprehensive 
peace’ (ibid.: 22). Each of the peacekeeping operations in West Africa – UNAMSIL in 
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Sierra Leone, UNMIL in Liberia and UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire (and, since 2013, MINUSMA 
in Mali) – could be considered quintessential multidimensional operations, embodying 
most of the features that typify UN peace operations today. 
These reform efforts notwithstanding, numerous critiques of peace operations remain. 
These include the UN’s managerial approach, which prevents adequate 
conceptualisation of peace operations within international politics, resulting in a lack 
of engagement with systemic structural causes of conflict and a lack of understanding 
of what security would mean in a given context (Higate and Henry 2009). Despite 
demonstrating evolved thinking, reviews and resulting documents such as Agenda for 
Peace and the Brahimi Report did not put forward suggestions for new thinking about 
peace operations, even as critics questioned the ‘underlying norms, values and beliefs’ 
upon which peace operations were based (ibid.: 9). Chief among these norms was the 
idea that liberal democracy (with the ubiquitous ‘free and fair elections’) was the 
desired end state for post-conflict states, and in fact ‘a necessary prerequisite for 
achieving long-term peace and security’ (ibid.: 11). As such, peace operations 
uncritically initiate and reinforce the existing neoliberal order, and ‘the design and 
conduct of peacekeeping missions reflect not only the interests of key parties and 
perceived lessons of previous operations, but also the prevailing norms of global 
culture, which legitimize certain kinds of peacekeeping policies and delegitimize 
others’ (Paris 2003: 443, quoted in Higate and Henry 2009: 11). 
Other problems relate to the lack of a long-term perspective. As Chapter 8 will 
elaborate, despite longer-term missions, planning for peace operations within the UN 
system is predicated on short time frames (at most annual mandates) with rigid 
planning, budgeting and reporting deadlines. While this permits continuous, rigorous 
monitoring, at least in theory, in management terms it encourages ‘business as usual’. 
In an effective summary of associated shortcomings, Fortna notes: 
The problems with peacekeeping are legion. Peacekeeping missions are often thrown 
into conflicts when the great powers want to be seen as ‘doing something’ but do not 
really want to act. Mission mandates are often ambiguous, reflecting the lowest 
common denominator of agreement among sending states and among the belligerents 
themselves. Peace operations are usually improvised and ad hoc; they are too often 
planned at the last minute and are perennially understaffed, underfunded and 
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underequipped . . . Troop levels are based on what member states are willing to 
provide, not on a realistic assessment of need. (2008: 76) 
Fortna (2008) further argues that the literature on peacekeeping is surprisingly 
underdeveloped theoretically, with opponents dismissing peacekeeping as irrelevant, 
and proponents listing its functions and practices with ‘little discussion of how the 
presence of peacekeepers might influence the prospects for peace’ (2008: 2). She 
argues that ‘little theoretical work has been done to specify what peacekeepers do to 
help belligerents maintain a cease-fire, or how peacekeepers might shape the choices 
made by the peacekept about war and peace’ (ibid.). She further notes, ‘most existing 
studies of peacekeeping focus almost exclusively on the perspective of the 
peacekeepers or the international community. In the discussions of mandates, 
equipment and personnel, relations among national contingents or between the field 
and headquarters, and so on, it is easy to lose track of the fundamental fact that it is 
the belligerents themselves who ultimately make decisions about maintaining peace or 
resuming the fight’ (ibid.: 2–3). As such, she argues that ‘[o]nly by considering the 
perspective of the peacekept – their incentives, the information available to them, and 
their decision making – can we understand whether and how peacekeeping makes a 
difference’ (ibid.: 3). She concludes that our current understanding of peacekeeping 
suffers from three gaps: ‘we know too little about whether or how much peacekeepers 
contribute empirically to lasting peace, we lack a solid understanding of the causal 
mechanisms through which peacekeepers affect the stability of peace, and we know 
too little about the perspective of the peacekept on these matters’ (ibid.). These are all 
issues with which this thesis is concerned. 
Higate and Henry (2009) have similar concerns. While noting that peacekeeping theory 
and literature has provided a wealth of information and generated much debate about 
the relative success or failure of peacekeeping and how to make it more effective, 
including when and how to intervene and the legality of doing so, resourcing, 
operational and organisational issues, rules of engagement, conflict resolution, etc., it 
has done this ‘largely overlooking its social face’ (Higate and Henry 2009: 8). They are 
concerned that ‘[s]ociological, anthropological and post-structural approaches to 
peacekeeping remain underutilized at the expense of macro-level political science or 
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international relations theorizing’ (ibid.: 16) which precludes a necessary focus on the 
perspectives of host populations and those employed in missions. 
Doyle and Sambanis concur, noting that ‘peacekeeping can only be as credible as the 
peacekeepers’ mandate and resources, and effective peacekeeping must be able to 
adapt to the particularities of the civil wars they are sent to resolve’ (2006: 49). 
Further, ‘[w]ell-chosen strategies can maximize the available space for peace, whereas 
strategies that are poorly matched to the conflict at a particular time can reduce the 
space for peace’ (ibid.: 51). 
One of the most significant efforts to address some of the criticisms outlined above 
has involved the effort to consider UN post-conflict peacekeeping more holistically. 
One aspect of this has been the move away from the relatively narrow nomenclature 
of peacekeeping operations to ‘peace operations’, in explicit recognition of the fact 
that peacekeeping necessarily encompasses a much broader scope than envisioned at 
its genesis. The most recent review of UN Peacekeeping Operations was the 2015 
High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), headed by President José 
Ramos-Horta, which released a 111-page report containing over 100 
recommendations. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon subsequently distilled this into a 
report for the General Assembly and Security Council, outlining priorities for ‘peace 
operations.’ The report notes this term refers to ‘all field-based peace and security 
operations mandated or endorsed by the Security Council and/or the General 
Assembly, including peacekeeping operations and special political missions, as well as 
the envoys and regional offices’ and was deliberately used to ‘capture the holistic and 
tailored way in which United Nations peace and security tools must be used if we are 
to achieve better and more sustained effect’ (General Assembly, Security Council, 
2015: 3).12  The priorities included: pursuit of negotiated political settlements; 
                                                          
 
12
 The terms peacekeeping has mostly been used thus far in this thesis. This is because the operations 
have commonly been known as peacekeeping, even while it is recognised that multidimensional 
operations undertake a whole range of other activities, including peacebuilding. From this point, 
however, I will subscribe to the recent convention of referring to ‘peace operations’ to reference the 
spectrum of operations summarised above. Nonetheless, as the title of both the thesis and this chapter 
suggest and as the next few paragraphs elaborate, the thesis will be specifically concerned with the 
broader range of activities that fall under the umbrella peacebuilding, thus this term will be used 
explicitly, as contextualised below. 
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protection of civilians; tailored and appropriate responses; global–regional 
partnerships, including standing arrangements and procedures and burden sharing, 
especially with African countries; and renewed focus on prevention and mediation. 
Another aspect of this holistic approach has been the increased focus on 
‘peacebuilding’ in parallel with peace operations. The UN’s contemporary definition of 
peacebuilding involves  
a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by 
strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the 
foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding is a complex, long-
term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by 
addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive 
manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that [a]ffect the functioning of 
society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and 
legitimately carry out its core functions. (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
2008: 18) 
Also in 2015, the Secretary-General nominated an Advisory Group of Experts to review 
the peacebuilding architecture. The resulting Security Council resolution 2282 (2016) 
(United Nations Security Council 2016a) drew on the report to understand ‘sustaining 
peace’ as a goal and a process to build a common vision of a society, ensuring that the 
needs of all segments of the population are taken into account, which encompasses 
activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of 
conflict, addressing root causes, assisting parties to conflict to end hostilities, ensuring 
national reconciliation, and moving towards recovery, reconstruction and 
development (ibid: 1-2). It recognised peacebuilding as ‘an inherently political process 
aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, recurrence or continuation of conflict, 
and further recognizing that peacebuilding encompasses a wide range of political, 
developmental, and human rights programmes and mechanisms’ (ibid: 2).  
Of relevance to this thesis, accompanying the move towards peacebuilding is the 
articulated importance of a regional approach. Resolution 2282 further welcomed the 
contribution of peacekeeping operations and peacekeepers to peacebuilding and, 
among others, stressed the importance of partnership between the UN and relevant 
regional and sub-regional organisations ‘to improve cooperation and coordination in 
peacebuilding, to increase synergies and ensure the coherence and complementarity 
of such efforts’ (ibid: 6).  
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Regions have long been recognised as both a blessing and a curse for international 
peacebuilding efforts in domestic conflicts. An Agenda for Peace highlighted the 
potential roles for regional organisations in peace and security, and birthed the 
concept of a ‘regional-global security partnership’ (Security Council Report 2006: 2). 
Subsequently, the Brahimi Report highlighted ‘the significant cross-border effects by 
State and non-State actors’, which often rendered supposedly intra-State conflicts 
decidedly transnational in nature, and the importance of ‘active political, logistical 
and/or military support of . . . major regional powers to peace operations’ (Panel on 
United Nations Peace Operations 2000: 3). Subsequent to the report, the UN Security 
Council adopted resolution 1327 (2000) that included ‘the importance of cooperation 
with regional and sub-regional organisations from early stages in negotiations’ among 
others (United Nations Security Council 2000b). 
The UN Charter recognises the role of regional bodies in peace and security in Chapter 
VIII. This includes encouraging the development of pacific settlement of local disputes 
through regional arrangements or regional agencies, either on the initiative of the 
states concerned or by reference from the Security Council. Any action must, however, 
be subordinate to the United Nations. Indeed, the UN is increasingly engaged in joint 
ventures with regional organisations, ‘for reasons such as geographic proximity, 
expediency, burden-sharing and others’ (Artiñano 2012: 1). Africa has been a particular 
focus for regional cooperation with the UN, stemming from ECOWAS intervention 
discussed in the previous chapter. For instance, the Summit Outcome Document of 
September 2005 endorsed a ten-year capacity-building programme for the AU, and in 
September 2005, the Security Council adopted resolution 1625 on strengthening 
cooperation between the UN and regional organisations, which recognised the need to 
develop an effective partnership between the Council and the AU. In January 2012, the 
Council adopted resolution 2033 with particular emphasis on the AU, and encouraged 
‘the improvement of regular interaction, consultation and coordination, as 
appropriate, between the Council and the AU PSC’ (ibid.: 1). 
Recently, and up to the present, the AU (and its subsidiary sub-regional organisations) 
and the UN have cooperated in peace operations and peace negotiations in Burundi, 
Chad, Somalia, Darfur, Central African Republic, Mali and South Sudan. In Darfur, a 
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hybrid AU-UN force for Darfur (UNAMID) was established in December 2006, then a 
completely new idea in global peace operations, while the Security Council approved 
the establishment of the AU-led African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2012, 
which is supported by a UN special political mission, the UN Assistance Mission in 
Somalia (UNSOM); logistics for both are managed by United Nations Support Office for 
the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA). This collaborative approach has also 
been in evidence with the MRU countries, which in fact provided several precedents: 
in 1993, the Security Council established the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), 
which was the first time the UN co-deployed military observers with a peacekeeping 
operation established by another organisation, namely ECOWAS. In 2003, the 
ECOWAS/French peace operation in Côte d’Ivoire was the first of its kind to be 
endorsed by the UN Security Council as a Chapter VIII peacekeeping operation.  
These initiatives are not without their shortcomings, however. This includes the 
ongoing ad hoc nature of the arrangements, including for funding, especially given the 
typical lack of resources African regional organisations face regarding equipment, 
logistics and personnel (United Nations Security Council 2014b). In 1994 Secretary-
General Boutros-Ghali labelled the ‘new regionalism’ as a challenge, noting that 
regional entities could enhance the efficiency and the effectiveness of UN efforts for 
peace and further democratise the international system, but ‘the very features that 
make regional entities effective may also make regional involvement seem 
threatening. Those close to a problem and well equipped to handle it may also be too 
close to its living historical associations: in short, regional involvement may raise the 
old fears of regional hegemony and intervention’ (quoted in Henrikson 1996: 62). 
Nonetheless, it is clear that regional organisations are to have an increasing role in 
peacekeeping operations, as well as to restoring peace, security and stability, alongside 
the UN. 
Given the various gaps in peacekeeping practice and theory highlighted above, it is 
necessary to consider the extent to which peacebuilding theory and practice have 
anticipated and addressed the concerns. The following section elaborates on this, 
highlighting further gaps in the peacebuilding literature, before Section 4.3 articulates 
my framework, which aims to address some of these gaps. 
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4.2. Limitations of contemporary peacebuilding theory 
Thanks to early theorisers such as Galtung, it is widely recognised that peace is more 
than the ‘absence of violence, absence of war’ (Galtung 1964: 2), or an explanation of 
why a period of violence comes to an end. Heathershaw (2007: 19) argues that 
peacebuilding is ‘a contested concept which gains meaning as it is practiced’. He notes 
further that ‘it is a complex and ‘intersubjective process of change entailing the 
legitimation of new relationships of power’ (ibid., emphasis mine). He concludes that in 
a given peacebuilding environment, there are a ‘multiplicity of discourses at play’ 
(ibid.: 21) and that understanding these and their cultural context results in a richer 
understanding of peacebuilding. Critics argue, however, that built as it is on a ‘liberal 
peace’ thesis, contemporary peacebuilding ‘applies  a  standardised  liberal  social  
model  that  is  insensitive  to  local  contexts, disempowers local communities and in 
practice has delivered poor-quality outcomes characterised by superficial 
democratisation,  entrenched  corruption  and  worsening socio-economic inequalities’ 
(Selby 2013: 58, quoted in Leib 2016: 36). This thesis aims to interrogate this 
perspective, which resonates with the critiques elaborated on above and below. It 
aims to shed light on the various bottom-up and top-down discourses at play, similarly 
arguing that better understanding of these and their cultural (particularly in this case, 
regional) context would not only lead to better understanding but also better 
peacebuilding outcomes. 
A significant critique of contemporary peacebuilding theory and analysis is made by 
Autesserre (2010; 2014). She notes that most studies ‘usually develop large-scale 
analyses that afford little sense to how peacebuilding actually operates in the field’, 
focusing on macro-level variables while ignoring the micro-level (2010: 15). She notes 
that resulting analysis on peacebuilding failure tends to settle on two sets of 
explanations, based either on economic, political, legal, security or contextual 
constraints or vested economic, political, security, or institutional interests. Such 
explanations do not provide sufficient theoretical understanding of ‘whether, how, or 
why the existing constraints and interests lead international actors to prioritize certain 
peacebuilding strategies’ (Autesserre 2010: 16). She advocates for international 
interventions and their processes to be viewed through the lens of a ‘dominant 
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peacebuilding culture’ (ibid.: 22). In her study on Congo, she found that this culture 
accordingly shaped constraints and interests, as well as international understanding of 
violence and intervention (ibid.: 23). She focuses on peacebuilding actors in the field 
and their ‘shared cultural and normative understanding’ (ibid.: 26), which encourages 
them to adopt similar intervention strategies in a given situation. She shows ‘how the 
dominant peacebuilding culture constitutes specific actors . . ., identities . . ., interests 
. . ., and assumptions that are taken as truths’ and which together ‘define “legitimate 
or desirable goals” for the actors to pursue’, (ibid.: 30) authorising and enabling 
specific practices and policies while precluding others. She further notes that 
‘explaining how culture influences action in the field also requires a consideration of all 
the peacebuilders involved in a postwar setting’ (ibid.: 29, emphasis mine) from 
Security Council members all the way down to field-based peacebuilders.  
Autesserre presents a related thesis in Peaceland, which aims to explain why 
international peace interventions often fail to reach their full potential, although in this 
case she focuses almost exclusively on the ‘everyday’ of peacebuilding by field-based 
actors. She uses three concepts – practices, habits and narratives – and demonstrates 
how their application by peacebuilders enables ‘inefficient, ineffective and 
counterproductive elements to persist . . . even when intervenors know these modes 
of operation are inefficient and at times harmful’ (Autesserre 2014: 36), partly because 
they enable interveners to function in the field. She demonstrates further how the 
structure of inequality in the international peacebuilding system generates power 
asymmetries between external interveners and local stakeholders, and shapes the 
perceptions of local people (ibid.: 40). Their efforts are also harmful because they do 
not promote local ownership, thus decreasing the effectiveness of international 
efforts. These are perspectives that I find have currency in relation to regional 
peacebuilding. 
Autesserre builds on Sending, who asserts that peacebuilding suffers from a lack of 
respect for local ownership and insensitivity to local context, stemming from 
assumptions that ‘universal features and mechanisms of the liberal peacebuilding is 
more important than geographically specific knowledge’, which makes peacebuilders 
blind to local factors that are critical for peacebuilding (Sending 2009: 1). 
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Specifically in relation to addressing regional conflict, Ohanyan notes that theories 
have largely evolved to explain or assess peace operations and as such prioritise 
‘organizational levels of analysis’ instead of the ‘broader political underpinnings of 
conflict processes and intervention strategies’ (Ohanyan 2015: 2). Pugh et al. (2004) 
similarly argue that regional dimensions are poorly articulated in the political economy 
literature, with little attempt to incorporate the regional level in analyses of conflict 
and post-conflict transformation. Relatedly, Doyle and Sambanis (2006) observe that 
‘[a]n important gap in the literature is the lack of analysis of the links between 
international and internal war . . . to date, we do not have an integrated analysis of the 
regional dimensions of civil war, except in studies that analyze one type of war (i.e., 
either interstate or intrastate) while controlling for the occurrence of other types of 
war.’ While this has changed somewhat (earlier references to Hoffman (2007, 2011a, 
2011b) and Pugh et al. (2004) are cases in point), this remains an underdeveloped area 
of study. The result is potentially obscuring ‘the greater complexity and diversity of 
actors and interest groups’ (Ohanyan 2015: 5). Furthermore, a ‘statist model of 
delivery . . . [also] underestimates the interconnections across borders in the formal 
and particularly the informal economies that underpin many conflicts’ (Pugh et al. 
2004: 23). Pugh et al. note further that while regional dimensions are addressed at the 
level of ‘high politics in arranging cease-fires and peace settlements . . . the regional 
dimension . . . often seems to evaporate at the level of economic intervention and 
postconflict transformation’ (ibid.).  
Thus, although there has been significant theorising about why wars break out, their 
duration, and factors affecting their termination (as discussed to some extent in the 
previous chapter), our knowledge of the conditions that lead to successful 
peacebuilding, or the best ways to achieve post-conflict peace remains limited (Leib 
2016). The next section accordingly outlines the framework that aims to contribute to 
a better understanding of peacebuilding, using peacebuilding efforts to address cross-
border conflict as a case study. It is derived from the gaps identified immediately 
above as well as the two preceding chapters, in relation to combatant motivations, 
new regionalisms and regional peacebuilding. 
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4.3. My conceptual framework: towards a regional 
peacebuilding theory 
My central research question, posed in Chapter 1, is: Why were international 
peacebuilding efforts ineffective in addressing the phenomenon of regional 
combatants, which contributed to the spread of regional conflict in the Mano River 
Union sub-region of West Africa?  
This question is asked in the context of the spread of conflict from Liberia to Sierra 
Leone in 1991; the participation of Sierra Leonean combatants in Liberia’s resumed 
conflict in 2001; Liberian and Sierra Leonean combatants’ participation in Côte 
d’Ivoire’s conflict from 2002; and Liberian fighters’ participation in the Ivoirian 2010–
2011 post-election violence. The previous chapters have demonstrated the limitations 
of prevailing ex-combatant, regional security and international peacebuilding 
approaches in addressing this question. Particularly, peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
theory are often critiqued for not taking into consideration the perspectives of the 
‘peacekept’ (Fortna 2008: 2) as well as the practices of on-the-ground peacebuilders 
(Autesserre 2014). While there has been a lot of research and resulting literature on 
the micro-level, including on ex-combatants as demonstrated in Chapter 2, this has 
mostly been in relation to the causes-of-war literature or conflict termination; few try 
to put this in the context of peacebuilding theory (indeed, the few exceptions include 
Fortna 2008).  
In relation to peacekeeping and peacebuilding practices, researchers have mostly 
focused on the organisational aspects of mandate-making at Security Council level, 
including when and how to deploy, logistical and human capital capacities, and so on. 
Welcome exceptions to such studies include Higate and Henry (2009) and Autesserre 
(2014) but even these focus almost exclusively on one set of actors – on-the-ground 
peacebuilders. Yet, even as Autesserre aims to justify a focus on ‘field-based 
interveners’ (Autesserre 2014: 39) she observes that their actions are based on 
‘[i]nstructions from the top’ (ibid.: 25), albeit interpreted and translated for the local 
context; that ‘local leaders of peacekeeping operations must translate any new 
mandate they receive into a series of concrete tasks for implementation’ (ibid.); and 
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she asserts that there is a ‘wide divide’ (ibid.: 26) between capitals and field offices and 
different priorities, as well as understandings of and potential solutions to problems. 
This suggests the significance of considering the spectrum of peacebuilders, from 
decision-makers at headquarters, to the interpreters of these decisions in host country 
capital cities, to field-based implementers. Further, in relation to regional dimensions, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding theories have remained largely state-centric even 
when, as Ohanyan (2015) observes, conflicts have an overtly regional dimension. 
In order to address these shortcomings and address my question, I propose a research 
agenda that advances the following three themes and related concepts:  
(i) Regional conflict as a function of the perspectives of the ‘peacekept’, in this 
case socially constructed combatant motivations. As Chapter 2 
demonstrated, former combatants’ multifaceted motivations, strategies 
and tactics require further interrogation and proper understanding by 
peacebuilders, in order to effectively address them. 
(ii) A consideration of the evolving historical, political, economic and social 
dynamics of regional conflict, in line with new regionalisms approaches, 
which provide the context for unpacking combatant motivations and 
peacebuilding practice. 
(iii) A concern with the everyday of peacebuilding, focusing on the practices of 
peacebuilders along the peacebuilding spectrum, from headquarters to the 
field.  
Of course, expanding the focus along the length and breadth of peace operations (that 
is to include the peacekept and the peacekeepers, as well as across the spectrum of 
peacebuilders) is rife with conceptual and methodological complexity. I have tried to 
manage this by introducing some delimitations. First is the choice to focus mainly on 
one group of the peace-kept, that is regional combatants, for reasons discussed in 
Chapter 2. Secondly, I focus one group of peacekeepers, albeit the largest one, the 
United Nations, although the discussion that follows will also consider its influence on 
sub-regional and national initiatives.  
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Two concepts highlighted above, motivations and practices, also require further 
elaboration. These are heavily informed by Alden et al.’s multi-layered framework of 
analysis for understanding and contextualising militias (2011: 20); Nilsson’s analytical 
framework to address why some ex-combatants return to violence (2008: 12–17); and 
Autesserre’s framework for investigating the everyday politics of international 
intervention and its impacts (2014: 24–35), in turn influenced by Adler and Pouliot 
(2011). 
My understanding of combatant motivations begins with the premise that they are 
multifaceted and socially constructed by ‘lucid, rational actors operating within the 
international system’ (Alden et al. 2011: 28). As rationality is socially constructed, 
actors’ interests and behaviour are subject to socializing norms and thus subject to 
change; thus ‘it is important to conceptualize motivations along a continuum, and . . . 
emphasize . . . that motivations are not only fluid but also can evolve based on the 
contextual realities of a specific locale and period’ (ibid.).  
As such, I hypothesise that regional combatants ‘employ a number of strategies to 
achieve their particularistic motivations . . . [including] manipulations of identity, and 
partnerships based on expediency and mutual economic benefit and that the 
strategies they employ depend on the target of persuasion (i.e. the government, 
international community, local population) and the characteristic or message they 
wish to convey through their strategies (e.g. to exert power, show resolve, foster 
trustworthiness)’ (ibid.: 29–30). Further, ‘[m]ilitias apply a set of ideas, beliefs, values 
and narratives to improve their internal legitimacy and accountability’ (ibid.: 32). 
Especially in a micro-regional context, they are likely to politicise identity-based 
cleavages variously to seek protection and support from local communities, and to 
create a social-psychological sense of unity both within the group and with other 
groups. 
From the literature reviewed in this chapter, we may also hypothesise that 
peacebuilding practice is unable to accurately ‘read’ this social construction of 
combatant motivations. This is because peacebuilding practices are uncritical, 
technocratic, top-down, cookie-cutter approaches, often working within short 
timeframes, focused on results-based indicators (Benner et al. 2011). They also have 
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typically over-ambitious agendas that pay scant attention to local contexts, and largely 
ignore institutional gaps both among peacebuilders and within the host country (Alden 
et al. 2011). Such approaches do little to address the root causes and subsequent 
factors for conflict, and can themselves foster ex-combatant re-marginalisation and 
remobilisation (Nilsson 2008). 
Here, the notion of ‘practice’ (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 7–8; also Autesserre 2014: 30–
31) may be considered as (i) a performance, i.e. a ‘process of doing something’; (ii) 
patterned – regularised over time and space; (iii) ‘competent in a socially meaningful 
and recognizable way’ (‘groups of individuals tend to interpret its performance along 
similar standards);’ (iv) resting on ‘background knowledge;’ and (iv) weaving ‘together 
material and discursive worlds,’ representing preferences and policies using a variety 
of materials (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 7–8). This elaboration again highlights the 
importance of narratives, but also hints at how regularised practices are norm-forming 
to the extent of limiting critical self-reflection. 
Further, this thesis is concerned with the effectiveness of peacebuilding practice. It 
borrows from definitions of organisational effectiveness, wherein definitions refer to 
the extent to which organisations are able to meet their stated objectives, and ‘the 
means through which they sustain themselves and attain their objectives, particularly 
those means that . . . come to assume the character of and function as organizational 
goals’ (Georgopoulos and Tannenbaum 1957: 535). These are discussed in Chapters 8 
to 10 in relation to border stabilisation objectives. For the purposes of this study, 
effectiveness also refers to the extent to which peacebuilding practice is able to 
address regional combatants’ motivations, which is expanded on in Chapters 6 and 7.  
Of importance also is the nexus of inter-subjective understandings that the 
motivations of the combatants bring to bear on the practices of the peacebuilders and 
vice versa, and the ways in which these are mediated by the regional dimension. By 
inter-subjective understandings, I mean that the identities and interests (or 
motivations) of regional ex-combatants and peacebuilders are endogenous to their 
interaction: the way they act towards one another is based on the meanings they 
ascribe to each other’s actions (Wendt 1992).  
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Further, an analysis of the regional dimension that is mediated by the new 
regionalisms approach elaborated on in Chapter 3 is critical in this context as it also 
highlights inter-subjective understandings, and the social construction of ‘region’, 
Further, it demands an exploration of contemporary forms of transnational 
cooperation and cross-border flows through ‘comparative, historical and multilevel 
perspectives (Schulz et al. 2001: 235), an approach that is particularly relevant to the 
subject. 
The framework is shown pictorially in Figure 1 below, which is based on Wendt’s 
‘Codetermination of institutions and process’ model (Wendt 1992: 406). In this 
framework, however, we are concerned with agents – combatants and peacebuilders – 
as much as their institutions and as such in the model they have ‘equal ontological 
status’ (Wendt 1987: 339). In addition to enabling us to consider them as ‘“co-
determined” or “mutually constituted”’ (ibid.) it also takes cognisance of the fact that 
it is ‘human action [that] instantiates, reproduces, and transforms . . . structures’ (ibid: 
345). It should be noted, and as will be apparent through the course of the discussion, 
that both sets of actors face constraints and opportunities, within a context of highly 
asymmetric power relations that operate at several levels both within and across their 
structures. This includes between the peacekept, including ex-combatants, and 
peacebuilders, as well as within peace operations themselves (for instance, between 
on-the-ground peacebuilders and headquarters). 
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Figure 1: A constructivist model of the regional peacebuilding process (based on Wendt 
1992: 406) 
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It should be reiterated that this thesis sits within the field of constructivist 
International Relations – that is, the social construction of international politics and 
structures. What this means is helpfully summarised by Jackson and Sørensen as: (i) 
international relations consisting of thoughts and ideas rather than simply material 
conditions or forces; (ii) the core ideational elements upon which to focus are the 
inter-subjective beliefs (ideas, conceptions, assumptions, etc.) that are widely shared 
among people; (iii) shared beliefs that compose and express the interests and 
identities of people; and (iv) a focus on the ways in which those relations are formed 
and expressed (Jackson and Sørensen 2003: 254).  
Accordingly, ‘the business of research [is] that of entering into the world of the people 
under study, scrutinizing their reasoning and language, exposing their assumptions and 
beliefs and showing how that conditions and shapes their behaviour’ (ibid.). In this 
context, and recalling the contribution of regional security complex theory in Chapter 
3, conflict results from disagreement, dispute, misunderstanding or lack of 
communication between conscious agents, and a proper reading of the conflict 
requires inquiry into ‘the discourses at play’ (ibid.: 257). 
Important also for this thesis is the relation of discourse to practice. As Foucault 
observes, discourses are ‘practices that systematically form the objects of which they 
speak . . . constitute them and in the practice of doing so conceal their own invention’ 
(Foucault 1977: 49). Narratives, as a particular form of discourse, are also important. 
Narratives are ‘technologies of the self’ – cultural practices we use to express, explain 
and validate ourselves and our lives (ibid.). They are also socially constructed over time 
(Autesserre 2014). In other words, narratives ‘attempt to explain or normalize what 
has occurred; they lay out why things are the way they are or have become the way 
they are’ (Bamberg 2010: 6). This, however, means that these narratives are open to 
misinterpretation for, as Foucault observes, narratives are ‘fragments and it is up to 
you or me to see what we can make of them’ (Foucault 1980: 79). Thus, narratives 
around ‘ex-combatant’, ‘mercenary’, ‘DDR’, ‘peacekeeping’, and ‘peacebuilding’ should 
not be taken as given but rather as socially constructed over time, to explain, to 
normalise, justify or indeed vilify. Similarly, I subscribe to a constructivist 
understanding of power in this context to be both material and discursive. 
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Against this backdrop I conclude this chapter by revisiting my research sub-questions, 
with corresponding propositions, which informed the rest of the thesis: 
Q1: What are regional combatants’ motivations for moving to participate in 
neighbouring countries’ conflicts? 
Proposition 1: A range of inter-related motivations are responsible for combatants’ 
participation in regional conflict, which are consolidated by particular narratives, 
strategies and tactics, and mediated by regional dynamics (Chapter 6 and 7). 
Q2: To what extent do peace operations and on-the-ground peacebuilders take into 
consideration these motivations when developing peacebuilding and regional 
stabilization strategies? What limits them from effectively considering these 
motivations? 
Proposition 2: Peacebuilders are constrained from adequately understanding regional 
combatant motivations as a result of adherence to dominant peacebuilding culture, 
prevailing discourses and ritualized practices, which limits effective engagement with 
combatant narratives and enables inefficient and ineffective modes of operation 
(Autesserre 2014: 5, 7) (Chapters 8 and 9). 
Q3: To what extent have resulting strategies been effective in promoting regional 
peacebuilding? 
Proposition 3: Peacebuilders are constrained from effectively responding to regional 
insecurity because of this adherence to culture, narratives and practices, and limited 
engagement with regional dynamics of conflict, with adverse implications for long-
term regional peacebuilding (Chapters 9 and 10). 
These questions and propositions guided my research design and data collection 
methods, as elaborated in the next chapter, and will be tackled as indicated above in 
empirical chapters 6 to 10. 
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5. Research design and methods 
The preceding chapters have variously highlighted the importance for regional 
peacebuilding of understanding the motivations and perspectives of non-state actors, 
holistically considering the regional dimension, and taking into account the ‘everyday’ 
practice across the spectrum of peacebuilding actors, with the previous chapter 
elaborating on the framework to analyse these issues. Against this backdrop, Section 
5.1 discusses my research design and elaborates on the research methodology – 
institutional ethnography and non-representative survey, respectively. Section 5.2 
discusses the choice of study sites and my experience in the field. Section 5.3 considers 
my positionality, given my dual role as a researcher and a UN staff member throughout 
most of the fieldwork and writing-up phase, and elaborates on my efforts to address 
this potential ethical dilemma. Section 5.4 concludes the chapter with a summary of 
my analytical methods. 
5.1. Research methodology 
The main imperative driving my research design was the determination that I wanted 
to research agents at opposite ends of the peacebuilding spectrum – that is, regional 
ex-combatants and international (UN) peacebuilders – in a holistic manner. This is not 
least because, as Richards (2005a) argues, ‘[t]heories of “new wars” have stripped 
violent conflict of its social content’ (2005a: 17). He further admonishes that ‘only by 
stepping up close will the complex intertwining of multiple motivations become 
tractable to analysis’ (ibid.: 11). Therefore, a large part of my study was about 
‘stepping up close’ – not just to the perpetrators of conflict but also to those whose job 
it is to try and end conflict. Of importance also was the idea that ‘the political world, 
including international relations, is created and constituted entirely by people. Nothing 
social exists outside of that human activity or independent of it’ (Jackson and Sørensen 
2003: 258).  
These considerations greatly informed my choice of methods, but I should also note 
that the course of my fieldwork itself greatly informed the eventual research methods 
applied. I commenced my fieldwork with a preliminary visit to Liberia from May to 
June 2010, but the bulk of my fieldwork took place over three months from February 
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to April 2012, and two further years from August 2012 to July 2014, followed by some 
residual activities from August 2014 to February 2015 and again from July 2015 to 
September 2016. For most of the period from August 2012, I was also working for the 
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Originally my appointment was only meant 
to provide me with a means of income while ‘in the field’, but it resulted in a 
substantive deviation from my initial research plan, especially given that it enabled me 
to undertake an in-depth study of regional peacebuilding approaches in situ. 
My original research plan, presented and submitted for ethical approval in late 2010 
following the preliminary visit, envisioned that my study would have both qualitative 
and quantitative elements, aimed primarily at uncovering regional ex-combatants’ 
movement and settlement motivations. The quantitative element was to include a 
structured questionnaire to build up a profile of ex-combatants, the characteristics of 
their community of origin and armed groups, and their post-conflict reintegration and 
settlement choices. The qualitative element was to uncover perceptions of DDR and 
reasons for settling in particular communities. I then planned to discuss the 
implications of these findings on regional peacebuilding. 
After my first visit to Liberia in 2012, two things became very clear: (1) I lacked and was 
unlikely to raise the necessary funds for a large-scale study on regional ex-combatants, 
and (2) whereas previous such studies had had a ready sampling pool and strategies 
based on DDR lists, the group I was interested in was essentially a hidden population, 
rendering random sampling procedures null and void. Even the strategy I had thought 
to use – respondent-driven sampling – upon closer scrutiny proved untenable, and 
would in no way have returned a sample that I could have defended as 
‘representative’. Also, when I conceived of the research, I had thought that I was 
dealing with a population that was at least bounded by the end of conflicts in Sierra 
Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire in 2002, 2003 and 2007, respectively. This proved not 
to be the case, however, when electoral violence erupted in Côte d’Ivoire following 
presidential elections in October–November 2010. An estimated 4,500 Liberians 
participated militarily (Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire 2011b), and some 225,000 
Ivoirian refugees fled to Liberia and settled in host communities and refugee camps 
along the Ivoirian–Liberian border, among them an unknown number of (former) 
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Ivoirian and Liberian militias. The willing participation of such a large number of 
Liberian ex-combatants in the conflict made me realise that my research project 
remained extremely relevant, and that it would be necessary to capture not only the 
motivations of those individuals who participated but also to strive to understand how 
regional participation in domestic conflict was taking place under the watchful eye of 
not one but two UN peacekeeping missions in both Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire (as well as 
a significant UN successor presence in Sierra Leone), especially following 
comprehensive DDR programmes, at least in Sierra Leone and Liberia, and given the 
apparent wealth of experience of international peace operations in the sub-region. 
This included sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS and MRU, which, as noted in 
Chapter 3, had instituted a range of strategies and frameworks to address insecurity 
and build peace in the sub-region following the conflicts in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
As such, it became clear that ‘my’ ex-combatants would need to share centre stage 
with the peacebuilders charged with securing a lasting peace in the sub-region (but 
who, at least to some extent, were failing to do so). It also brought to the fore the 
concerns of the new regionalisms approach, as borders, especially between Liberia and 
Côte d’Ivoire, became a transnational or micro-regional locus of insecurity, and 
essentially a case study for how to not to do regional peacebuilding.  
I therefore decided on a two-track approach. The first involved an element of my 
original research – an effort to assemble the range of perspectives of regional ex-
combatants regarding their motivations for fighting, their experience of DDR, their 
motivations for moving to fight, and their current prospects, extending my focus to 
recently remobilised Liberian fighters from the 2010–2011 electoral crisis. 
Concurrently, I decided to analyse UN and regional peacebuilding efforts, seeking to 
identify whether the two perspectives could meet in the middle, or indeed what 
prevented them from doing so.  
To this end, while it threw up all sorts of ethical dilemmas, I was extremely fortunate 
to secure a position with UNMIL, fortuitously working on vulnerable youth (ex-
combatants by another name in common Liberian parlance) as well as cross-border 
stabilisation. While most constructivists (or the anthropologists among them in any 
case!) would advocate an ethnographical approach for understanding ex-combatant 
80 
 
 
 
motivations, given my positionality, I decided to apply this approach instead to my 
study of peacebuilders. At the same time, even though I did not want to apply a 
quantitative survey instrument, I decided to apply a systematic approach to the study 
of ex-combatants, which took the form of in-depth interviews. My research 
methodologies thus evolved into a combination o ‘institutional ethnography’ to study 
peacebuilding institutions, and a ‘non-representative survey’ to study ex-combatants. 
5.1.1. Institutional ethnography 
Institutional ethnography (IE) was originally developed by Dorothy E. Smith as a 
methodological realisation of a Marxist feminist sociology project (Smith 2002). 
According to DeVault, ‘[i]nstitutional ethnographies are built from the examination of 
work processes and study of how they are coordinated . . . Work activities are taken as 
the fundamental grounding of social life, and an institutional ethnography generally 
takes some particular experience (and associated work processes) as a point of entry’ 
(DeVault 2006: 294). 
IE permits an examination into how people are drawn into a common set of 
organisational processes (Gubrium and Holstein 2001). It seeks to explore how 
people’s lives are socially controlled, and how individuals are bound to institutional 
activity without their knowledge. As with other types of ethnography, IE is an 
investigation of social organisation concerned with and situated in ordinary daily 
activity and a method by which to explore the social relations13 that structure everyday 
life.  
IE is generally concerned with the extra-local and trans-local influences on people’s 
social activities within institutions, which are thought to be increasingly replacing 
social organisation with ‘technologies of social control’ (DeVault 2006: 6). DeVault 
(2006) describes these technologies as discursive by nature, and Smith refers to them 
as ‘exogenous systems of rationally designed textually-mediated forms of organisation’ 
(Smith 2002: 39). Indeed, text plays a critical role, and as such it is ‘a method of inquiry 
that problematizes social relations at the local site of lived experience and examines 
                                                          
 
13 The term ‘social relations’ is taken in its Marxist sense to mean connections made 
between people through activity, rather than relationships. 
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how textual sequences coordinate consciousness and ruling relations’ (Walby 2007: 
1008). 
This extra-local discourse acts as a mutual point of reference in the local context, even 
as the authors of external discourse/text transcend the local historical context (Luken 
and Vaughan 2014). At local levels people use this external discourse to coordinate 
and rationalise their activity and enter into local discourse with others who do the 
same. Thus, the uniqueness of individual experiences and perspectives appear to be 
overridden by these forms of social organisation (institutions) that generalise and 
objectify through discourse (reading, talking or acting), initiated by the standardised 
and replicable form of extra-local text. The aim is to unravel the interconnectedness of 
activities in different sites, as well as to learn about the individual’s location in the 
relations of ruling or to learn what the individual does with texts (Walby 2007).  
For the purpose of this thesis, and the fieldwork undertaken, it should also be recalled 
that IE involves sampling institutional processes (in this case regional peacebuilding 
processes) and social relations, rather than a population (Smith 2002: 26). As Smith 
explains: ‘institutional ethnographers are not using people’s experiences as a basis for 
making statements about them, about the population of individuals, or about events 
or states of affairs described from the point of view of individuals’ (Smith 2005: 125). 
Smith’s contribution has been ‘to discover how ideas, legitimated through coordinated 
discourses, organize knowledge and action’ (Smith and Turner 2014: 261) in everyday 
life. But she also recognises that people’s lived experiences are organized by processes 
that ‘extend outside the scope of the everyday world and are not discoverable within 
it’ (Smith 1987: 178).  
This is particularly pertinent for this thesis, which explores how extra-local UN policy 
(largely embodied in texts, as is common with most large bureaucracies) and the 
resulting practice (as defined in the previous chapter) mediate social relations with 
regard to regional peacebuilding vis-à-vis their day-to-day interpretation, adaptation or 
indeed abandonment on the ground, and how this interacts with the narratives and 
discourses of target beneficiaries, in this case ex-combatants. Thus, I seek to 
understand how peacebuilders’ daily practice is shaped by (and indeed shapes) extra-
local discourses derived from official texts. 
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In my methodology, I used the range of institutional ethnography tools, primarily 
textual analysis, but also interviews and participant-observation to analyse and 
illustrate how people’s lived experiences are organised by, and in turn shape to the 
extent possible, processes beyond their everyday. For the textual analysis, I limited 
myself to publicly available documents for the most part. Apart from ethical concerns 
(see below), I was interested in dominant narratives and discourses, and documents in 
the public domain are indicative of the collective acceptance of a prevailing narrative 
related to an official approach or strategy. These documents include Security Council 
and General Assembly resolutions and documents concerning peace operations, 
reports of the UN Secretary-General, UN Headquarters’ assessment reports, and 
Panels of Experts reports, among others.  
As may be expected, participant-observation also featured heavily in my research. This 
included participation in internal and cross-UN mission policymaking and cooperation 
on cross-border stabilisation; involvement in developing and implementing sub-
regional cross-border security strategies; and countless meetings with regional 
peacebuilding institutions, including Liberian Government ministries and agencies, 
MRU, ECOWAS, international and national NGOs, and specialised agencies of the UN, 
among others. The research also drew directly and indirectly on statements and 
observations made in public gatherings by government officials, employees of non-
governmental organisations, academics and other stakeholders involved in regional 
peacebuilding practice throughout the conduct of this study. I further conducted 
formal, semi-formal and informal interviews, and held innumerable conversations with 
representatives of these institutions. Table A2.1 in Annex 2 provides a summary of 
formal and semi-formal interviews conducted.  
5.1.2. Studying ex-combatant narratives: a non-representative survey method 
As noted in Chapter 2, research on the motivations of combatants in both Sierra Leone 
and Liberia has benefited from a variety of methodological approaches. This includes 
ethnographic studies in the vein of Utas (2003), large-scale surveys, including, notably, 
Humphrey and Weinstein’s (2004) random sampling strategy with Sierra Leonean ex-
combatants, and the respondent-driven sampling method employed by Bøås and 
Hatløy (2008) in Monrovia. Several anthropological studies have also considered 
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motivations in the two countries in tandem (Hoffman 2011a; Richards 2005; Ferme 
and Hoffman 2004). These varied approaches have yielded a rich body of data, 
demonstrating the relevance of different approaches in studying this complex subject. 
While an ethnographic approach to studying regional combatants inherently appealed 
to me, I realised that this would likely only allow me to follow one group/cohort, 
whereas I was interested in a cross-section of ex-combatants – Sierra Leoneans, 
Liberians, Ivoirians; urban and rural residents; ‘first generation’ movers and more 
recent participants in cross-border conflict; and so on. The survey method would have 
been perhaps more appropriate but I did not have hypotheses to try and ‘prove’ but 
rather guiding propositions. Furthermore, as mentioned above, I did not have any 
reasonable expectation of estimating my sampling frame given the fluid nature of the 
population I was dealing with. This latter point speaks to a wider limitation of the 
survey method in this type of study, as firstly, sampling and data collection relies on 
within-borders population frames, and secondly, standard statistical analyses may not 
be able to adequately capture important motivations to do with the social connections 
that occur in fluid border areas. 
I thus chose a hybrid approach – using a survey-instrument style questionnaire (which 
would enable me to situate my ‘data’ within actual large-scale surveys) but 
administering it in an in-depth interview format, to enable me to get the information, 
especially in relation to narrative analysis, required for the type of analysis I was after 
(see Annex 3 for the questionnaire, information sheet and consent form). 
Notwithstanding, I understood my work would have several limitations – including that 
I would not be able to draw generalisable conclusions. I was reasonably confident, 
however, that I might be able to compile enough data to interrogate the proposition of 
myriad motivations, and the narratives developed to support them. 
As I was concerned with narratives, I viewed my interviewees’ responses as 
performative acts; thus I was as concerned with what they wanted to emphasise, as 
with what I wanted to ‘objectively’ know, which allowed me not to get too hung up 
about whether I was getting the ‘right’ information or the ‘truth’ but rather accounted 
for these by building in cross-checks for certain questions (for instance asking the same 
question in different ways). 
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In terms of actual methodology, in-depth interviews were conducted with 53 ex-
combatants, although for most of the analysis data from 50 interviews – 25 in 
Monrovia and 25 in Grand Gedeh County – were used for consistency. I also undertook 
six formal focus group discussions (FGDs): one exclusively with ex-combatants in 
Monrovia; two with a mixed group of ex-combatants and community youth, also in 
Monrovia; two with mixed group of former combatants and refugees/former refugees, 
just outside Monrovia (Sierra Leoneans) and in Grand Gedeh (Liberians/Ivoirians); and 
one with ex-combatants and miners in a mining community in Gbarpolu, bordering 
Sierra Leone. In a nod to the ethnographic approach, I further engaged in extensive 
participant-observation and informal group discussions with ex-combatants and mixed 
groups similar to those with whom I conducted FGDs. Taking advantage of work trips I 
was also able to engage extensively with refugees residing in various communities in 
Nimba County (November 2012), in PTP Camp in Grand Gedeh (April 2013) and in Little 
Wlebo Camp in Maryland County (November 2013 and February 2016) (See Table A2.2 
in Annex 2 for a summary of combatant-related interviews and FGDs). While I engaged 
some female ex-combatants, none that I came across had been active in cross-border 
conflict so females are unfortunately not represented in my sample. I did, however, 
have informal conversations with pro-Gbagbo female refugees in camps and host 
communities in Grand Gedeh and Maryland counties, as well as with Sierra Leonean 
females accompanying ex-combatants, who had opted for community resettlement in 
Liberia. These conversations helped me to gain a gendered perspective on the regional 
dimensions of conflict, but not enough to substantially inform my analysis and 
subsequent discussion.  
5.1.3. A note on focus group discussions 
FGDs are considered to sit somewhere in between participant observation and 
individual interviews. In keeping with Morgan (1997), I did not draw a distinction 
between formal group interviews and more informal group gatherings and instead 
used a range of settings based on what seemed most appropriate in a given setting. 
For instance, in March 2012, I engaged in focus group discussion with a small group of 
ex-combatant and community youth near ELWA junction in Monrovia. This was quite 
impromptu, took the form of an informal discussion in a drinking circle on an 
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outcropping near the beach, and consisted of me throwing in questions from time to 
time but it mostly consisted of a free-flowing discussion about a range of topics. In 
contrast, on 21April 2013, I held a highly structured focus group discussion with 
regional ex-combatant and non-combatant youth at West Point. The setting was at a 
Youth Intellectual Forum, and I was asked to propose the issue for discussion (‘Conflict 
and regional security in post-conflict West Africa’), which was publicised in advance. 
On the day itself, a moderator introduced me and the topic, admonished participants 
to speak openly and freely, and then handed me the floor.  
As different as these, and my other focus group settings were, they each yielded a 
wealth of information that not only greatly informed my analysis but also emphasised 
the social construction of motivations and inter-subjective understandings of regional 
peace and security. This is because with FGDs group interaction is an explicit part of 
the method (Berg 2008), with the group dynamic and interactive nature resulting in a 
synergy that places greater emphasis on participants’ viewpoints. As such, not only 
does it ‘reflect collective notions shared and negotiated by the group’ (ibid: 178) but 
an FGD may also emphasise those narratives that collectively carry more weight, and 
‘the comparisons that participants make among each others’ experiences and opinions 
are a valuable source of insights into complex behaviours and motivations’ (Morgan 
1997: 15). The FGDs also emphasised the performative nature of narratives, buoyed as 
participants’ orations were by the presence of an audience. Further, in purely practical 
terms the FGDs also allowed me to ‘observe a large amount of interaction on a topic in 
a limited period of time’ (ibid: 8).  
This is not to say conducting FGDs is problem-free. Some of the disadvantages, 
however, such as the limited number of questions posed, particular personalities 
dominating the discussion, or insufficient observational data (Berg 2008) was eased by 
the triangulation of data obtained with the non-structured interviews and participant 
observation. Indeed, the fact that I conducted individual interviews with focus group 
participants, often shortly after group discussions, meant I could tease out incomplete 
information and hear from the quieter participants.  
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5.2. Study sites 
As mentioned above, certain developments during the lifetime of my fieldwork led to 
some adjustments, both in terms my approach and of my planned research sites. In 
terms of the institutional ethnography, which included investigation of regional and 
international institutions, most of the primary fieldwork was done in situ, i.e. in 
Monrovia, but work on these areas also took me to Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire and 
Freetown, Sierra Leone, as well as to various border regions. I additionally took 
advantage of a stint at the UN Secretariat in New York to observe first-hand ‘how 
things work’ at UN Headquarters, as well as to interview staff who had been or still 
were involved in backstopping DDR, peace operations and political affairs in the sub-
region. 
With regard to ex-combatants, my research sites were more varied. In addition to 
Monrovia, where the majority of ex-combatants, whether national or regional, had 
indicated a preference for resettlement during Liberia’s DDR programme, initial 
fieldwork in 2010 and early 2012 had focused on gold mining camps, rubber 
plantations and refugee resettlement camps along the border with Sierra Leone, 
where key informants had reliably informed me that many Sierra Leonean ex-
combatants still remained, as at the time I was still mostly interested in identifying and 
interviewing Sierra Leonean ex-combatants still residing in Liberia.  
From 2010–2011, however, Côte d’Ivoire experienced large scale post-electoral crisis. I 
recognised that my study would be enhanced by the opportunity to capture the 
perspective of ‘active’ ex-combatants. Therefore, during my 2012–2014 period, in 
addition to fieldwork in two deprived (slum) areas of Monrovia, I also concentrated 
research efforts on border towns, refugee settlements and gold mining communities in 
Nimba, Maryland and Grand Gedeh Counties, which border Côte d’Ivoire, the latter 
with support from a research assistant (see  Figure 2 below for locations, and the Table 
A2.3 in Annex 2 for a summary of key participant observation opportunities in these 
and other areas. 
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Figure 2: Map of Liberia with study sites 
 
Adapted by Aaron Jell from www.nationsonline.org/maps/liberia-political-map.jpg  
I should also note that I had originally envisioned undertaking research in Sierra Leone, 
potentially on returned Sierra Leonean ex-combatants. As the research evolved, 
however, it became clear that Liberia remained the locus for ex-combatant activity, 
within which various types of regional ex-combatants coalesced, including Sierra 
Leoneans who had fought in Liberia (and Côte d’Ivoire), and Liberians who had fought 
in Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. In the course of my research I also came across other 
types of ex-combatants who were not the focus of my study but whose experience 
nonetheless informed the study, including Liberian ex-combatants who had not fought 
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in any other country, and Ivoirian ex-militias14 who were laying low in Liberian refugee 
camps and settlement communities.  
Throughout my research, and in keeping with the new regionalisms approach 
elaborated in Chapter 3, it became clear that Liberia’s border regions were highly 
subject to particular discourses and narratives, which fed into the ways in which ex-
combatants both perceived themselves and were perceived, and resulted in very 
specific intervention strategies by national, regional and international peacebuilders, 
which meant that notions of ‘border’ came to feature much more strongly in my 
research than originally anticipated.  
5.3. Ethical considerations and positionality 
[Don’t] you see her hair? Don’t worry, she’s our sister.15 
I found that the foremost factor that granted me access to and ‘kudos’ among ex-
combatants and other ‘vulnerable youth’ was my choice of hairstyle – the dreadlocks I 
had started to grow in 2009. When I had announced my intention to begin ‘growing 
dreads’ to my parents a few years earlier, my father opined that only crazy people and 
drug addicts wore dreads, and my mother simply begged, ‘please don’t.’ For 
conservative Sierra Leoneans it was the ultimate posture of rebellion and, while in 
more liberal Liberia I observed with surprise quite a few women sporting the hairstyle 
in 2006, in both countries it remained somewhat risqué, associated with a spirit of 
rebellion, individualism and, fortuitously, the style of choice among the ‘cooler’ ex-
combatants, laden as it was with the connotations of the iconic Bob Marley. Sitting in 
‘cane juice’ (local Liberian brew) drinking circles, ‘attaya’ tea shops and gold mining 
camps, I was frequently greeted with ‘one love’, ‘my African sister’, and a fist pump. 
                                                          
 
14
 While I have used this term as loosely interchangeable with combatant, here I use the term ‘militia’ 
deliberately to separate these from groups of former fighters who (on the whole) would have been 
recognised as ex-combatants and would have had the chance to go through a DDR process as part of a 
peace agreement. Conversely, the mostly pro-Gbagbo Ivoirian militias for the most part were not 
considered eligible for the Ivoirian DDR programme, which was ongoing during most of my research, as 
not belonging to recognised fighting factions, which was another source of tension. 
15
 A common refrain among ex-combatants, referencing my dreadlocks as an indicator of my solidarity 
with them, in reaction to whether they could trust my presence in their space. 
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When joints were about to be lit, or little packets of some illicit drug or the other were 
being (not too surreptitiously) bought and sold, someone would invariably look 
enquiringly in my direction, before someone else would respond with something along 
the lines of the quote above. 
My ability to interact with these groups was further enhanced by the fact that I was 
from the sub-region, although somewhat removed: with Liberians, I was simply from a 
sister country, where they knew that we speak the ‘English from England’ (as opposed 
to the American-influenced English of Liberia), and that we shared the experience of 
being ‘youth’16 from desperately poor countries devastated by conflict. I spoke to, and 
interviewed Sierra Leoneans in Krio, the lingua franca, who were quite excited that 
their ‘sister’ had come looking for them and that they weren’t forgotten in Liberia. My 
grandmother was half Liberian, with most of her family remaining there most of their 
lives, so by extension I also had the benefit of being Liberian as well as Sierra Leonean, 
something it turned out I had in common with a good number of my respondents, as 
shown in the next Chapter. Also by serendipity, my key informant/research assistant in 
Montserrado County was a half Liberian, half Sierra Leonean ex-combatant, who spoke 
fluent Krio. Quite apart from the fact that this meant he had extensive contacts with 
the Sierra Leonean ex-combatant community, once he realised that, despite seeming 
appearance to the contrary, I was ‘actually’ Sierra Leonean and spoke Krio he warmed 
to me considerably and went out of his way to help. An aspiring student himself, he 
was also keen to see my research progress, and even took it upon himself to undertake 
a situation analysis of ex-combatants in Liberia for me. Similarly, my research assistant 
in Grand Gedeh, a Liberian, had spent time as a refugee in Côte d’Ivoire, at one time 
returning to Liberia to try and become a child combatant before being chased down by 
his mother and returned to Côte d’Ivoire. (Incidentally, both cited avenging atrocities 
against family members as their reason for wanting to fight.) 
This apparent acceptance notwithstanding, my access to these circles was at all times 
mediated by these and similar gatekeepers. I found that when I tried to track people 
down directly, they would agree to meet and then adamantly deny that they had been 
                                                          
 
16
 In West Africa a youth is largely considered as anyone between the ages of 15 and 35. 
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combatants, even if others had reliably confirmed that they were. It appeared that I 
was never considered quite trustworthy enough to divulge information to, even in 
informal circles, so I quite quickly realised it made more sense to formalise my 
interactions, which provided them with a measure of control over the situation, 
especially as this invariably included a ‘sitting fee’ of US$5, negotiated in advance with 
the gatekeeper. More formalised settings also meant that I could obtain informed 
consent from all the people with whom in-depth interviews were conducted, including 
to record (some) interviews. The ethics of ‘paying for information’ was ameliorated, as 
far as I was concerned, by the desperate situation many of my interviewees found 
themselves in; I felt it was the least I could do in return for them taking the time and 
effort to talk to me, and we framed it as providing for ‘scratch cards’ (mobile phone 
top-ups), which they could use to help me identify others to interview (during FGDs I 
also provided refreshments to the extent that this was possible).  
During the period I was working for UNMIL, I did not go out of my way to hide this fact, 
so although I was always explicit that my engagement with interviewees was only in 
relation to my academic research, invariably, however, I found that respondents were 
always keen to get a message across to UNMIL about the many shortcomings of 
reintegration programmes and the dire situation of youth. In any case this was useful 
for my work at UNMIL, because these were also issues I was consumed with 
professionally.  
Ethical considerations were arguably more problematic in terms of my institutional 
research. In order to keep myself accountable, I have made a point not to use any data 
that I could not have reasonably obtained from public records, unless I explicitly 
requested permission from the author(s), it was provided to me in direct relation to 
my PhD research, or it was non-confidential material that I had produced myself. 
Needless to say, however, my analysis is also informed by the countless meetings I 
participated in, confidential documents that I both read and produced on the topic, 
and informal conversations about the regional combatant ‘problem’, which I cannot 
divorce myself from. In order to ensure accountability, I informed supervisors, co-
workers and other colleagues about the nature of my PhD and its relation to my day-
to-day work and reminded them at regular intervals that this was a part of my reason 
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for being in Liberia and that the day-to-day working of the UN formed a component of 
my study. Anybody I interviewed in relation was also explicitly informed of my study. 
My positionality in relation to my colleagues at UNMIL and to the institution itself also 
merits some consideration. In reading both Autesserre’s books referenced above, in 
which she takes to task the construction of knowledge among peacebuilders, as well as 
their problematic practices, habits and narratives, I felt that I did not recognise myself 
in her characterisation of the inhabitants of Peaceland. Instead, I imagined myself 
more closely aligned to those exceptional individuals who, she noted, had taken the 
time and effort to understand the context in which they were working, and engage 
more meaningfully with the peacekept. After all, at the beginning of my fieldwork I had 
lived with Liberian hosts who were relatives or friends of family friends, and 
introduced to more of the same. Other Liberians I came to know, and socialise with, 
through my fieldwork and then at work, like my combatant communities had cross-
border ties, including with Sierra Leone, so we had that in common, while others 
hailed from the same County in Liberia or ethnic group as my grandmother’s family. 
Yet other Liberians, who I met through church and other social institutions were 
Americo-Liberians, again some with extensive ties with my Creole (Krio) community in 
Sierra Leone, so there was an instant familiarity, and more than once I was stopped in 
the street by someone enquiring whether I was so-and-so’s daughter from the 
Americo-Liberian/Congo community, so I suppose I also had that ‘look’ about me. 
All of this had me smugly dismissing Autesserre’s assertions about interveners’ 
everyday, which ‘created and maintained firm boundaries between them and their 
local counterparts’; ‘their perception of themselves as markedly different from host 
populations’; and their ‘valuing external expertise over local knowledge’ (Autesserre 
2014: 12-13), as not applying to me, with the additional benefit of doing my PhD 
undoubtedly rendering me more self-aware and reflective than most. But this was 
juxtaposed with frequent assertions by Liberian and other African colleagues that 
other, invariably ‘Western’ colleagues especially ‘liked me’ and gave me opportunities 
because ‘I understood their language’, and knew how to write like ‘they’ wanted. They 
largely ascribed this to my growing up in the West (which was not true but my accent 
seemingly proved what I denied), or at least from the insider knowledge I had gained 
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from working and living abroad for a significant period. While I largely dismissed the 
former observations, I could not discount the latter, nor the fact that I seemed able to 
move (relatively) easily between the worlds of the ‘interveners’, ‘insider interveners’ 
and the ‘peacekept’, and that this ‘in’ with interveners, including at senior levels, 
enabled me to make insights and arrive at conclusions central to this thesis from a 
highly privileged position. I did challenge my ‘insider’ perspective constantly, however, 
to the extent that I was quite worried about some of my conclusions, particularly in 
chapters 8 and 9. Nonetheless, while they left me wondering nervously about whether 
I would be hired again within the UN, they also enabled me to confidently conclude 
that I had not sacrificed academic rigour at the altar of my rarefied UN perspective! 
Notwithstanding, given the inherent ethical and positionality dilemmas with both the 
ex-combatant and institutional aspects of my research, I was ever conscious of the 
need to be reflexive about my engagement, especially considering that in no way could 
I have been perceived as ‘neutral’ in either setting, given that in my work I was 
constantly called upon to inform decisions about the very things I was studying. To 
keep myself accountable, I maintained an audio diary, where I tried to think through 
my concerns and how best to address them. As mentioned above, I also largely limited 
myself to publicly accessible documents, and regularly informed and reminded 
supervisors and other colleagues of my research. 
5.4. Relating methodology and data collection to analysis 
The empirical chapters that follow are largely guided by discourse analysis, I make use 
of the three main modes of discourse analysis, namely the negotiation of discourses in 
social relationships/interactions; the production of identities and subjectivities through 
discourses; and the production of power/knowledge, ideologies, and control through 
discourses (Clarke 2005: 183). Clarke characterises discourses as ‘relentlessly social 
phenomena,’ and as language that both reflects and shapes social order as well as 
individuals’ interaction with society (Clarke 2005: 147–8, citing Jaworski and Coupland 
1999: 3).  
In keeping with my constructivist framework, I am concerned with discourse both as 
the construction of meanings, and as bodies of knowledge ‘constituting sets of 
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practices [and] distinctive disciplinary formations through which power/knowledge 
operates’ (Clarke 2005: 6). Further, in keeping with my multi-layered framework, I 
agree with Clarke’s observation that  
Because we and the people and things we choose to study are all routinely both 
producing and awash in seas of discourses, analyzing only individual and collective 
human actors no longer suffices for many qualitative projects. Increasingly, historical, 
visual, narrative, and other discourse materials and nonhuman material cultural 
objects of all kinds must be included as elements of our research and subjected to 
analysis because they are increasingly understood/interpreted as both constitutive of 
and consequential for the phenomena we study. (Clarke 2005: 145)  
In relation to the discourse analysis itself, I incorporated both narrative and textual 
analysis. The combatant motivation chapters draw largely on a narrative analysis 
approach, which relates to the collection and analysis of qualitative information in 
order to understand the narratives people – in this case ex-combatants – use to create 
meaning in their lives and experiences. I thus endeavoured to ‘see the world’ through 
the eyes of combatants (Riley and Hawe 2005: 1), while being aware of the 
performative nature of their narration, mediated by their perception of me, both as a 
researcher and a UN staff member. My concern was with aggregating data from ex-
combatant interviews and categorising their accounts into motivations, strategies and 
identities, aided by a detailed interview questionnaire and reinforced by focus group 
discussions both with ex-combatants and with relevant communities (refugee/ex-
refugee), including in mixed settings. The latter, together with an extensive review of 
relevant documentation, provided some triangulation of data. The focus group and 
informal discussions were particularly important for reinforcing the motivations 
articulated by ex-combatant interviewees, but also taking them beyond individual 
perspectives and anchoring them within border societies. As noted above, in these 
contexts, the co-constructed and performed nature of accounts became even more 
apparent, the latter being greatly aided by my analysis of audio recordings of 
interviews and (the formal) discussions. These are elaborated on in Chapters 6 and 7. 
While I had initially planned to use NVivo to analyse the transcripts of the interviews 
and discussions, I found that I was already coding as I listened to and transcribed my 
recordings, with the added value of being able to think through the inflections and 
performative nature of the discussions, so I ended up coding manually. 
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In Chapters 8 to 10 I analyse the extent to which peacebuilders were seeing/able to 
see the world through the eyes of combatants, and the extent to which the narratives 
of regional ex-combatants were able to ‘speak’ to the practice of peacebuilders. In this, 
I largely relied on textual analysis as discussed in Sub-section 5.1.1 above, and 
considered especially the ways in which largely extra-local text, as discussed in Chapter 
8, engages with and is translated by on-the-ground peacebuilders (Chapters 9 and 10). 
These empirical chapters now follow. 
95 
 
 
 
6. Regional combatants in West Africa: motivations and 
machinations 
Chapter 6 presents the empirical data from my research with ex-combatants, situating 
the findings within the rich body of work on combatant motivations in the Mano River 
sub-region, discussed in Chapter 2. Building on emerging themes, it delves into the 
question of combatant motivations for moving to fight, aiming to address sub-question 
1: What are regional combatants’ motivations for moving to participate in 
neighbouring countries’ conflicts?  
Section 6.1 presents a brief profile of the ex-combatants I interviewed. This is not to 
imply that I infer any representativeness from my sample, but more to demonstrate 
my effort to ensure that I would be able to capture variations in experiences and 
motivations. Section 6.2 focuses on regional combatants’ motivations for moving to 
fight within the sub-region, and contrasts these with their initial motivations. In 
keeping with the conceptual framework introduced in Chapter 4, Section 6.3 considers 
the social construction of combatant motivation narratives, and indeed the evolution 
from a combatant to a regional (ex-)combatant, arguing that the lack of awareness of 
which, as subsequent chapters show, have placed limitations on responding 
peacebuilding practice, which do not engage sufficiently with this social 
‘constructedness’. Section 6.4 concludes. 
6.1. Ex-combatant profiles 
For the purposes of this thesis, as elaborated in Chapter 5, the bulk of analysis in this 
chapter is based on data from interviews with 50 ex-combatants, 25 in Monrovia and 
25 in Grand Gedeh, undertaken between April 2013 and March 2014. Each of these 
had fought in at least two of the four countries in the sub-region (i.e. Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea); quite a few had fought in three and at least one had 
fought in all four. I additionally use data from six focus group discussions I conducted 
with ex-combatants, community members, refugees, former refugees and miners, 
between April 2010 and November 2013, as elaborated in the previous chapter and in 
Annex 2.  
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While a relatively small sample, the analysis is informed by numerous informal 
interviews, conversations and group discussions with former combatants (both 
regional and country-bound), and other groups over several years. Further, each of my 
key informants in Monrovia and Grand Gedeh (one who was a former combatant, and 
one who had a near miss with the experience) richly informed my research, as 
individuals who had interacted with countless regional fighters, and the discussion 
below is greatly enhanced by their perspectives. These sources were further 
supplemented by UN Panel of Experts reports; UNMIL reports; interviews and informal 
conversations with UNMIL staff between 2010 and 2013; and transcripts from witness 
testimonies during the trial of Liberia’s former President Charles Taylor in The Hague 
(under the jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone) for war crimes over his 
role in Sierra Leone’s conflict. 
All of the 25 combatants interviewed in Grand Gedeh were Liberians. Of those in 
Monrovia, 12 were Liberian, nine were Sierra Leonean and four self-identified as both. 
While limited and non-representative, my sample demonstrates similar characteristics 
to those from large-scale representative studies undertaken, including one in Sierra 
Leone in 2003 (Humphreys and Weinstein 2004), and one in Liberia in 2006 (Pugel 
2007). For instance, during his Liberia survey undertaken in 2006, Pugel (2007) found 
that the average (mean) age of respondents was 26.6, which would be the equivalent 
of 33.6 at the time I undertook my research in 2013 (born around 1980). 
Correspondingly, the (modal) average birth date among my respondents was the early 
1980s, with their dates of birth ranging from 1963 to 1990 (see Table A4.1 in Annex 4).  
Similarly, I captured a spread of ethnicities. As elaborated in Table A4.2 in Annex 4, 11 
of Liberia’s 15 ethnic groups were represented in my sample (Pugel’s study captured 
10 groups). Members of the Krahn ethnic group were over-represented, but this was 
to be expected as Grand Gedeh is a Krahn-dominated County, and I purposely 
prioritised researching in Grand Gedeh to interrogate the kinship narrative with Côte 
d’Ivoire. At the same time, however, it should be noted that only four respondents 
reported as being exclusively Krahn, with the others also indicating one or two other 
ethnic affiliations. The 13 Sierra Leoneans (including those who were half Liberian) 
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reported six ethnic groups between them (Table A4.3 in Annex 4). Humphreys and 
Weinstein (2004) captured 10 ethnicities, noting that there were no appreciable 
differences in the demographic makeup between Civilian Defence Forces (CDF) and 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) respondents, including ethnicity. My sample was too 
small to make any similar conclusion but it may be worthwhile to note that the six RUF 
respondents reported four ethnic groups among them (Kissi, Mende, Limba and 
Temne).  
There are some obvious and expected differences, however. For instance, comparing 
the original fighting factions of my respondents that started fighting in Liberia, relative 
to those captured in a random sample survey of ex-combatants by Pugel (2007), 
former AFL and ULIMO-J respondents were over-represented (Table A4.4, Annex 4). 
This was to be expected, given that half of my interviews were undertaken in Grand 
Gedeh County where former President Doe originated from, and both these groups 
were pro-Doe (or at least anti-Taylor). Most of these went on to fight for MODEL, 
which was considered a reincarnation of ULIMO-J, and supported by Gbagbo against 
Taylor, and unsurprisingly also fought for pro-Gbagbo forces in Côte d’Ivoire. Similarly, 
with my Sierra Leonean sample, RUF was over-represented (Table A4.5, Annex 4), 
which could be expected because, as noted above, it was mostly RUF combatants who 
fled to Liberia following the end of Sierra Leone’s civil war. Nonetheless, although 
LURD was not the first fighting faction for most of my respondents, it should be noted 
that at least six of them, both Sierra Leoneans and Liberians, went on to fight for LURD. 
As noted in Chapter 1, an additional (deliberate) feature of this sample was an effort to 
encompass four distinct timeframes of cross-border conflict. The first reflected 
movements between Sierra Leoneans and Liberians at the start of each conflict, for 
instance a Sierra Leonean who had started with NPFL in 1989 and then joined RUF in 
its invasion in 1991, or a Liberian AFL soldier who took refuge in Sierra Leone and while 
there joined the Liberians United for Defence Force (LUDF), which became United 
Liberation Defence Movement for Liberia (ULIMO) and fought against RUF and NPFL, 
both in Sierra Leone and Liberia in the early 1990s. The second period is during the 
denouement of the conflict in Sierra Leone, which coincided with its resumption in 
Liberia, and relates to the movement of RUF combatants who retreated from Sierra 
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Leone to join Charles Taylor’s ‘Special Forces’ in Liberia against the LURD insurgency 
that started in 1999, and the corresponding movement largely of ex-CDF fighters to 
Liberia as well as Guinea, in particular to bolster LURD. The third period correlates with 
the period of the initial Ivoirian conflict (2002–2007), as Liberia’s war was ending, with 
anti-Taylor forces, particularly former MODEL fighters, operating in eastern Côte 
d’Ivoire in support of pro-Gbagbo factions. Some pro-Taylor forces also rallied in 
support of anti-Gbagbo elements however, a pattern which was later repeated with 
the appearance of anti- and pro-Ouattara militias during the electoral crisis, which is 
the fourth period (2010–2012). The four periods are represented in Table A4.6 in 
Annex 4. 
6.2. Combatant motivations for moving to fight in the MRU 
region 
My findings on combatants’ original motivations for fighting are much in keeping with 
the literature on myriad combatant motivations in West Africa discussed in Chapter 2. I 
also found that many of the reasons cited for moving to fight are reflected in initial 
motivations for fighting at home (noting also that not all combatants first fought at 
home). Interestingly, however, as Table 1 below shows, while some initial motivations 
map on to subsequent motivations, for the most part respondents cited multiple 
trajectories to participating in subsequent conflicts. 
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Table 1: Multiple trajectories to subsequent motivations 
Original motivation/mobilisation Motivation for moving 
Involuntary conscript I (abducted [as a 
child]/arrested and pressed into service) 
Escape from possible prosecution/ostracism 
Mourning parents’ death during war 
Followed commander (too small/afraid to say 
no) 
Recruited for military prowess 
Friends joining – needed to show commitment to 
unit 
Reintegration too difficult 
No other trade to survive on 
Promised money 
Involuntary conscript II (little other alternative 
but to join; revenge; afraid of life outside of 
group) 
Continued revenge 
Continued anger at Pro-Taylor factions 
‘Arrested’ and taken to other war front 
Recruited for military prowess 
Followed commander ([fear of not] responding 
to direct order) 
No funds to support family/means of survival 
Help ethnic group stay in power/relatives 
complaining about situation 
Money 
Followed fellow combatants to fight 
Voluntary conscripts (opportunistic) 
Money/Loot/‘free for all’ 
No other job opportunities 
Go along or be killed 
Anger at Pro-Taylor factions 
Into ‘bad life’ 
Fighting for countrymen/ethnic brothers/wife’s 
homeland 
Friends from previous faction joining 
Professional soldiers 
Escape from Sierra Leone after being associated 
with AFRC 
Prior fighting experience against same enemy 
(forced) 
Platoon commander gave order 
‘Believers in the cause’ 
Prior fighting experience against same enemy 
(volunteered) 
Prior experience in the country/region 
Income from existing work insufficient/ way to 
improve life at home 
No other means of survival 
Friends/former combatant colleagues joining 
Recruiters were ‘paying much’; opportunities for 
looting 
 
I find that my critique of the ‘greed’ motive notwithstanding, financial incentives 
played a significant role in most combatants’ stated reason for moving to fight.  
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Table 2 below summarises these motivations as well as their stated frequency. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Ex-combatants’ stated motivations for moving to fight 
Motivation Particulars # (Montserrado) # (Grand Gedeh) 
Economic/Financial  Money/Loot/Rice 5* 9* 
Money to support family, build 
house 
- 3 
Poverty/Lack of alternative & 
reintegration opportunities/ 
means of survival 
1 7 
Relational (military) Order/request from commanding 
officer 
3 5 
‘Forced’ to go (arrested/ 
conscripted) 
4 - 
Friends from faction going 
(relating to safety, acceptance, 
commitment to unit) 
- 9 
Relational (ethno-social) Supporting ethnic kin - 5 
Escape ostracism/prosecution 3 1 
Extension of conflict Take revenge on ‘home’ faction 2 - 
Extension of same conflict/cause 4 - 
Military expertise Prior conflict/area expertise 3 - 
Psycho-social ‘psychological issues’ – loss; lack 
of direction; revenge killing 
3 1 
*not mentioned exclusively 
Nevertheless, as the table also demonstrates, respondents also subscribed to a range 
of other motivations, including professional, socio-cultural (kinship) and socio-
emotional (group identity) motivations, as well as motivations related to survival. 
Further, when espoused, financial incentives were hardly stated as being the sole 
motivating factor – they are almost always either justified with another factor (for 
instance kinship-based motivations), or couched in terms of a survival strategy. As one 
respondent summarised, ‘I have relatives in Côte d’Ivoire that were complaining of the 
situation of government ruling and they [recruiters] offered me money’ (Ex-combatant 
#33, Grand Gedeh). The following sub-sections explore each of these motivations in 
greater detail. 
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6.2.1. Economic/Financial incentives 
‘I followed my friend combatants to fight and we were offered money’ 
- Interview with Liberian ex-combatant #22 in Grand Gedeh 
 
‘I didn’t have a job after disarmament and needed to support my kids in school’ 
- Interview with ex-combatant #32, Grand Gedeh 
 
The administration of former President Laurent Gbagbo has hired an estimated 4,500 
mercenaries, mainly of Liberian origin . . . The majority of these mercenary forces originate 
primarily from the Nimba and Grand Gedeh counties of Liberia . . . Several reports suggest that 
they have been paid in advance of specific operations. Estimates range from CFAF 500,000 to 
1,000,000 (US$ 1,000–2,000) per operation  
- Excerpts from the Report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire, April 2011 
 
As mentioned above, my earlier critique of the mercenary label and prioritisation of 
economic motivations notwithstanding, it is clear that many combatants who were 
involved in other countries’ conflicts engaged in excessive levels of looting and 
racketeering across borders (Silberfein and Conteh 2006; Human Rights Watch 2005; 
International Crisis Group 2002, 2003b). Further, in their analysis of regional combat, 
both the International Crisis Group (ICG) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) emphasise 
that contractual arrangements enticed many fighters, who were promised between 
US$200 and US$500 each to fight. As the quote above demonstrates, according to the 
Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire Panels of Experts, similar offers were made and accepted 
during the Ivoirian 2010–2011 post-electoral crisis.  
While half of the ex-combatants I interviewed were primarily motivated by economic 
reasons, and some even referred to themselves as ‘mercenaries’, it is important to 
note that even for this group, their motives largely related more to survival and the 
search for viable livelihood options for both them and their families in the face of 
limited post-conflict opportunities at home. Supplementing this view, in neighbouring 
countries in addition to fighting, ex-combatants were also involved in various 
economic activities including farming and alluvial mining, and as such, opportunities to 
participate in conflict could be considered as something of an effort to diversify 
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livelihoods.17 Thus, one could conclude that at these motivations are rooted in poverty 
and the absence of any real alternatives.  
This issue cannot be overstated. The current occupations of many of my respondents 
gave fresh meaning to term manual labour. In Monrovia, most of my research was 
undertaken in West Point, a vast slum area comprising tightly packed houses along a 
narrow paved road, sandwiched between the ocean and the rest of the city. The 
livelihoods of many of the residents were connected to fishing, and some of my 
respondents earned their living from helping to haul in the fishing nets. Of my other 
respondents one crushed rocks; another cleaned out public pit latrines; yet another 
sold drugs. Others reported being unemployed or they stole, begged, hauled goods or 
worked in construction as a daily hire. When asked about what economic activity most 
ex-combatants were involved in, one FGD discussant wittingly responded, ‘the Ministry 
of Hustle’. In Grand Gedeh, being more rural, there was a slight difference as several 
were farmers (although mainly subsistence, or contract workers on others’ farms). 
Others were artisanal gold miners, others still, carpenters. But a good number 
reported doing odd jobs to survive, or being unemployed. My key informants further 
observed that many were habitual drug users. There were exceptions of course – one 
was a goldsmith, another a clerk at the ports authority, while another was a graphic 
artist; but for many, the prospect of cash up front, followed by further opportunities 
following a successful mission was invariably a strong pull.  
6.2.2. Extension of conflict 
‘Misef decide say dis wan grain man way day go enh destroy, destroy, leh we put am behen. 
Leh we see if nahr im nahr di only iron way nohr dae cut’ (I decided for myself that this man 
[Charles Taylor], who was responsible for all this war and destruction, had to be stopped. I 
thought, does he think he is the only one that iron can’t cut? [ i.e. does he think he’s 
invincible?]) 
- Interview with ex-combatant #5, West Point, Monrovia 
The above quote came from an interview with a Sierra Leonean ex-combatant who 
first volunteered with the Liberian-dominated ULIMO when it formed in Sierra Leone, 
                                                          
 
17
 Based on mixed combatant/miners’ focus group discussions in communities bordering Sierra Leone 
and Côte d’Ivoire. 
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and then later took part as a CDF fighter, both times to contribute to putting an end to 
Charles Taylor and the RUF. He also went on to fight with LURD, having been recruited 
in Guinea as someone known for opposing Charles Taylor. His experience is not unique 
and various researchers have pointed to similarities in the composition of the armed 
groups that lined up against each other, whether in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, 
and even Guinea, such that traditional enemies such as the RUF and CDF of Sierra 
Leone continued to fight one another in Guinea, even after the conclusion of Sierra 
Leone’s conflict, this time alongside Charles Taylor’s government troops or LURD, 
respectively. The following example, summarised from ICG’s 2002 report on the 
regional nature of Liberia’s conflict, illustrates the complexity of this multi-sited ‘civil’ 
warfare, which effectively amounted to a series of proxy wars: 
In 2000, after an attack on Guinea by RUF fighters at the behest of Charles Taylor to 
weaken LURD, President Conté moved to return the war back to Liberian soil by 
supporting the Donsos (Sierra Leone hunter militias from refugee camps in Guinea) 
and the LURD to pursue their enemies deep into Sierra Leone and Liberia. He provided 
further air and artillery support, and Guinean troops crossed into Sierra Leone. 
Guinean gunships bombarded several Sierra Leone and Liberian towns, obliterating 
Koindu, a major trading centre and RUF base in Sierra Leone . . . U.S. support for 
Guinea’s military was increased, and Guinea greatly stepped up supply of the LURD. 
Kamajor and Donso fighters, freed by the lull in Sierra Leone, travelled via Freetown 
and Conakry to join the LURD invasion. The offensive, launched in mid-November 
2000, advanced rapidly in Lofa County. In January 2001 the offensive turned east, 
driving for the centre of Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia movement, 
Gbarnga. Its success – killing hundreds of RUF, brought Donsos to within a few 
kilometres of the Kono diamond fields in Sierra Leone and took the LURD deep into 
Lofa County in Liberia. (International Crisis Group 2002: x) 
Many of these Kamajors were from ethnic groups whose traditional lands span the 
Sierra Leone–Liberia border. As the ICG report puts it: ‘militias such as the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) – effectively Liberian President Charles Taylor’s 
foreign legion – the Sierra Leonean Kamajor “hunter” militias and a range of Liberian 
dissidents have battled with little regard for national borders’ (International Crisis 
Group 2002: i). A similar situation arose with Liberians fighting in Côte d’Ivoire. A 2003 
ICG study reported that ‘western Côte d’Ivoire has become a new battleground in 
Liberia’s war’ (International Crisis Group 2003b: 24), with heavy fighting between the 
rebel MPIGO fighters, which included many Liberians and FANCI government troops 
who used mainly Krahns to lead the assault. The campaign was largely a Liberian affair 
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involving fighters from both the LURD and Taylor’s Anti-Terrorist Unit. Pro-Taylor 
forces in Côte d’Ivoire also claimed that their fight was linked to the struggle to drive 
rebels out of Lofa County in Liberia, and the ICG hypothesises that this group saw 
themselves as ‘part of an unfinished war that seems tied to Taylor’s desire for a 
Greater Liberia’ (ibid.: 26). 
Of course there were exceptions, and even in my sample, there were individuals who 
had fought for NPFL and then with LURD in Guinea or with MODEL in Côte d’Ivoire, but 
these tended to be people who had been coerced into fighting for NPFL when they 
were children, often following the death of parents at the hand of the NPFL, and later 
saw an opportunity to fight against NPFL as a means of getting revenge. 
6.2.3. Relational (ethno-social) 
‘There’s no way the Krahn, Gio [sic] and Grebo who feel that Gbagbo is a brother to 
them will ever allow for Gbagbo people to suffer’ 
- Participant, focus group discussion, 21 April 2013, Monrovia 
 
The dominance of the mercenary or financial incentive narrative notwithstanding, 
there is also widespread and increasing recognition that this alone has not been 
sufficient to mobilise fighters to take up arms in neighbouring countries. Because the 
kind of deep ethnic divisions that we see, for instance, in central Africa are not as 
evident in West Africa, this factor is usually only considered in passing in the literature. 
Yet, Silberfein and Conteh (2006) point out that many of the local anti-RUF militias 
were pulled into the LURD rebellion because of refugee flows and kinship ties, as well 
as pre-existing trade links and anti-Taylor orientation, as discussed above, stemming 
from their fight against the RUF at home. As noted in Chapter 2, Ferme and Hoffman 
observed that those CDF that moved across borders tended to comprise combatants 
with family ties on both sides of the border (2004: 78). Hoffman further notes that 
‘[m]any fighters could claim, with more or less equal legitimacy, to be citizens of either 
Sierra Leone or Liberia. Liberian ex-combatants living for years in Sierra Leone, the 
children of Sierra Leonean traders who grew up in Monrovia, young men from border 
communities with parentage in both countries—all of these complex webs of 
biography made the very idea of a fixed, stable identity absurd’ (Hoffman 2011b: 40). 
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Indeed, as demonstrated in Section 6.1, my interviewees demonstrated similar 
characteristics. 
On the Liberia–Côte d’Ivoire border, ‘Ivorian Yacoubas, their Liberian Gio “cousins” and 
northern fighters and civilians (Dioula) were the targets of, and in turn targeted, the 
Ivorian Guéré and Liberian Krahn fighters and civilian populations, creating a cycle of 
inter-ethnic violence’ (International Crisis Group 2003b: 23). This cycle largely repeated 
itself in the 2010–2011 Ivoirian crisis. Post-crisis, this perspective has gained significant 
currency. 
The ex-combatants in my study did apply kinship narratives to explain their activities, 
but they did this less often than peacebuilding discourse and popular opinion suggests. 
Individual respondents, especially in Grand Gedeh, did not mention this to as great an 
extent as anticipated. Instead, they seemed to reference it as an afterthought, as a 
means of justifying their activities. In the words of one ex-combatant (interviewee 
#36), ‘I fought to help protect my wife’s homeland and I was offered a huge sum of 
money’. Accordingly, while they generally tended to align with ‘like’ factions – for 
instance groups that supported their home conflicts, and groups that were dominated 
by related ethnic groups – this should not necessarily be taken as a primary motivating 
factor, as is currently the vogue in terms of policy responses.  
Indeed, for many commentators, policymakers and practitioners (including UNMIL 
staff, government ministry officials, UN Country Team staff, as well as among county 
administration and traditional authorities interviewed over the course of the research), 
an increasingly popular explanation is the importance of social and kinship ties, which 
have aligned fighters from one side of the border with their relations on the other side. 
As we will see in Chapters 9 and 10, this perception has heavily influenced 
peacebuilding practice but not necessarily for the better. 
Notwithstanding, as could be expected for the reasons cited above, the Grand Gedeh 
group of respondents more than the Monrovia-based group subscribed to socio-
emotional motivations and kinship ties. They further ascribed motivations to historical 
alienation and ongoing persecution of their kinsmen (both in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire), 
as well as lack of effective post-conflict justice mechanisms, resulting in ‘victors’ 
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justice’ at their expense, both as ex-combatants and as people hailing from a particular 
ethnic group/region. These observations notwithstanding it is important to point out 
that, as shown in Table A4.6 in Annex 4, a good number of respondents who fought in 
Côte d’Ivoire did so on behalf of pro-Ouattara/anti-Gbagbo rebel groups (11, versus 16 
who fought for pro-Gbagbo groups. This might be expected if the research had taken 
place in Nimba, the dominant county for Liberian Gios and Manos who supported 
Taylor against Doe, and are ethnically linked with Ivoirian Yacouba, who supported 
Ouattara (or at least were seemingly anti-Gbagbo) but is more surprising that this was 
reflected in Grand Gedeh, which is dominated by Krahns who are considered mostly 
pro-Gbagbo. 
It should also be noted that while kinship factors did not feature as heavily as expected 
in individual interviews, it was discussed at length in most of my FGDs, both at the 
border and in Monrovia. As one participant explained during the discussion in 
Monrovia on 21 April 2013,  
The war in Liberia and Sierra Leone came about like this. In 1989 when the war started 
in Liberia, here, first of all we got our brothers and sisters who lived in Sierra Leone . . . 
So when the war began in Liberia in 1989 in 1990 they left from there and came down 
and joined the other group that was here and all started fighting so when Liberia war 
came down like this and when the war started in Sierra Leone, they went back because 
they have some relationship between here and Sierra Leone. For example, my mother 
comes from Sierra Leone and my father from Liberia so I find myself leaving from 
Liberia to go to Sierra Leone and I find myself leaving from Sierra Leone to come to 
Liberia . . . So when the Sierra Leone conflict pick[ed] up they left from here and went 
there. . . . In Liberia in 199[1] after the first war eased down the war picked up in Sierra 
Leone our brothers left from here and went there . . . [we] learned [that] in Sierra 
Leone Doe [supporters were] down there also. Our brothers who left from here and 
went to Sierra Leone knew much about that [enemy] so they came on this side, gave 
the information and found other guys to go there.  
For him, the explanation was twofold: firstly, that Sierra Leoneans and Liberians are 
essentially the same people, ‘brothers and sisters’, so it was not difficult to find Sierra 
Leoneans to participate in Liberia’s conflict, and vice versa. Further, recalling the 
previous section, the refugees who fled to Sierra Leone, especially AFL who were being 
rearmed by the Sierra Leone Government, were still considered a threat, so Liberian 
rebels volunteered for the RUF rebellion as part of their fight against the same enemy. 
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However, as with the Grand Gedeh group, the same participant observed that very 
soon self-interest motivations became apparent:  
They [Liberian fighters] found their own group and started fighting [in Sierra Leone] 
just to get some gold and diamond to bring in Liberia . . . So you find with the conflict 
in SL they [would] go there go and get something, pick up something of value, come 
here and sell it and spend the money. 
During the same discussion, someone else noted that the gains from looting soon 
meant that cross-border fighting became a common practice. Another noted that such 
practices were still facilitated by familial links and have carried into the present, 
observing that ‘nowadays it’s also easy for people to commit a crime in one country 
then cross the border and melt into that society.’ Yet another commented: ‘[with] 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, if I have relations in the other country, if I cause trouble in one 
country, I can run next door and still be protected [murmur of agreement from the 
group] I feel our problem is stemming from that.’ Indeed, this emphasised a 
practicality of fighting across the border. As one Liberian ex-combatant told me during 
our interview on 21 May 2013, when he was fighting in Sierra Leone, he was not afraid 
of being identified as different because many people took him to be a Sierra Leonean 
(and indeed his mother’s family originated from Sierra Leone). An UNMIL colleague 
also narrated an experience in Guiglo, Côte d’Ivoire, in 2008 when they were trying to 
encourage Liberian ex-combatants to return. During a community meeting, elders 
insisted that the seeming Liberians among them were actually their sons and brothers, 
and when challenged over the fact that they spoke Liberian English, they asserted that 
this was easily explained as young people were frequently sent across the border to 
reside with relatives, and after a few months quickly picked up the lingua franca, 
whether Liberian English or French. 
It is also worthwhile to note that FGD participants also attributed the influence of 
personal relationships at the highest levels as a significant contributing factor to 
regional conflict. In this they referred to Ivoirian President Houphouët-Boigny as the 
architect of conflict, noting his role in supporting Charles Taylor’s original insurgency 
based on his personal relationship with former President Tolbert who was killed by 
Doe. In the present, they referenced President Sirleaf’s ‘siding’ with President Ouattara 
(who was a senior official in Houphouët-Boigny’s government) as further evidence of 
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the Liberian Government’s anti-Krahn sentiment, and a factor that also justified their 
involvement in the Ivoirian crisis. These issues and their implications will be discussed 
in greater detail in the following chapter. 
6.2.4. Relational (military) 
[I moved to fight because] I was too small to say no 
- Interview with ex-combatant #16, Monrovia (Sierra Leonean) 
 
‘When you are asked by your former commander to join a battle and you refuse, you become 
a targeted threat’ 
- Interview with ex-combatant #42, Grand Gedeh 
 
The literature on conclusion of conflict in Liberia has often tried to ascertain the extent 
to which chains of command continue to exist, post-DDR. Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire 
Panels of Experts regularly asserted the continued importance of these structures, 
especially in relation to cross-border conflict (Panel of Experts on Liberia 2013a, 2012a, 
2012b, 2011). In their November 2011 report, the Liberia Panel ‘observed that Liberian 
mercenary command structures in the Ivorian conflict were fluid and relied on an 
alliance of generals who often activated their own recruits, mainly drawn from 
unemployed Liberian ex-combatants’ (Panel of Experts on Liberia 2011: 3). 
They tended to link these with access to external sources of funding, citing this once 
again as a major motivating factor. Certainly, as discussed above, finances play a large 
part, but in my research, several respondents discussed their inability to reject a direct 
order from a [former] commander, including due to fear, which speaks to a level of 
indoctrination and hierarchy that for some has yet to be rescinded in peacetime. One 
ex-combatant spoke of having no choice out of fear that something might happen to 
his family members if he refused to go and fight; another noted that if a planned 
attack failed due to an ambush, it could be presumed that combatants were 
responsible for leaking intel (especially if they had initially declined to go), and 
punished accordingly. 
This particular aspect highlights a limitation of my research, mainly that it focused on 
rank and file ex-combatants and not, for instance, the brokers of violence, such as 
former commanders, or entrepreneurs of violence. As noted above, while I concur that 
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they are and should be a focus of study, this was balanced by my belief that the foot 
soldiers are also a critical part of the equation and equally worthy of study, as the ones 
that accept and carry out the missions, or who do the bulk of the fighting, and 
especially the importance of understanding how it is, as Ero and Temin note, that 
‘political entrepreneurs can easily find a pool of willing recruits to challenge the central 
authority, many of them youths . . . rebel leaders prey on young, unemployed, 
impoverished groups and use them to engage in widespread attacks against their 
governments in order to obtain access to resources’ (Ero and Temin 2004: 113). 
It should further be noted that this set of motivations may also be partly responsible 
for the apparent phenomenon of ex-combatants’ fluid loyalties, whereby their 
allegiance to one group or the other was mediated by commanders. Witnesses in 
Charles Taylor’s trial relate how ULIMO-K merged with NPFL while Taylor was 
President and supported the RUF to fight in Sierra Leone (around 1998). This may have 
come as a surprise to some, as they had received support from Guinea at the start of 
the war and had been engaged in the fight against the RUF in Sierra Leone. Taylor’s 
strategy, however, was to ‘look for one of the most senior officers in ULIMO-K to work 
along Sam Bockarie in Sierra Leone’.18 He contacted Abu Keita, who was Deputy Chief 
of Staff for ULIMO-K, through a former ULIMO-K member. Keita, while initially 
suspicious, accepted the offer to work alongside RUF’s Bockarie, after which it was 
assured that ULIMO-K fighters would be encouraged to join RUF offensives against 
Sierra Leone and Guinea. It should be noted also that even in this situation, there is 
some question as to the extent to which ULIMO-K fighters had allegiance to NPFL, as 
Taylor’s defence opined that Mandingo trial witnesses were working against Taylor 
even while in his Government, especially as LURD grew out of ULIMO-K (Trial of 
Charles Taylor Blog 2008). 
6.2.5. Military expertise 
‘I was on Mission. I was a Missionary’ 
- Focus group discussant, Clara Town, Monrovia, 19 May 2013 (Liberian) 
                                                          
 
18
 Testimony of Varmuyan Sherif, former member of the Special Security Service and witness for the 
Prosecution at the trial of Charles Taylor on 9 January 2008 
https://charlestaylortrial.wordpress.com/2008/01/09/440/, downloaded 20 March 2015.  
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‘We bihn dae yahr as special forces’ (We were here as special forces) 
- Interview with ex-combatant #2, West Point, Monrovia (Sierra Leonean) 
 
The main (other) set of motivations articulated by my respondents were capacity-
based (to do with professionalism, capacity, and previous experience, i.e. ‘professional 
soldier’ narratives). These narratives convey a sense of professionalism and pride in 
being able to do something well. This latter point illustrates that the image of African 
mercenaries simply as marauding out-of-control forces that are only interested in, and 
get their sole benefits from, looting and pillaging is at least partially incorrect. While 
this was certainly a feature of their activities, it is also clear that they saw themselves 
primarily as contracted workers (Human Rights Watch 2005).  
Thus, it is perhaps possible to conclude that these regional combatants, if labelled 
mercenaries, share at least some commonalities with their contracted western 
counterparts: no different, say, than the British ex-Special Air Services (SAS) officer 
now serving as a specialised private security contractor in Iraq. Evidence of this is 
found by Ferme and Hoffman (2004), who point out that Sierra Leonean militias 
became more professionalised and trained to what their officers perceived to be 
international standards that marked a legitimate fighting force, and then exported 
these standards to LURD when they joined them (although they then took a strategic 
decision to undermine these standards for reasons discussed below). Therefore, 
perhaps the case could be made to consider, for instance, the CDF as more akin to a 
foreign legion, or a force that transformed from civil to regional defence. Further, as 
Silberfein and Conteh (2006) and Human Rights Watch (2005) note, regional fighters 
saw themselves more as special forces carrying out missions than as mercenaries. Time 
and again my respondents used the term ‘special forces’ to refer to themselves, 
especially with regard to the Côte d’Ivoire conflict.  
Silberfein and Conteh (2006) also mention that many fighters hoped to accumulate 
enough savings to invest in starting a business. This stated desire recalls Utas’ (2003) 
and Richards’ (2005) assertion that youth saw their involvement in the conflict as a 
way of attaining status independent of restrictive traditional social structures, one that 
they failed to achieve or regressed from, once their own countries’ conflicts had 
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ended. This modernisation element – socialisation into urban culture, and disdain 
among youth about farming and rural livelihoods – is a well-documented feature of 
post-conflict settlement decision-making, but with a few exceptions (significantly 
Utas), this has not been investigated as a factor affecting motivations to fight, and 
certainly not taken into account in DDR programming, which often includes a 
significant agriculture component. 
Hoffman (2011a) makes an important contribution to the discussion, wherein he draws 
attention to the nexus between violence and labour. In his view the conflicts in West 
Africa represent a ‘spatial and socio-political configuration, the purpose of which is to 
rapidly assemble male bodies for efficient deployment in overlapping service of 
security and profit’ (2011a: xii). In employing the ‘War Machines’ model, he asserts 
that becoming a regional warrior represented a vocation rather than some sectarian 
affiliation, and was just one among the limited choices young men in the region have 
available to them: ‘The men may be called up at any moment as laborers on the 
battlefield, workers on the plantation, or diggers in the mine’ (2011a: 164). Of direct 
relevance to this thesis, he considers the capture and reterritorialization of war 
machines, seeking to understand how for instance CDF was transformed into a 
mercenary army, and considering the transition of the conscription of ‘marginal urban 
youth into a disposable reserve army that was deployed across international borders’ 
(ibid.).  
Hoffman’s ‘lack of alternative options’ model is an important one with which I concur. 
My main point of departure, however, is that he, like Weinstein, prioritises structure 
over agency and, like many others, largely limits motivations to ‘mercenary’. I 
observed that for my respondents, there was a sense of pride in being considered as a 
professional in some sphere. They were conscious that when they chose to go ‘on 
mission’ or to be part of ‘special forces’ they garnered particular respect from those 
they were going to fight alongside and the fear of the population. They also note that 
they were recruited for particular or special missions, not to fight in general but 
sometimes for those offensives that were considered particularly difficult – and while 
to others this may read as if they were dispensable, they chose to read this as evidence 
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of their fighting prowess and particular skillset. One respondent in Grand Gedeh was 
particularly known for his performance in the battlefield, so although he wished to 
retire he was always sought out for missions. Despite having a family and thoughts of 
escaping this life, possibly through migrating, it seemed that he genuinely enjoyed 
being called upon for something in which he was an expert. 
6.2.6. Psycho-social 
Many of the combatants I interviewed who had entered the war while they were 
young and who had experienced the loss of loved ones (mostly parents) also expressed 
an effective abandonment to the violence of conflict, whether at home or in another 
country. They also largely saw the opportunity to fight further afield as an opportunity 
for ‘revenge’ against an indeterminable enemy.  
As predicted by the literature, some also committed atrocities where they came from 
and as such could not return home. For instance, one Grand Gedeh respondent joined 
NPFL when his mother was killed and when he went with them to his hometown, he 
committed a lot of atrocities, and so cannot return. Another noted that in Grand 
Gedeh his fellow ex-combatants can keep secrets or try to protect one another but this 
is not possible in Nimba where he came from.  
My key informant in Grand Gedeh opined that for about half of the respondents, 
fighting was the only way they are able to ‘enjoy life’. In his words, ‘When they see 
themselves in that action, they feel like wow, it’s nice’. He elaborated on the 
enjoyment that one of the interviewees seemed to derive from describing the action 
to him, with some going so far as trying to explain the pleasure they feel from being in 
combat. One also explained that to date, he feels the need to shed blood from time to 
time, and when he does not he begins to feel ‘human’ and thinks too much about the 
things he has done. Others noted that they do not feel part of society and are isolated, 
lacking any other skills or job. This was especially true of those who started to fight 
when they were young, who noted, ‘If someone says, “come fight for me for one, two 
months,” I will go’. 
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These interviewees could not really say who they had been fighting in aid of or who 
they had been fighting against and, as could be expected, did not have particular 
allegiance to any group, even at home. One of them who had fought for ULIMO-J also 
fought variously for Forces Nouvelles, Front populaire Ivoirien (pro-Gbagbo) and Forces 
armées des forces nouvelles (pro-Ouattara) groups. His reason for going to fight was ‘I 
had no established life in Liberia and was roaming about finding ways to survive . . . in 
the battlefield I can loot anything’. To some extent, this could be expected as a natural 
response to trauma. 
6.3. Experience of DDR 
‘I disarmed at Camp Suffering’ 
- Ex-combatant #5, Monrovia 
 
The regional perspective is critical for DDR in the MRU sub-region, especially as many 
Sierra Leonean RUF and AFRC (ex-Sierra Leone army junta) combatants fled across the 
border to Liberia in 2000, in lieu of participation in Sierra Leone’s DDR (Benner et al. 
2011), while Liberian participants in Côte d’Ivoire’s conflict anticipated more lucrative 
DDR benefits there than what they were able to obtain in Liberia.  
Of my Sierra Leonean respondents, none disarmed only in Sierra Leone, seven 
disarmed only in Liberia, one disarmed in both places, and one disarmed nowhere at 
all. Of my Liberian/Sierra Leonean respondents, all four disarmed only in Liberia. Of my 
Liberian respondents in Montserrado, eight disarmed in Liberia and four disarmed 
nowhere at all. Finally, of my Liberian respondents in Grand Gedeh, 16 disarmed in 
Liberia, one disarmed only in Côte d’Ivoire, two disarmed in both places and six 
disarmed nowhere at all (i.e. 39 disarmed, 11 did not).  
Of those who did not participate in Sierra Leone’s DDR programme, their main reasons 
related to listening to their leaders and lack of clarity over eligibility for DDR. Most did, 
however subsequently participate in the Liberian DDR, either participating as 
foreigners or masquerading as Liberians. Similarly, some Liberian ex-combatants had 
their weapons taken away by commanders, thus were unable to register for 
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programmes. Others were afraid of being stigmatised. Further, it should be noted that 
of the 39 that disarmed, some did not complete reintegration programmes, either 
because they were only interested in the money provided during the disarmament 
phase or because they were remobilised to fight elsewhere (mainly Côte d’Ivoire). 
Some actually interrupted their training to go and fight again, and even some of those 
that went through complete programmes still later went to fight in Côte d’Ivoire. All of 
those that went through the programme found fault with the level and type of training 
they received, and most make direct reference to it when discussing the reasons for 
their current adverse economic circumstances. 
Notwithstanding, general consensus is that the Sierra Leonean and Liberian peace 
operations were at least qualified successes (Olonisakin 2008; Fortna 2008), with 
76,000 and 103,000 individuals respectively participating in DDR process. For example, 
Olonisakin (2008) concludes that after a rocky start, UNAMSIL could be considered a 
successful model of multilateral peacekeeping, thanks to organisational learning both 
in the field and at UN headquarters, and the rendering of justice to the most notorious 
warlords. Yet, respondents’ perspectives of DDR particularly resonate with much of the 
literature, as various studies have noted some shortcomings with programmes in both 
countries, stemming from their conception, structure and implementation (Solomon 
and Ginifer 2008; Human Rights Watch 2005; Humphreys and Weinstein 2004; Thusi 
and Meek 2003). For instance, Sierra Leone’s disarmament was considered too rigid, 
disadvantaging traditional and pro-government militias who were denied entry. Also, 
during the demobilisation phase, the encampment period was considered too short to 
effect any substantial and sustained change in behaviour and attitudes, and effectively 
break up existing command and control structures amongst the armed factions 
(Solomon and Ginifer 2008). A UNDP staff member noted in an interview that this 
period was meant to last three months in Liberia but was reduced to just a month.19 
Reintegration programmes were considered to be western-conceived, poorly funded, 
coordinated and monitored, and delivered poor-quality training in jobs there was no 
demand for, particularly given the depressed post-conflict economies; programmes 
                                                          
 
19
 Interview, May 2010 
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focused mainly on economic reintegration at the expense of social and political 
integration (United Nations Mission in Liberia 2007a; Silberfein and Conteh 2006). 
The limitations highlighted in the literature were especially relevant in the regional 
context. Ferme and Hoffman (2004) note that in Sierra Leone, unmet expectations of 
DDR programmes and pressure from patrons with a vested interest in overthrowing 
Taylor’s regime made demobilised combatants more susceptible to the offers made by 
recruiters to fight abroad, while the International Crisis Group (2003b) asserts that as a 
consequence of the Sierra Leone DDR programme’s failure disarm a core of (RUF) 
hardliners, many combatants opted out of DDR programmes altogether, preferring 
instead to move with their guns to fight with Taylor against LURD. This decision to 
avoid disarmament in favour of cross-border combat was not limited to the RUF. 
Ferme and Hoffman (2004: 78) note that the formal end to combat in Sierra Leone 
brought about a deeper division between the demobilising elements and the 
professionalised segments of the CDF, many of whom crossed to Liberia and Guinea to 
support LURD. The lack of a regional disarmament strategy meant that the fighters 
that moved to Liberia could not be targeted, a shortcoming that was replicated at the 
end of Liberia’s second conflict in 2003, after which many Liberian and Sierra Leonean 
fighters moved on to Côte d’Ivoire. The situation was ‘further complicated by the 
expectation that soldiers could collect more than twice the $300 stipend available in 
Liberia once demobilization in the Côte d’Ivoire was underway’ (Silberfein and Conteh 
2006: 350). 
These shortcomings were all evident in my ex-combatant respondents’ experiences 
with DDR, which was uniformly considered problematic by respondents and focus 
group discussants alike. Most of the ex-combatants related their current lack of 
opportunities to the failures of the DDR programmes, whether they participated or not. 
In addition to limited material benefit (e.g. a $150 initial reinsertion grant) and the 
paucity of appropriate programmes, ex-combatants commonly cited the short 
cantonment periods (failure to provide alternatives to ‘gun language’), the lack of 
longer-term psychosocial support, and the lack of empowerment – political and social, 
in addition to economic. It was also depressingly coincidental that most respondents 
referred to Camp Scheiffelin, the primary cantonment site for DDR in Monrovia which 
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is also a military barracks, as ‘Camp Suffering’. Although this is a common mistake 
among Liberians, it was clear through conversation that the misnomer was well-
earned, and the place had become something of a symbol of everything that was 
wrong with Liberia’s DDR programme.20 
In keeping with the general argument of this study, which will be developed further in 
later chapters, studies on DDR have demonstrated that reasons for their limitations are 
at least partly related to poorly understood combatant motivations: Bøås and Hatløy 
(2008) observe that with regard to Liberia, a failure to understand combatants’ 
motivations during wartime led to poorly thought-out reintegration programmes in 
peacetime. A 2007 UNMIL evaluation of the DDR programme found that the 
reintegration options made available to ex-combatants were supply rather than 
demand-driven; that the programme appeared to equate training and education with 
reintegration, contrary to the UN’s definition of it as a process; and that its focus on 
‘economic’ reintegration came at the expense of psycho-social assistance (United 
Nations Mission in Liberia 2007b). Similarly, basing their conclusions on ex-combatant 
interviews, Solomon and Ginifer critique Sierra Leone’s DDR as ‘a foreign-driven 
exercise that largely ignored the needs and concerns of local communities and ex-
combatants’ (2008: 4), further noting that ‘[p]rogramming decisions did not appear to 
be based on information on ex-combatants’ needs and viable opportunities in local 
communities’ (ibid: 5).  
These observations resonated with my study participants. As one focus group 
discussant21 summed it up: ‘After the war the disarmament processes was not 
conducted rightfully. [This was] the first shortcoming/failure [or reason for ongoing] 
instability in four countries. You cannot carry someone who has stayed 15 years 
fighting – the only language the man understands is the language of the gun, you carry 
                                                          
 
20
 The DDR programme was launched by the Liberian National Commission on Demilitarization, 
Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR) and its international partners at Camp 
Scheiffelin in December 2003. The programme had failed to prepare for the overwhelming demand, 
however, and the resulting chaos led to nine deaths and the programme being temporarily suspended. 
21
 Youth Intellectual Forum, 21 April 2013, Westpoint. 
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the man three days in the cantonment site and give him $100 [sic] the man is not 
transformed. He is not transformed. Never transformed’.  
6.4. Motivations as social constructs 
I think that ex-combatants cast narratives about themselves that enable them to be active participants in 
violent conflict and inducing war and mayhem. They see it almost as a war game; not zero-sum, you go 
on a mission you collect your bounty, you come back. There is a kind of impersonality about the whole 
thing. It lends itself to people absenting themselves; they talk about it by glossing over the details. While 
intensely personal, they focus on things they were promised and things they hoped to achieve or get, 
rather than the things they did to achieve what they wanted to. I struggle with this because you talk to 
very personable and sweet [people] actually but [they] have been responsible for doing terrible things.  
- My research diary, 15 December 2013 
 
In her chapter on dialogic/performance analysis, Riessman (2008) tells us that ‘[s]tories 
. . . are composed and received in contexts – interactional, historical, institutional, and 
discursive . . . are social artefacts, telling us as much about society and culture as they 
do about a person or group’. She notes further that ‘[w]e are forever composing 
impressions of ourselves, projecting a definition of who we are, and making claims 
about ourselves and the world that we test out and negotiate with others’ and in so 
doing we create ‘identities that are situated and accomplished with audience in mind’ 
(2008: 106).  
Bøås and Jennings (2008) extend Riessman’s perspective to explanations of regional 
conflict, noting that  
A meta-narrative is . . . understood as the outcome of processes of storytelling. All of 
us tell stories, and by telling stories we define the world and our place within it. As acts 
of self-definition, this storytelling takes place within a pre-established framework: it 
can constitute, mould or break this framework, but it will always be conditioned by it. 
Most of these stories are first and foremost important for the practice of everyday life, 
but, when combined with perceived experiences of grievances (political and/or 
economic), they can be combined to form powerful meta-narratives about ‘self’ and 
‘other’. Thus, a meta-narrative is the supposedly transcendent and universal truth 
about a collective ‘self’ and its relationship to other ingroups (e.g., ‘others’). The power 
of the meta-narrative is, therefore, located in its empowerment of those regionalising 
actors who ‘master’ them to integrate a wider set of memories, experiences and 
aspirations in a perceived coherent whole. The politics of memory is, therefore, an 
integral dimension in the construction of meta-narratives. (Bøås and Jennings 2008: 
155) 
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The idea that narrative plays a significant role in constructing combatant motivations is 
well documented, or at least demonstrated in the literature. Research such as 
Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) is useful for showing differences between ex-
combatants’ perceptions about themselves and which they want to portray, and what 
actually happened. An example is their finding that while only 12 percent voluntarily 
signed up to the RUF, the majority of RUF combatants report their marginalisation as 
the reason for participating in the conflict. Similarly, although CDF fighters mostly 
joined to defend their communities, they also cite marginalisation.  
The motivations for moving articulated above, including ‘mercenary’, ‘missionary’ and 
‘kinship’, could also be considered meta-narratives. Added to these in the post-conflict 
context are the narratives of the ‘ex-combatant’ and, at least in Liberia, ‘marginalised 
youth’. This section therefore considers the social construction of combatant 
motivations, especially with regard to how ex-combatants understood and promoted 
their participation in neighbouring countries’ conflicts.  
6.4.1. The social construction of an ‘ex-combatant’ identity 
From reading (or listening to) narratives of combatants, it is clear that these are 
socially constructed, depending on the narrator, the person being narrated to, the 
theoretical bent of the person being narrated to, and the circumstances of the 
narration. Because all narratives may be considered socially constructed, ex-
combatants’ social construction of motivations other than predominant economic 
incentives are at least as important in terms of self-motivation and justification, 
especially as the repeated performance of these alternative models in turn entrenches 
combatants’ sense of, respectively, disenfranchisement, pride, exclusion, comradeship, 
and so on. As discussed in subsequent chapters, failure to understand this has 
potentially grievous implications for regional conflict resolution efforts. Exploring the 
ways in which regional ex-combatants’ identities are crafted is particularly relevant in a 
context where, as noted above, their motivations and identities are generally limited 
to ‘mercenary’, and where peacebuilding responses have made little effort to 
problematise these other motivations, or even simply unpick them.  
Apparent during my fieldwork was the co-construction of the various narratives, 
especially evident during the focus group discussions. This and the relational motives 
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highlighted the persistence of a common group identity among (ex-)combatants, post-
conflict. Yet, while combatants are commonly accepted as a group for study, after 
conflict ends, peacebuilders do not generally consider them to constitute a cohesive 
identity. This is problematic because, as noted in Chapter 2, ‘for demobilized fighters, 
the most salient identity is the group identity they share as members of an ex-
combatant community’ Nilsson (2008: 13). This is relevant because the ‘causes of war’ 
literature tells us that groups of individuals contemplating engaging in organised 
violence have a much greater chance of succeeding if they share a common identity. 
Without such an identity, be it in their ethnicity, religion, regionalism, ideology or 
something else, disgruntled individuals will not perceive that they are facing a common 
problem, which they can collectively work to overcome (Black 2008).  
As such, it is important for regional peacebuilders to pay attention to collectively 
constructed narratives, which could provide the impetus for former combatants to 
take up arms as has occurred in West Africa, but to note also that these may not fall 
into neat categories with clear-cut responses. The kinship narrative deserves further 
attention here. Black (2008: 161) notes: ‘kinship is a highly charged cultural category in 
many communities and often becomes the basis for total social identity . . . family and 
kinship often serve as the ground from which springs a rich harvest of deeply felt 
metaphors for other social identities’. As noted above, many of my Grand Gedeh 
respondents identified as Krahn, inasmuch as some were mixed. In Liberia, being a 
Krahn at the same time means being a Doe supporter; anti-Taylor; a founder of ULIMO 
and MODEL; an opponent of the current Liberian administration; a brother of the 
Ivoirian Guéré; a trouble-maker; and so on. These were narratives that came up time 
and again in individual interviews and focus group discussions, among ministry 
officials, etc, in response to Krahns being tried for mercenarism (see Chapter 7). This 
was simultaneously considered a source of pride and victimisation by my respondents, 
which enabled them to justify crossing the border to fight in Côte d’Ivoire. It is 
important to note here that here respondents’ use of the word kinship is purposeful 
and relates to its academic sense – it means more than ethnic group affiliation, and is 
more an expression of social identity based on the ‘exclusionary hold of bonds which 
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are believed to be based on the most intimate details of birth and marriage’ (Black 
2008: 161). 
Yet, mobilisation of the kinship narratives must be taken with a large pinch of salt, 
especially given the prevailing mix of selective incentives and socio-emotional 
motivations for cross-border combat. Across the literature on motivations to fight is 
the tension between individual motivations and actions, and the wider social and 
institutional context. This is reflected in Utas’ idea of ‘enchantments with modernity’ 
(2003: 39), which results in ‘a social landscape where the trajectories of tradition and 
modernity are continually being negotiated and contested’ (ibid.), and Richard’s 
hypothesis that conflicts in both countries were partly a revolt by the agrarian 
underclass (Richards 2005). Notwithstanding the appeal to kinship motives, it is 
therefore possible to consider the economic motivations underpinning regional 
combat as efforts by regional combatants to escape traditional forms of social 
cohesion (or for young people, oppression), in the face of an elite that was increasingly 
unable to provide adequate patronage. For the majority of ex-combatants, at the end 
of their countries’ conflicts this effort to break free of these traditions remained an 
incomplete process. This meant that despite this social currency of kinship narratives, 
peacebuilding practices that reinforce traditional authority structures, for instance, are 
not going to adequately address motivations. 
Another example with which to sound a note of caution is the appeal of the mercenary 
narrative by ex-combatants themselves. They appear to marshal the mercenary 
narrative as a ‘securitisation’ narrative, and a means of staying relevant (current); it 
may be read as a (partially successful) attempt to appear more important than they 
recognise themselves to be. The missionary/mercenary narrative could also be 
considered a means of reclaiming agency – a sense of pride and belonging, of being a 
professional, of being good at something, hence the frequent references to being 
‘special forces’, ‘a good fighter’ and so on.  
Black notes, ‘[o]f course, all identities, all selves, are multifaceted . . . These attributes 
are drawn on both by the individual and by others to understand just who she or he is’ 
(2008: 148). Following this, we must ask what the outcome of these narratives is. From 
my research, it is apparent that the ex-combatant narrative continues to affect/drive 
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justification for participation in cross-border activities, and is especially potent when 
paired with kinship and marginalisation narratives. The narrative persists for a variety 
of reasons, particularly because of continued (and perceived as deliberate) 
disempowerment of ex-combatants, or a lack of justice against the people that led 
them to sacrifice their youth in war (e.g. bitterness about lack of follow-up on Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) recommendations that advocated for 
commanders to be brought to justice – as one of my respondents noted, ‘only the 
youth suffer’). In a nutshell, as per the framework presented in Chapter 4, to 
understand motivations as narrative involves inter-subjectivity of social meanings, and 
not understanding this inter-subjectivity, or indeed that motivations are necessarily 
socially constructed, limits the ways in which people understand, interpret and 
develop responses to what they have been told, as will be demonstrated in Chapters 9 
and 10. 
6.5. Conclusion 
The preceding discussion highlights that combatant motivations are more complex 
than the ‘financial incentives’ motivations often ascribed to their actions by national 
and international peacebuilding entities. While the literature on fighters who move to 
fight supports this view by concentrating on selective incentives, and almost 
exclusively on mercenary tendencies, my research demonstrates that ex-combatants 
have constructed a range of narratives beyond the material (or mercenary) that 
explain (or justify) their reasons for moving to fight. While invariably each of these 
includes an element of monetary gain, they are hardly ever exclusively couched as 
such. Neither are they mutually exclusive. In some cases, their initial reasons for 
fighting will have some implications for their motivations for moving to fight; for 
others it relates to memories of loss, or the need for revenge; yet others subscribe to 
the brothers-in-arms narratives; and others still subscribe to such considerations as 
providing for one’s family, lack of alternative opportunities, and feelings of 
helplessness. Further, the application of (cross-border) socio-cultural motivations 
means – at least to the outside observer – that they should not necessarily be 
identified as ‘foreign’ combatants, which is important for how they mediate the post-
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conflict world in their non-native country. This is supported by the limited literature on 
the topic, which indicates that factors beyond material (or mercenary) motivations 
influenced decisions about moving to fight. These include kinship ties and social 
networks. 
From a conflict resolution perspective, greed over grievance theory predicts that 
opposing sides will only agree to negotiations if the costs of war are perceived to be 
higher than the costs of peace. These considerations featured prominently in the 
policy perspectives of foreign governments and international organisations that 
sponsored peace negotiations and peace operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte 
d’Ivoire, which variously (at first) rewarded potential spoilers (such as Foday Sankoh 
and Charles Taylor) with senior government positions and implemented DDR 
programmes that prioritised the economic reintegration of ex-combatants. As 
demonstrated above, however, motivations relate to a myriad of economic incentives 
and socio-political grievances. Thus, we should be able to concur that it is also relevant 
to query whether, particularly given the persistence of regional instability, spanning 
four countries and over two decades, whether the post-conflict environment has 
successfully addressed the underlying social, political, governance and economic issues 
that has motivated belligerents to participate in multiple conflicts.  
Additionally, peacebuilders must engage with the appeal to socio-emotional and socio-
cultural narratives but, as the preceding discussion demonstrates, this engagement 
must be nuanced to reach an understanding of the purpose and function of the 
narrative if didactic and prescriptive solutions are to be avoided. The next chapter 
expands on these narratives, buoyed by the collective, and in keeping with the 
framework’s consideration of the new regionalisms approach. It reinforces the 
assertion in this chapter that while economic motivations are important, combatants 
are also able to draw on kinship ties and social identities, but at the same time 
cautions against a simplistic understanding of these motivations.  This precedes a 
discussion on resulting peacebuilding practice addressed in Chapters 8 to 10, 
highlighting their limitations, stemming from the constrained understanding of the 
narratives discussed in this chapter and the next, as well as the rigid nature of 
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international peace operations, which contributes to their inability to address regional 
conflict adequately. 
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7. Insecure spaces: exploring the dual narratives of kinship and 
exclusion in Liberia’s borderlands 
In 2010 when I undertook my fieldwork scoping study I decided to travel to Liberia by 
road from Sierra Leone. I was to be accompanied by our Sierra Leonean driver, who 
wanted to visit his Liberian father who was ill in Monrovia, along with his younger 
brother, who was to remain in Liberia for a while. I travelled on my Sierra Leonean 
national passport but was assured by various authorities in Freetown (that is, the 
Sierra Leone Police, Department of Transport and Liberian Embassy officials) that my 
driver would not need a national identification document (he did not possess one) and 
that the travel certificate I had obtained for the vehicle would cover him. I was again 
assured of this in Gendema, the immigration checkpoint on the Sierra Leone side of 
the border, where we obtained a Laissez-passer (a paper travel document) for his 
brother, and withstood half-hearted efforts at bribes. Upon crossing to Bo Waterside, 
the Liberian side of the border, however, we were refused entry by Liberian 
immigration authorities, who scoffed at the idea that we should have imagined that 
the car’s documents could possibly cover the driver and sent us back across the bridge 
of the Mano River (from which the Union takes its name) to obtain a Laissez-passer for 
the driver as well. On our return, we were taken through an extremely laborious 
process, and car documentation notwithstanding were only permitted to proceed after 
several calls to my host, who was able to reach someone senior enough to compel 
them to let us go, but not before I had been divested of US$10 to retrieve my passport 
from an overzealous (read corrupt) immigration health official. 
Several weeks later I stood at the border post at Yekepa in Nimba County, and border 
officials again asked for US$10 to ‘process my passport’ before I could be allowed to 
cross, this time into Guinea. Pointing to the two market women who had just 
clambered off the back of a motorcycle taxi coming from Guinea to the market day in 
Yekepa and started off into Liberia without so much as a glance at the immigration 
officers, I asked the officials why the women were not subject to border controls while 
I, who was as much an ECOWAS citizen as they, was. They laughingly informed me that 
there was a difference between ECOWAS citizens from the vicinity, who were 
considered just as people from neighbouring villages and who moved back and forth 
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between the borders on a daily basis, and as such could not seriously be considered 
subject to border controls, and those, like myself, from further afield. Abandoning my 
quest for a free pass into Guinea I chased after the market women to ask in my halting 
French how often they came to Liberia. I was met with blank stares and after several 
seconds of miscommunication they responded to me in Liberian English that while 
they were Guinean they could not speak French, only English and their local language. 
What is the point of these stories? On the one hand, they demonstrate how 
interconnected the peoples in the countries that make up the Mano River Union are, 
with families scattered throughout the sub-region (shortly after Nimba I went to Sinoe 
County where I met for the first time one of my grandmother’s younger sisters, who 
like my grandmother was born there but unlike her had lived in Liberia all her life). This 
interconnectedness is even more pronounced in border areas. I witnessed countless 
examples of this in the course of my research: in a taxi from the Bo Waterside border 
one woman turned to her left and spoke effortlessly in Liberian English then to her 
right and spoke fluent Krio to her sister who she was bringing to Liberia for the first 
time. I observed two children walking, unaccompanied, using a bush path to bring a 
cow from Guinea to sell at the meat market in Kono in Sierra Leone, and by chance 
saw them a few days later, returning home cow-less. In Zimmi, a Sierra Leonean border 
town with Liberia, when I tried to pay for something, the traders asked if I had US 
dollars, preferring to receive this currency over Leones, as their closest markets were 
in Liberia, which used US dollars alongside the Liberian dollar. 
On the other hand, my experiences also highlighted the exploitative and sometimes 
conflictual relationships that ordinary citizens have with border security agents, often 
the sole representatives of the states in these areas, even as these officials recognise 
the fluid and practically uncontrollable ebb and flow of population movements across 
national borders: they turn a blind eye to cross-border traffic, despite the borders 
being officially closed (for instance during the 2014 Ebola crisis that affected Guinea, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone). Female cross-border traders report that for them, 
harassment by border security officials on both sides of the border, rather than armed 
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conflict, presents the most significant cross-border security threat.22 The Liberian 
government readily acknowledges that there are an estimated 131 unofficial border 
crossing points, compared to 45 official ones (Office of the Senior Inspector 2015a, 
2015b), many of which are either completely unmanned or inadequately monitored. 
This chapter explores borders as sites of conflict in the Mano River region in the 
context of the combatant motivations and narratives discussed in the previous 
chapter. It focuses mainly on the Liberia–Côte d’Ivoire border, but also draws insights 
from research on Liberia’s other borders with Sierra Leone and Guinea. It aims to 
respond to the conceptual framework’s call to examine these within the historical, 
political, economic and social dynamics of regional conflict. While it naturally enhances 
the discussion on kinship identities and narratives of exclusion, building on such 
studies as Hoffman (2011a, 2011b), and Utas (2003), it also contributes to discussions 
on narratives regarding young men’s use of their main asset – their capacity for labour 
– to fulfil their transnational aspirations to break free from economic disadvantage and 
the constraints of tradition, as well as the tensions these efforts create with more 
traditional identity narratives.  
Accordingly, Section 7.1 elaborates on border areas as micro-regions, recalling the 
conceptual framework that incorporates a new regionalisms approach, and 
highlighting associational and ethnic relations as one factor that drives this micro-
regional conflict. It also elaborates on the example of Grand Gedeh border 
communities at the margins of the state and society, and the ways in which ethnic 
relations are marshalled in violent support of ‘kin’ in this micro-region. Section 7.2 
considers refugee camps at borders as a microcosm of the foregoing considerations, 
and as specific sites of combatant recruitment, something that has been well 
documented in central Africa but much less understood in West Africa. Section 7.3 
problematises the foregoing, noting the limitations of this focus, especially in light of 
emerging cross-border threats. Specifically, it examines the evidence of cross-border 
combat related to other factors peculiar to border regions, relating it particularly to 
other types of movement, mostly in search of better income opportunities (i.e. as a 
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 Women’s focus group discussion at second Joint Council of Chiefs and Elders Meeting, January 2016. 
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form of labour migration). Through this interrogation of prevailing narratives around 
kinship and economic opportunities, it begins to consider their implications for 
peacebuilding actors, the fuller discussion of which will take place in subsequent 
chapters. Section 7.4 concludes. 
Many sources of data informed this chapter. In addition to the ex-combatant 
interviews and focus group discussions elaborated on in the previous chapter, the 
discussion below draws on fieldwork undertaken in Liberia’s regions bordering Sierra 
Leone, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire to examine borders as the nexus of cooperation and 
conflict in West Africa. It utilises focus group data from mining camps and refugee 
communities near the Sierra Leonean and Ivoirian borders; interviews with UNMIL, 
Liberian Refugee, Repatriation and Resettlement Commission (LRRRC) staff and Liberia 
Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (BIN, now Liberia Immigration Service (LIS)) 
officials; transcripts from a Mercenarism court case hearing in Liberia, in which all but 
one of the defendants were from Grand Gedeh; and participant-observation from 
working on this issue while at UNMIL, including meetings and conversations with both 
Ivoirian and Liberian national security officials, visits to Ivoirian refugee camps, analysis 
of grey literature, and informal discussions. 
7.1. Border areas as micro-regions 
As noted in Chapters 3 and 4, regional peace and security approaches remain state-led, 
maintain a focus on physical security, and inadequately conceptualise region in 
regional peace and security theories. In contrast, new regionalisms and borderlands 
literature encourage a commensurate focus on non-state aspects, and the interactions 
between them, including in the context of regional conflict. This is especially relevant 
in Africa’s micro-regions – those regions that exist between the national and local 
levels and which were traditionally considered within the boundaries of the nation-
state but now increasingly straddle state boundaries (Söderbaum and Taylor 2008a).  
This is reflected in the borders and borderlands literature by developed by Feyissa and 
Hoehne (2010) from which the title of this chapter is borrowed. They distinguish 
borderlands – territorially defined physical space along both sides of the border – from 
borders, i.e. the institution of inter-state division according to international law (2010: 
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1), highlighting borderlands as fields of opportunity for the people inhabiting them. 
Accordingly, they ‘examine the (sometimes conflicting) (re)bordering and border-
crossing processes within which the agency of the borderlanders is situated’ and 
‘emphasize the multiple possibilities engendered by marginal spaces and being 
marginal’ (2010: 2). 
Grant (2008: 105) postulates something similar for the MRU in his elaboration of the 
‘Parrot’s beak’, where Guinea’s southern border converges with the Sierra Leone and 
Liberia borders (incidentally the area where initially Ebola emerged and spread in West 
Africa). He concurs that regions are ‘imagined communities’ (ibid.: 108), noting that 
‘[b]oth within and outside the Mano river basin identities based on conceptions of 
nationality, ethnicity, language, religion and symbols are in constant flux . . . Individuals 
may have multiple identities, which overlap and change over time’ (ibid.).  
One statistic about cross-border ethnicities is that four in ten Africans today belong to 
an ethnic group that has kin across borders. Another is that at least 177 ethnic groups 
are split into two or more countries by existing nation-state boundaries (Mungai 2015). 
The MRU is not exempt. Table 3 and Figure 3 below demonstrate some of the 
overlaps.  
Table 3: Common ethnic groups with overlaps in the Mano River Union 
Côte d’Ivoire Guinea Liberia Sierra Leone 
Mende Mandéyi Mende, [Vai, Gola] Mende [Gola] 
Mandinka Malinké Mandinka/Mandingo Mandingo 
 Kissi Kissi Kissi 
 Limbanyi  Limba 
Soussou   Susu 
Krouman (incl. 
Guéré) 
 Kru, Grabo/Grebo 
(including Krahn) 
Kroo 
Fula / Peulh Peulh 
(Fula/Fullah) 
 Fula/Fullah 
 Guerze/Kpelle Kpelle Kono 
 Loma Lorma  
Yacouba (Dan)  Gio (Dan)  
Wee, Guéré, or 
Wobe 
 Krahn, Sapo  
Sources: Poole and Mohamed 2013: 16; author’s research. 
 
129 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Major Ethno-linguistic groups in ECOWAS 
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/50/Niger-Congo_map.png/635px-
Niger-Congo_map.png  
As discussed in Chapter 6, ethnicity and kinship have been mobilised as an identity 
narrative to support participation in cross-border conflict. Against this backdrop, the 
next section explores in greater detail these narratives within the concept of the 
Liberian–Ivoirian border as a micro-region (or indeed several micro-regions), focusing 
especially on the Grand Gedeh County–Toulépleu Prefecture area. 
7.1.1. On the margins: Liberian–Ivoirian border micro-region  
The Mano River Union has several micro-regions. For this study, this section focuses on 
the Liberia–Côte d’Ivoire borderland, and specifically the areas incorporated by Grand 
Gedeh, River Gee and Maryland Counties on the Liberian side, and the Toulépleu and 
San Pedro Prefectures on the Ivoirian side. These are areas with historical ethnic 
interlinkages, enhanced by exchange of populations, including refugees, resulting 
firstly from the Liberian crisis in the 1990s and early 2000s, and then from the Ivoirian 
conflict from 2002–2007 and again in 2010–2011, of which there were 18,552 
remaining in December 2016 (UNHCR 2017). This population exchange has also 
included combatants and militias. (I have excluded Nimba County from this analysis 
because although it also borders Côte d’Ivoire, its people are more closely aligned with 
a different ethnic group, and because Charles Taylor’s NPFL drew early supporters 
from Nimba, people from this group fought in Côte d’Ivoire on the side of the rebels 
and later Ouattara supporters, sometimes engaging directly in conflict against people 
from Grand Gedeh).  
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Speaking of northern and western Uganda, Bøås and Jennings (2008) elaborate on how 
combative ‘state-society relations’ (Söderbaum and Taylor 2008a: 30) can help shape 
and give meaning to certain identities. They note that political and economic 
marginalisation has resulted in ‘meta-narratives that have contributed to rendering 
these areas into chronic cross-border micro-regions of conflict’ (Bøås and Jennings 
2008: 155). They further note that ‘[t]hese micro-regions of conflict are set in motion 
by the elaboration, contestation and manipulation of meta-narratives of identity, 
power and betrayal, and their spread across borders is facilitated by the particular 
pathologies and failings that may grow out of the neo-patrimonial state (ibid.: 154). As 
such, ‘regions are negotiated and (re)articulated through social practices informed by 
meta-narratives of pasts and presents’ (ibid.: 155), ‘revolving around issues such as 
betrayal, resistance, sacrifice and security’ (ibid.: 150).  
Specifically, in relation to cross-border conflict, Bøås and Jennings argue that  
cross-border micro-regions of conflict can best be defined in terms of speech acts 
(Shapiro 1981), as multiple interpretations of the region struggle, clash, deconstruct 
and displace one another (Neumann 2003). These regions are thus first and foremost 
social constructions. They are imagined by regionalising actors and constructed 
through social practices based on the meta-narratives that are formed by these 
imaginations in the context of pre-established frameworks of storytelling. The region is 
made up of moving bodies and, as such, is lived social space, but this space is given 
direction by regionalising actors and the meta-narratives at their disposal (Bull and 
Bøås 2003). By lived social space, we mean the sum of social practices and discourses 
that exist within a certain physical or virtual space. (Bøås and Jennings 2008: 154)  
The following account demonstrates the salience of these perspectives in the micro-
region under study: 
In December 2015, the Grand Gedeh County Council of Elders produced what they 
called a White Paper titled ‘The Case Against Holding Celebrations of Independence 
Day23 (July 26 2016) Birth Anniversary of the Republic of Liberia in and by Grand Gedeh 
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 Every year a different county or several counties are responsible for holding annual Independence Day 
celebrations, attended by the President and different dignitaries, including members of the international 
community. Given the poor road networks and infrastructure (including accommodation) and the 
centralised nature of funding, most counties find it very difficult to host the event, especially against the 
expectations that they have to do their county proud, and they spend much of the year leading to the 
event trying in vain to get their county ready for the ‘honour’. In any case the celebration was not held 
in Grand Gedeh. 
131 
 
 
 
County’ (Grand Gedeh County Council of Elders, Inc 2015). They began by noting the 
difficulty of hosting such an event at the height of the rainy season, especially as the 
county was often cut off from the rest of the country during this period due to the 
poor road network, leaving it ‘conspicuously isolated’ (ibid.: 7), and the unsuitability of 
the capital to think of holding such an event in Grand Gedeh, given the dearth of 
infrastructure and appropriate lodging. They go on to note how the county had been 
laid waste by the ‘uncivil war’ and how it had ‘suffered the worst . . . in relative terms, 
of the deadly and near-total destruction of its human resource, fabric of its society, 
and economic infrastructure’ by the NPFL (ibid.: 16). They elaborate on the adverse 
effects of ‘NPFL occupation’ which are still today ‘present, visible and troubling’, 
including the decision to create another county, partly out of Grand Gedeh; the insult 
of having critical law enforcement functions controlled by officials imported into the 
county; and the remittance of foreign investments from the county to central 
government with no tangible benefits accruing to the county. They then asserted that 
‘justice delayed is justice denied’ over the upholding of a guilty verdict of 13 Grand 
Gedeh citizens, convicted on mercenary charges for participating in cross-border 
attacks against Côte d’Ivoire in 2011 and 2012, even though five people had been 
acquitted on the basis of the same evidence (this trial will be discussed further in 
Chapter 10). They interpreted the verdict as a political trial by the current Liberian 
Government, geared towards pleasing the present Ivoirian Government of President 
Ouattara, in return for its aiding and abetting Charles Taylor’s NPFL ‘in its illegal 
invasion and near destruction of Grand Gedeh County’ and ascribing remarks of the 
former Minister of Internal Affairs in Johnson-Sirleaf’s government as analogous to the 
government claiming that ‘Grand Gedeans are mercenaries.’  
I have elaborated on this communication because it concisely captures the often-
repeated sentiments of marginalisation and vilification expressed by so-called ‘Grand 
Gedeans’ or Grand Gedeh citizens as they describe themselves (notably, rather than 
Liberian citizens), stemming from the very beginning of Liberia’s conflict and 
continuing to the present day, due to their affiliation with former President Doe. An 
interesting aspect of this is that an equal level of hostility is directed at the Liberian 
government and the Ivoirian government, rooted in both historical and current events. 
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During a focus group discussion, one participant told me: ‘NPFL passed through Côte 
d’Ivoire. If war is coming it wouldn’t have been in secret. There would have been 
meetings, the [Ivoirian] government of the day would have to know so through Côte 
d’Ivoire government support, war was able to come to the country. Maybe they had 
differences with the Doe regime [which contributed to] the fact that they allowed 
people to cross and destabilise the sub-region.’24 The sentiment was updated to match 
the situation during the Ivoirian civil war and, in citizens’ views, perpetrated in the 
aftermath of post-electoral crisis. As the same participant went on to note:  
‘Another problem in Côte d’Ivoire . . . the international community needs to do 
[better] as [they are] turning blind eye to what’s happening in Côte d’Ivoire. While [it 
is] true [that] Ouattara won elections . . . those being hunted are those from Gbagbo 
area. The two factions committed crimes but the international community is ignoring 
that. Ouattara is now chasing Gbagbo people while Gbagbo is in The Hague and the 
international community is not telling Ouattara that the peace you fought for in your 
country is right before you, you have to do the rightful thing. If you keep hunting 
Gbagbo people you will not have peace . . . These tribes, Grebo, Krahn . . . all across 
and along border. All are inter-related. If Gbagbo, who is Bété, who speak[s the] Kwa 
language – other Kwa speaking people are sympathetic. I am telling you there are 
people in Maryland County who have their quarters [homes] in Côte d’Ivoire [they are] 
more like family. They are Grebo people. If someone dies they go across the Cavalla 
River and sympathise – family. So the problem . . . I want to tell the international 
community that we need to tell the Ivoirian community to stop hunting the people 
from Gbagbo . . . If [the international community] can’t correct that we will always see 
Liberians being asked to cross [to fight against the Ouattara regime]. 
This is a widely-held perception, including by government authorities. Following a 
March 2016 quadripartite military forces meeting between the armed forces of Liberia 
and Côte d’Ivoire, UNMIL and UNOCI, that was discussing cross-border security (more 
on this in Chapter 10), I was having an informal discussion with a senior Armed Forces 
of Liberia (AFL) official, during which he made the following observation: 
Africans believe very much in intermarriage. If I go across the border and ask a man to 
marry his daughter and he agrees because of my wealth or position, and then we have 
two or three children . . . Tell me, if something happens on this side, and I call upon 
them to help, there is no way they will not help to protect me. That culture is in our 
DNA. It is culture driven. They just have to protect you.25 
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 Focus group discussion, Monrovia, 21 April 2013. 
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 Conversation on 19 March 2016. 
133 
 
 
 
The following paragraph from the UN Panel of Experts June 2012 Mid-Term Report 
also highlights the complexity of identity narratives in this region, even with ‘known’ 
mercenaries: 
UNMIL informed the Panel that the three individuals accused of mercenarism – Zoulou 
Geui Taar, Bahi Thierry and Tafin D. Albert – were released from Gbarnga Prison on 19 
April 2012 . . . The Panel notes that although the 13 December 2011 [Liberian security] 
Task Force meeting cited three Liberians who would be charged with mercenarism, the 
Liberia Correctional Service intake forms for the three lists only one individual with a 
Liberian nationality – Bahi Thierry – and lists the other two as Ivorians. That error 
appears to be related to the fact that the individuals are Krahn/Guerre, and have 
family ties to communities on both sides of the Liberian-Ivorian border. (Panel of 
Experts on Liberia 2012b: 17) 
In the same report, they further note that during the imprisonment of 38 Ivoirians who 
had crossed into Liberia at the village of Tasla, near Youbor, River Gee County, on 24 
May 2011, the Liberian chief of Tasla village was also imprisoned alongside the 
Ivoirians, indicating some level of complicity with traditional authorities.  
The point is, the fact of economic motives notwithstanding, combatants and border 
communities alike are able to marshal potent motivations based on kinship, fuelled by 
perceptions of prejudicial treatment against their collective, even if this includes 
people across the border (and even if, as discussed in the previous chapter, individual 
combatants do not strongly adhere to this feature). In this context, conventional 
militarised solutions are hardly likely to prevail, especially when identity-based 
motivations continue to be fuelled.  
Grand Gedean cross-border grievances against both the Ivoirian and Liberian 
governments prevail, and have been brought up-to-date by the increasing 
encroachment, since 2015, of Burkina Faso nationals (‘Ouattara’s people’)26 hired as 
labourers by Ivoirian (and, it must be noted, Liberian) commercial farmers; the Liberian 
Government’s seeming unwillingness to take action to arrest the situation is taken as 
further evidence of its lack of interest in the welfare of Grand Gedeh citizens, 
especially given the unpleasant connotations resulting from the participation of 
Burkinabé nationals in Charles Taylor’s original invasion of Grand Gedeh shortly after 
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 Stemming from the popularly-held perception that Ouattara is at least half Burkinabé. 
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his arrival from Côte d’Ivoire. An UNMIL staff member working on cross-border 
stabilisation in the region related a conversation he had with a border town chief in 
the affected area, who opined that the similarly hands-off approach taken by the 
Ivoirian government on this issue had a direct correlation to the anti-Krahn sentiment 
associated with the support of NPFL by Houphouët-Boigny’s government, in which 
Ouattara was a senior figure, and exacerbated by his perceived animosity towards 
their relatives, the Ivoirian Guéré, and by extension to them on the Liberian side, 
especially given their opposition to his presidency and continued allegiance to former 
President Gbagbo.27  
Bach (2008: 172) asserts that ‘[m]icro-regionalism often involves a powerful cognitive 
component whereby boundaries defined through geo-ethnic or religious bonds prevail 
over lines of territorial partition’. These bonds have a powerful capacity to paint 
people as ‘other’ (or ‘us versus them’). I sat in on a Grand Gedeh County Security 
Council (CSC) meeting on 19 January 2016 during which a traditional 
hunter/community watch forum member gave ‘evidence’ of a run-in with Burkinabé 
farmers. He ‘performed’ his testimony in the form of a dialogue between him and the 
farmers, which took place entirely in French, interspersed with (his) narration in 
Liberian English, including translation for those CSC members who could not speak 
French (a fact that he appeared mildly surprised by). At one point a CSC member asked 
how he knew that the farmers were Burkinabé as opposed to Ivoirian, and he replied 
very matter-of-factly that it was not the French of the ‘people of the border’ (which he 
was not only familiar with but also spoke) but that of a ‘foreigner’.28 These sentiments 
are mirrored by Ivoirians from communities in western Côte d’Ivoire, where the 
upsurge of Burkinabé farmers into western Côte d’Ivoire resulted in fatal clashes in 
2015.  
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 Based on a conversation in April 2016. 
28
 Incidentally, in an environment where physical appearance may not be a giveaway, different accents 
or language use are used as the marker for ‘othering’. This was the case during the 13 March terrorist 
attack in Grand Bassam, Côte d’Ivoire, where it was noted that the attackers had ‘Tuareg’ accents, while 
evidence of the cross-border nature of attacks on Côte d’Ivoire following the post-electoral crisis often 
came down to the fact that the attackers were communicating with one another in Liberian English (this 
is countered by the observation that in the same way Liberians at the border – like the hunter – can 
speak localised French, so can some Ivoirians in these regions speak Liberian English) 
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These narratives are reinforced by Ivoirian refugees. Indeed, the hostility of refugees 
towards the Ouattara government, expressed during informal interviews and focus 
group discussions in Grand Gedeh in February 2014 when there were about 52,000 
remaining in Liberia, from a height of about 220,000 following the post-electoral crisis 
(Momodu 2014), appeared unabated during a focus group discussion I attended at the 
Little Wlebo camp in Maryland in February 2016, when fewer than 30,000 remained. 
Chapters 9 and 10 provide more background on the alleged connections between 
Ivoirian refugees and cross-border militias, but this will be discussed in the next section 
mainly within the context of the co-creation of kinship narratives, reinforced by the 
idea that Liberians border residents are hosting their ethnic kin, sheltering them from 
the persecution they are sure to face if they return to Ouattara’s Côte d’Ivoire. 
7.2. ‘Dangerous Sanctuaries’29: refugee camps as sites of 
fomentation and recruitment 
If borders and borderlands may be considered insecure spaces, refugee camps situated 
at borders are even more so. Lischer (2006) highlights that violence often accompanies 
refugee crises, arguing that some refugee crises can instigate the spread of civil war. 
She suggests that three attributes influence whether a refugee crisis will cause the 
spread of war: the origin of the refugee crisis; the policy of the receiving state; and the 
influence of external and non-state actors. She also characterises refugees by the 
cause of their flight, noting that where refugees are ‘situational’, that is those who flee 
to escape intolerable conditions and general destruction rather than specific 
persecution, they are often willing to return home as soon as stability is re-established 
(Lischer 2006: 10). In contrast, when a refugee crisis results from direct persecution or 
oppression, possibly on the basis of ethnic, religious, linguistic or political identity, this 
‘group persecution can facilitate political or military organization among the refugees 
and cross-border violence’ (ibid.: 10) and these refugees ‘generally refuse to return 
home unless they are assured protection from their persecutors’ (ibid.). As will be 
discussed in subsequent chapters, it was presumed that militias were numbered 
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among the Ivoirian refugee population in Liberia, some of whom were implicated in 
cross-border attacks. 
Lischer notes a third category, a group that is essentially a ‘state-in-exile’, including 
political and military leaders, who ‘organize the refugee crisis as a strategy . . . [and] 
refuse to return home unless they do so in victory’. She concludes that this group, 
along with persecuted refugees, has the highest propensity for political violence 
because it includes ‘a highly organized political and military leadership’ (ibid.: 24). 
Subsequent to the Ivoirian post-electoral crisis, the UN Panel of Experts traced much of 
the source of cross-border attacks as originating from Ghana, and highlighted the need 
to interrupt the funding flows between these state-in-exile refugees and those 
refugees in Liberia, noting that:  
Long-standing alliances between Liberian mercenary and Ivorian militia commanders 
who previously fought together in Moyen-Cavally, western Côte d’Ivoire, as well as 
ethnic, familial and political connections between those individuals and former elites 
of the Gbagbo regime living in Ghana, constitute strong networks for the transmission 
of funds through couriers and bank transfers . . . from whom they receive funds, 
communications equipment such as satellite telephones, and instructions. The Panel 
observed . . . Individual combatant commanders in Liberia rely on their own personal 
connections to these elites in Ghana. (Panel of Experts on Liberia 2012a: 18) 
While financing is critical, it is also important to understand the concerns shared by the 
‘state-in-exile’ and persecuted groups. During my participant-observation of refugee 
communities between 2012 and 2016, an enduring narrative among refugees was not 
only their persecution, even as refugees in relative safety in Liberia, but also that of 
their exiled leadership in Ghana. At these different points in time, and even in the 
middle of an accelerated refugee return programme in 2016, these perceptions of 
victimisation were kept alive with frequent news from home (facilitated by the refugee 
camps’ proximity to the borders) of the deployment of FRCI in western Côte d’Ivoire 
where most of the refugees were from, which was now the official military but 
amalgamated from the conquering rebel armies that had supported Ouattara’s 
presidency bid, and as such considered an ‘army of occupation’. Their presence was 
considered to have facilitated the arrival and take-over of the refugees’ vacated land 
by northern foreigners and citizens of Burkina Faso, setting the inevitable scene for 
land conflicts down the line. Added to this were perceptions that DDR was poorly 
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implemented in western Côte d’Ivoire, Gbagbo’s stronghold (and of course not 
extended at all to those Ivoirian militias residing in Liberia or indeed Ghana), and the 
decision to keep the Liberian–Ivoirian borders closed during the 2015 presidential 
elections, ostensibly because of the threat of the cross-border spread of Ebola, but 
which also denied the vote to thousands of anti-Ouattara voters, who could not return 
in time to register, let alone vote. Other key concerns remained the Ouattara 
Government’s lack of commitment to genuine reconciliation – as one young refugee 
female told me, ‘without reconciliation there can be no peace’. Another opined, ‘When 
you are president it should be for everyone but two camps still exist. Two sides fought 
but only one side was brought to justice.’ This echoed a commonly held view among 
refugees of a ‘selective’ or ‘victor’s’ justice, similar to that of ex-combatants and focus 
group discussants as discussed in the previous chapter. They pointed to the hundreds 
of pro-Gbagbo political prisoners languishing in prison, while pro-Ouattara militias who 
had committed similar atrocities were not punished. The Government’s decision to 
allow Gbagbo and his principal co-conspirator, former leader of the Young Patriots and 
Minister of Sport and Youth under Gbagbo, Charles Blé Goudé, to be charged and tried 
by the International Criminal Court was another bone of contention. 
Lischer also notes that the ability of the latter two groups to spread conflict depends 
on the capability of the receiving state to secure its borders and demilitarise refugees, 
and its will or desire to prevent conflict; thus its response to refugee militarisation is 
critical to whether the conflict spreads. While the Liberian government cannot be 
accused of complicity as a receiving state, the Ivoirian government has expressed the 
opinion that the Liberian government has not done enough to prevent cross-border 
attacks. Further, if we consider the micro-region, it is apparent that cultural and ethnic 
alliances have engendered a significant level of complicity. As an UNMIL staff member 
observed to me in March 2012, ‘they were being hosted by their Liberian counterparts, 
who were returning the favour and hospitality of previous years when they were 
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refugees in Côte d’Ivoire.’30 How to address this aspect is also not widely considered, 
as will be discussed more fully in Chapter 9. 
Non-state actors, including humanitarian agencies, can also inadvertently capacitate 
refugees to engage in violence, for instance through the indiscriminate provision of 
humanitarian assistance (Grant 2008). These latter features appeared to be apparent 
in this micro-region. As mentioned previously, in the aftermath of the Ivoirian 2010–
2011 post-election crisis, over 220,000 people, many of them Gbagbo supporters, fled 
to neighbouring countries, the majority to Grand Gedeh County where three refugee 
camps were established to accommodate them (with a further two in Nimba County 
and one in Maryland). Many also settled in communities before being encouraged to 
move to camps in Liberia’s three other counties bordering Côte d’Ivoire – Nimba, River 
Gee and Maryland Counties. It became an explicit goal of the Liberian Government and 
humanitarian actors to encourage refugees to stay in camps rather than communities 
(encouraged by providing certain types of assistance only to refugees residing in 
camps).31 This was also widely perceived as a strategy for containing the activities of 
Ivoirian combatants and militias among the refugees, aided by inadequate screening 
measures by the Liberian authorities and UNHCR, who in the face of the maximum 
influx, granted Ivoirian asylum seekers prima facie refugee status without them 
undergoing individual status determination.  
This reality of this perception was borne out in the detention and arrest of 86 
suspected Ivoirian armed elements on 1 April 2011, after they entered Maryland 
County (Panel of Experts on Liberia 2012b). Nearly 100 more suspected Ivoirian armed 
elements were apprehended in Liberia in 2011, including 38 Ivoirians who crossed into 
River Gee and were ultimately extradited to Côte d’Ivoire, and many others eventually 
being granted refugee status. They were part of ‘of a larger force of approximately 85 
armed Ivorian combatants and Liberian mercenaries who had fled Abidjan on 3 May 
2011, and entered Liberia with their weapons and ammunition following clashes with 
the Forces républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire, the armed forces of the Ouattara 
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 Interview with UNMIL staff member, March 2012. 
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 Interview with LRRRC official, February 2012. 
139 
 
 
 
Government in Côte d’Ivoire, and after committing extrajudicial killings of Ivorian 
civilians’ (Panel of Experts on Liberia 2012b: 16). 
Several cross-border attacks from Liberia into Côte d’Ivoire were also carried out 
during this period, including an ambush on UNOCI peacekeepers on 9 June 2012 in Tai, 
close to the Liberian border, which resulted in the death of seven Nigerien 
peacekeepers. UNHCR asserted throughout that they had preserved the civilian 
character of the camp, including through screening, and their security in collaboration 
with Liberia National Police (LNP) stationed in or near the camps ensured that the 
camps were weapons-free. UN Panel of Experts reports, however, uncovered evidence 
that ‘Ivoirians . . . had been recruited primarily in refugee camps within Liberia’ (Panel 
of Experts on Liberia 2012a: 16). They also note the heavy involvement of Liberians 
both as commanders and foot soldiers (for instance comprising half the force that 
attacked village of Sakré, close to Tai, in Moyen-Cavally, Côte d’Ivoire, in April 2012) 
who together with Ivoirian refugee militias were engaged ‘in and around Ziah refugee 
camp, Konobo district, and Zwedru, Grand Gedeh county’. I observed for myself this 
connection between Liberian ex-combatants and (presumed) Ivoirian ex-militias in 
refugee camps. On a visit to a refugee camp with an UNMIL colleague in 2013, he 
recognised and was recognised by a Liberian ex-combatant at a local watering hole, 
where we sat with him and his Ivoirian ‘comrades’. My colleague had met the Liberian 
ex-combatant at the so-called Peace Camp in Guiglo, Côte d’Ivoire, a decommissioned 
Liberian refugee camp,32 during a trip some years previously to encourage Liberian ex-
combatants to return home. (Most had declined, citing lack of opportunities at home 
and the hope that they might still gain something from the relatively more attractive 
DDR programme in Côte d’Ivoire.)  
Following the encampment policy, rumours persisted that cross-border attacks were 
being planned by militias with refugee status residing in camps and their Liberian 
supporters, such that UNHCR periodically received written requests from the 
Presidents of Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia to relocate the refugee camps further inland, 
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 According to the Panel of Experts on Liberia, in addition to being home to a substantial Liberian 
refugee community, Guiglo ‘had been the nerve centre of mercenary recruitment for the Lima group by 
the former Gbagbo regime during the 2002–2003 Ivorian conflict’ (Panel of Experts on Liberia 2011: 20). 
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away from the border, which is prescribed by international humanitarian best practice 
but was considered impractical and costly in this context, not least because the 
refugees were happy to be touching distance from home, more easily able to keep an 
eye on things and, in the case of some, among family members. Nonetheless, several 
further cross-border attacks occurred in April 2013, and attacks on Ivoirian 
government installations close to the Liberian border, including as recently as 2 
December 2015 and 29 March 2016, are consistently alleged to have a cross-border 
dimension (conversation with UN Panel of Expert member in February 2016 and 
communication from UNOCI). As noted in Chapter 1, a summary of cross-border 
attacks is provided in Table A1.2 in Annex 1. 
7.3. Revisiting economic motivations 
The foregoing has strongly emphasised cross-border associational ties and common 
identity creation that can perhaps facilitate cross-border conflict. As the previous 
chapter showed, however, this is only a part of the story. This section thus discusses 
two other aspects – lack of economic opportunities, and financial motivations, relative 
to the regional dimension. This discussion can be seen as both a supply and demand 
dynamic and will be taken in turn. Rather than obviating the importance of these 
dynamics, however, they also demonstrate an interplay with the cross-border 
dynamics discussed in the first section of this chapter that need to be taken into 
consideration in mitigating measures.  
7.3.1. Search for alternative employment 
In 2010, I conducted some research on residual combatant chains of command in 
Liberia. Time and again I was informed by UN and NGO staff that the best place to 
conduct this type of research was in the gold and diamond mining camps, often 
situated in the counties bordering other countries – especially Gbarpolu, Grand Cape 
Mount and Grand Gedeh. Additionally, these areas attracted young men, including – 
so the story went – cross-border ex-combatants. Indeed, five of my 25 interviewees in 
Grand Gedeh were artisanal miners. Because ex-combatants apparently congregate in 
gold mining camps, they are also highlighted as recruitment sites for cross-border 
conflict. The Panel of Experts for Liberia reported in 2012 that several militias (some of 
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who, incidentally, were also registered refugees) were arrested ‘at the New York Gold 
mine in Grand Gedeh County, for allegedly preparing a cross-border raid into Côte 
d’Ivoire’ (Panel of Experts on Liberia 2012a: 22). 
Why gold mining camps, one may ask? Hoffman argues that not only are the labourers 
deployed to work in mines the same as those deployed on the battlefield in the Mano 
River Union, they also demonstrate ‘post Fordism or flexible specialization’, meaning 
‘the organizational logic at work in the region was increasingly one of making young 
men available for “just in time” production based on whatever opportunities 
presented themselves: mining, timber cutting, tapping rubber, or war fighting’ 
(Hoffman 2011b: 42). From my own research I would venture that because, like cross-
border combat, border mining communities provide an opportunity to access relatively 
quick cash, in an environment where the rules that apply are those governed by camp 
chairmen (like commanders) but where traditional or even national authority does not 
penetrate, young men through their labour can make or decide their fortunes. Further, 
diamond and gold mining communities ‘absorb the [absent] state’s functions as a 
provider of social services, including education, employment and support for miners 
and their families when they are sick’ (UNMIL/JMAC/Liberia Desk 2010). UNMIL 
research found evidence of smaller-scale chains of command present in some of these 
arrangements, where ‘certain groups continue to wield power and influence due to 
their war-time reputations combined with the latent threat of violence’ (ibid.). This is 
illustrated by a story related to me by a Landmine Action (now Action on Armed 
Violence) staff member, wherein, in the mining community Wesua in Gbarpolu County, 
ex-combatants who had initially expressed an interest in leaving the mining to 
participate in a skills training project later dropped out after being discouraged from 
doing so by the mining entrepreneurs they worked for, who were mostly former 
wartime commanders.  
I interrogated this perspective with research in Henry Town, Bopulu District, Gbarpolu 
County in 2010. The county borders Sierra Leone but has the distinction of having no 
official border crossing point with that country, although it is known to have at least 
seven unofficial ones (Office of the Senior Inspector 2015a, 2015b). During interviews 
with UNMIL and NGO personnel, it was clear that it was also considered something of 
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a beacon for ex-combatants, including Sierra Leoneans who had remained in Liberia. 
During my arrival and introduction the Camp Chairman, upon hearing that I was Sierra 
Leonean, promptly informed me that ‘half’ of the more than 18,000 camp residents 
(Weedee 2012) were my countrymen. I soon found that while indeed many of these 
were ex-combatants, they had not necessarily fought outside Sierra Leone but had 
made their way to Liberia and Henry Town after the war, making their way via ‘bush 
roads’. They had heard about Henry Town by word of mouth from their compatriots 
who had since returned, and followed in their footsteps, driven, as one of my 
interviewees told me, by the relatively less stringent regulatory environment that 
prevailed in Liberia. In my interactions I identified three types of Sierra Leonean 
miners. There were the ‘lifers’ who indeed had fought in Liberia, had more or less cut 
ties with family and life in Sierra Leone and seemed to live only for the day. Then there 
were those who planned on (and succeeded in) only being there for a short while, 
driven by the intention to return with enough money to build a property, acquire a 
business or marry a wife. Finally, there were those who appeared to be in the grips of a 
‘wild west’ type existence, where the gold they dug for every day bought them 
everything from satellite TV and mobile phones to Nike trainers, booze, drugs, or even 
a warm body for the night, these items conveniently priced in grams of gold. These 
people expressed that their intention was only to be there for a short period but in 
reality had come years previously and still remained, with little to show for it.  
I found this experience to be extremely instructive for how I framed my subsequent 
understanding of regional combatant motivation. Speaking to some of them, there 
seemed no distinction as to whether they were crossing borders to fight or to dig for 
gold: both occupations required a skill they possessed in abundance – strength – and 
potentially provided a pathway to a better life.  
This is the argument that Hoffman elegantly elaborates on in various articles and his 
book, War Machines (2011a, 2011b, 2007). He observes that ‘the language of labor, 
employment, gain, compensation, reward, security – the language, in other words, of 
postmodern work – was very much the language of militia fighters throughout West 
Africa’s Mano River War’ (Hoffman 2011b: 34). He urges readers to think of violence as 
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a mode of production and of the perpetrators of that violence as a ‘workforce’ (ibid.: 
36).  
As noted above, an in-depth discussion of warlords and political entrepreneurs, as 
separate from rank and file combatants, is outside the scope of this thesis, but it is 
worthwhile to make brief mention here in relation to a demand-side discussion of the 
political economy of micro-regions and the financial incentives of these groups. I 
consider their motivations in the context of the ‘political marketplace’ (de Waal 2016). 
Much has been written about the ‘new geography of conflict . . . in which resource 
flows rather than political or ideological divisions constitute the major fault lines’ 
(Grant 2008: 114), often using the West African conflicts as case studies. Indeed, in the 
sub-region ‘the illicit trade networks in blood diamonds and other commodities to grey 
arms sales markets, nascent regional trade corridors, regional conflicts, cross-border 
trading and migration’ are noted, often facilitated by the informalisation of political 
power (Söderbaum and Taylor 2008b: 22).  
Charles Taylor especially has been held up as the poster child for warlordism, and his 
support for conflicts in neighbouring countries can be explained at least in part by his 
desire to exert control over lucrative diamond and timber resources, including in Sierra 
Leone. As Grant (2008: 114) notes, ‘Taylor’s remarkable ability to conclude commercial 
deals with a wide range of business interests on exporting timber, rubber, diamonds 
and iron ore provided the means to pay his military commanders and officials, 
promote patrimonial networks among chiefs and other supporters and purchase 
weapons’. 
Speaking of the so-called Parrot’s Beak, and extending the analysis to include Côte 
d’Ivoire, Grant notes that it was ‘a hotly contested micro-region as belligerents fight 
for control of diamonds, gold, timber, rubber, agricultural products and humanitarian 
aid – not to mention of the requisite cross-border routes and conduits for weapons, 
goods and people’ (ibid.: 120) This has extended into peacetime, where ‘people, 
diamonds, weapons, illegal narcotics, various extractive commodities, foodstuffs and 
consumer goods are known to pass relatively freely across the borders’ (ibid.: 118), 
facilitated by the ‘the dual forces of globalisation on the one hand and already-weak 
state capacity on the other’ (ibid.: 113). I have already noted above that Sierra 
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Leoneans and others prefer artisanal mining in Liberia due to the comparatively weak 
regulatory regime. It is not difficult to imagine that these could develop into or be co-
opted by a more sophisticated machinery, benefitting from a command and control 
system similar to that which existed during the war, bringing with it the attendant 
violence that accompanies illicit cross-border activities in other parts of the world. 
Even this situation, however, should not be considered as a simple economic 
transaction. de Waal, expanding on the political marketplace, conceptualises it as ‘a 
system of governance run on the basis of personal transactions in which political 
services and allegiances are exchanged for material reward in a competitive manner’ 
(2016: 1). He notes however that financial motives are still insufficient, and that 
‘Typically, we see moral populism and a political marketplace flourishing hand-in-hand. 
The two feed off one another: political entrepreneurs call on moral populist scripts to 
mobilize support and exclude others, while moral populists utilize political business 
strategies to survive and prosper’ (ibid.: 3).  
7.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to interrogate more closely, through the lens of the micro-
region, the cultural identity narratives discussed in the previous section and the 
literature, which are trumped by regional combatants and peacebuilders alike as an 
important motivating factor for participation in cross-border conflict. In keeping with 
the conceptualisation of the new regionalisms approach, it emphasises the importance 
of evolving historical, political, economic and social dynamics that cannot be ignored 
when analysing and responding to regional conflict. It noted that border regions are 
areas in which conflicts often arise and are perpetuated: they are often the most 
remote from nations’ capitals, and accordingly are often the most neglected, and 
easily become areas where grievances foment. This is especially the case for the Mano 
River Union countries, where the movement of cross-border fighters is set against a 
backdrop of poorly patrolled borders, ethnic loyalties that straddle multiple dividing 
lines, and contested border areas.  
The chapter further highlighted the persistence of symbolic and social identity around 
which people are able to rally. People will point to the ethnic overtones of factions in 
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conflict, relating to cross-border kinship, historical ties, and socio-political grievances. 
It also shows, however, that just as international boundaries between neighbouring 
countries are both real and imagined, so the lack of boundaries between these regions 
is equally as real, and imagined. By this I mean that at the same time as cultural 
affinities are marshalled to justify cross-border conflict, this cannot be divorced from 
the individual desires for improving one’s situation, even if the reason is communal (to 
obtain a wife, or to build a house for one’s family). This elaborates on the previous 
chapter’s conclusion that material/financial incentives are but one aspect of a complex 
set of combatant motivations. While cross-border communities commonly assert that 
young men are recruited because of familial ties, it is also clear that this ethnic kinship 
identity is wielded opportunistically and to personal advantage – for instance, being 
able to slip in and out of countries undetected because it is difficult for outsiders to 
identify individuals from across the border as strangers, which facilitates their 
participation in neighbouring conflicts and ensures their safety or protection among 
kinship groups in neighbouring communities. Thus, those external peacebuilders who 
would settle on such characteristics as kinship ties to propose mitigating measures 
must be savvy to the reality that border communities and regional combatants 
strategically deploy relational ties as bargaining chips or options.  
Indeed, the narratives of society, culture, and what constitutes an in-group has 
changed and been exacerbated by colonial and post-colonial national configurations 
and conflict. It is therefore too simplistic to subscribe to traditional idealised versions 
of culture, society and familial ties and relations and necessary to consider not only the 
impetus of personal ambition and gain, but that ambition in the context of what it 
means for a person to be a meaningful member of society.  
Conversely, while economic motives are salient, it is important to realise that these are 
similarly mediated through socio-cultural perspectives, facilitated by the nexus of 
cross-border kinship and economic opportunities available in borderland micro-
regions. As such, appropriate responses require peacebuilding discourse and practice 
that can understand and address the seeming dichotomies and differing motivation 
narratives. The extent to which this has happened, and the implications are the subject 
of the next three chapters, which considers in turn the organisational processes of 
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peace operations, which frame peacebuilders’ ways of working, recalling the 
institutional ethnography approach (Chapter 8), and the resulting practices by 
international peacebuilders (Chapter 9) and their national counterparts (Chapter 10). 
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8. Peace operations’ mandates and their limitations  
The next few chapters provide an analysis of peacebuilders’ capacity to effectively 
address regional conflict, especially given the complexities associated with combatant 
motivations highlighted in the two previous chapters. The two chapters that follow this 
one will place peacebuilding practice in dialogue with these motivations, evaluating 
the extent to which resulting cross-border stabilisation efforts in the Mano River Union 
(MRU) sub-region effectively address regional combatants’ motivations. This chapter 
serves as something of a bridge as – in keeping with the conceptual framework, which 
advocates a consideration across the spectrum of peacebuilding practice – it considers 
the broader context within which peacebuilding practices are shaped. 
This chapter highlights two issues. Firstly, it considers Autesserre’s assertion that the 
practices, habits and narratives intrinsic to international peacebuilders constrain their 
effectiveness (Autesserre 2014). She ascribes this to on-the-ground peacebuilders 
themselves who, particularly in their habits ‘do not prioritize intimate understanding of 
local histories, cultures, or language’ and ‘reproduce counterproductive modes of 
operation instead of challenging them’ (Autesserre 2014: 33). While I agree to some 
extent, her focus on on-the-ground peacebuilders does not allow for sufficient analysis 
of the ways in which extra-local factors, as highlighted in relation to institutional 
ethnography in Chapter 5, contribute to this reproduction of counterproductive 
modes, even as she recognises that external factors significantly influence on-the-
ground activities. This chapter seeks to redress this to some extent. Accordingly, 
Section 8.1 takes as its starting point the context within which Security Council 
resolutions are crafted, resolutions being the most important documents for peace 
operations because they provide their mandates, that is the authority for their 
operations and broad outlines of their required (mandated) peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding tasks. This section shows how resolutions are, however, developed 
within a context of competing priorities, financial constraints and crisis, potentially 
curtailing peacekeeping and peacebuilding practice at the source. 
Section 8.2 expands on the second issue, which relates to how mandates are 
translated into practice on the ground, and as such, the means by which extra- and 
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trans-local factors influence on-the-ground peacebuilders’ practices, and the ways in 
which peacebuilders in turn react, respond and influence these processes. It 
particularly explores the role of ‘text’ in this regard. Recalling institutional 
ethnography’s reading of texts discussed in Chapter 5, institutions such as the UN 
could be considered as ‘textually-mediated forms of organisation’ (Smith 2002: 39). In 
such institutions, again as noted in Chapter 5, external or extra-local discourse is 
important because it acts as a mutual point of reference in the local context, even 
though the authors of external discourse/text mostly transcend the local historical 
context. The discussion thus elaborates on the distinctive ways in which texts structure 
consciousness, social relationships and ‘ruling relations’ (Walby 2007: 1008) within the 
UN. The aim is to unravel the interconnectedness of activities in different sites, as well 
as to learn about the individual’s location in the relations of ruling or to learn what the 
individual does with texts (Walby 2007). As such, the section also explores the ways in 
which texts are reinterpreted, manipulated, traduced and evaded33 by peacebuilders 
on the ground and the implications for peacekeeping and peacebuilding practice.  
As noted above, this chapter could be considered broad strokes that relate to 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding practice more generally, but given that the thesis is 
concerned with regional peace and security, Section 8.3 introduces the language on 
regional and inter-mission cooperation in the Mano River sub-region, while an 
arguably innovative response to the reality of cross-border conflict and multiple peace 
operations in a single region, is similarly constrained. This provides the basis for critical 
analysis of its implementation in Chapters 9 and 10, which contextualise the discussion 
and consider in detail how the limitations generate an imbalanced interaction with the 
narratives and discourses of regional combatants highlighted in previous chapters, 
thus limiting the value of programmes and interventions on the ground. Section 8.4 
provides some concluding remarks on the role and impact of texts in such contexts.  
It should be noted that this chapter is not meant to be read as an extensive critique or 
evaluation of UN peace operations, which has been examined exhaustively elsewhere 
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 I wish to acknowledge that this phrasing is adapted text from the feedback of one of my supervisors, 
Robin Luckham.  
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(see for instance Koops et al. 2015; Fortna 2008; Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Nor does 
it provide a comprehensive overview of the inner workings of the UN. It does, 
however, elaborate on the constraints it faces in relation to the literature discussed in 
Chapter 4, which posits international peacebuilding as cut-and-paste, discourse-driven, 
top-down and formulaic. It draws extensively on textual analysis and my participant-
observation of the efforts by the UN to support Liberia and her neighbours to 
consolidate regional peace and security, and is framed within the institutional 
ethnography approach discussed in Chapter 5. 
8.1. Making  mandates for peace operations  
Chapter 4 has already highlighted several shortcomings associated with UN peace 
operations. Thus, it is appropriate only to recount a few relevant ones here, in relation 
to constraints on determining peace operations’ mandates. Four aspects may be 
highlighted: the political nature of decision-making within the UN; financial 
considerations; the crisis nature of conflicts, which colour how peacekeeping decisions 
are made; and the bureaucratic nature of the UN, resulting in adherence to stock texts. 
Each of these issues influences the mandates that are eventually passed to on-the-
ground peacebuilders.  
With regard to the political nature of decision-making, Weiss and Thakur (2010) note 
that the Security Council and General Assembly34 are intergovernmental forums in 
which people make decisions as delegates of national governments with their own 
national foreign policies and priorities. As such, ‘[t]he politics of the Council also 
contort the mandates themselves, as compromise is always required. The danger for 
the Council is the muddying of the political objective; as the “obfuscation of the 
political objective leads to ambiguity in the mandate”’ (Nadin 2014). Accordingly, 
ensuing resolutions are often the result of significant negotiations, and are often 
watered down to achieve consensus, especially in the Security Council, where all five 
permanent members (the P5) must agree before a resolution is passed (or at least not 
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 These are two of the six principal organs of the UN, the other four being the Secretariat, Economic 
and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, and the International Court of Justice. 
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sue their veto). For relatively small and un-strategic countries, such as those in the 
Mano River sub-region,35 but which each have the benefit of a champion among the 
P5,36 possible areas of contention may not be immediately obvious. Indeed, as 
mentioned in previous chapters, the three countries have been both learning ground 
and poster-child for robust multidimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding, which 
kept them funded year after year, but this does not preclude disunity of purpose.  
The crisis nature of decision-making around peace operations also adversely affects 
mandates. Nadin notes further: 
The Security Council, however, usually under pressure of events on the ground, very 
rarely has a chance to formulate a strategy before establishing a peace operation. 
Instead, most missions are forged out of the ‘political and organisational pressures’ of 
the day and engendered with ‘a culture of ad-hoc decision-making in a climate of 
constant crisis’. (Nadin 2014) 
While this critique may be relevant in the immediate aftermath of a crisis, it does not, 
however, explain why apparently similarly constrained resolutions are passed year 
after year in long-established missions, including UNMIL and UNOCI. 
Another consideration, especially with longer-term missions, is the cost of financing 
operations. While all member states share the burden for funding peace operations, 
the P5 are required to pay a larger share of assessed funding contributions for peace 
operations37 because of their special responsibility for maintaining international peace 
and security. Indeed, they are among the top 10 providers of assessed contributions, 
with the United States contributing three times more than the second highest 
contributor (28.57 percent compared to China’s 10.29 percent in 2016 (United Nations 
Peacekeeping n.d.)).38 It is worth noting here that for the 2016–2017 budget year, the 
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 With the possible exception of Côte d’Ivoire, which is economically and strategically important for 
France. 
36
 Mostly as a result of colonial history – namely the UK for Sierra Leone, the USA for Liberia, and France 
for Côte d’Ivoire. 
37
 The General Assembly apportions peacekeeping expenses based on a special scale of assessments 
under a complex formula that Member States themselves have established, taking into account, among 
other things, the relative economic wealth of Member States. 
38
 The top 10 providers in 2016 were: United States (28.57%); China (10.29%); Japan (9.68%); Germany 
(6.39%); France (6.31%); United Kingdom (5.80%); Russian Federation (4.01%); Italy (3.75%); Canada 
(2.92%); and Spain (2.44%) (United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d.). 
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UN peacekeeping budget was US$7.87 billion, covering 16 missions, and there has 
been consistent pressure, not least among the P5, to reduce peacekeeping costs, 
especially those arising from older missions such as UNMIL and UNOCI. For instance, 
the Secretariat developed a budget of US$205 million for Liberia for the financial year 
2016–2017, already representing a decrease of 40.5 percent in gross terms from the 
previous 2015/16 appropriation. This was slashed, however, by a further 9 percent by 
the Fifth Committee (see below) in its resolution approving financing of UNMIL for this 
period. 
It should be noted that while the Security Council is chiefly responsible for establishing 
and maintaining peace operations, the General Assembly also plays a significant role. It 
has supervisory responsibilities over the UN Secretariat, within which the Department 
for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) sits, and approves its budget, staffing regulations 
and structure (Peterson 2007: 99). Additionally, member states contribute troops and 
other personnel to peace operations.39 The Administrative and Budgetary Committee 
of the General Assembly, also known as the Fifth Committee,40 comprising all member 
states, is further responsible for considering and preparing draft resolutions on 
programme budgets for adoption by the Assembly, including for peace operations 
(United Nations Secretariat 2004). The Fifth Committee’s work is largely done on the 
basis of informal consultations and, once consensus is reached, is submitted to the 
General Assembly (United Nations Secretariat 2004). The Fifth Committee holds three 
sessions: during the main part of the General Assembly session (September to 
                                                          
 
39
 In addition to those countries that contribute to decision-making on financing, troop contributing 
countries (TCCS) also play an important role. As of 31 August 2016, there were 100,019 uniformed 
personnel (military and police) from 123 countries, serving in the 16 peacekeeping missions around the 
world (United Nations 2016). The bulk of peacekeeping troops, including for West Africa are drawn from 
member states, mostly developing countries rather than the Security Council. The top three troop 
(police and military) contributing countries as of 31 August 2016 were Ethiopia (8,326); India (7,471); 
and Pakistan (7,140). Source: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2016/aug16_2.pdf. 
Their influence is somewhat limited, however, by insufficient consultation by the Security Council about 
where and under what circumstances peacekeeping missions are decided.  
40
 There are six committees of the General Assembly in total, the remaining being: Disarmament and 
International Security Committee (First Committee); Economic and Financial Committee (Second 
Committee); Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee (Third Committee); Special Political and 
Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee); and Legal Committee (Sixth Committee). 
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December); a resumed session in March; and a second resumed session in May, 
specifically to deal with administrative and budgetary aspects of UN Peacekeeping. 
Even within the UN, the way the Fifth Committee operates has been critiqued. In his 
2016 statement on behalf of the Africa Group at the close of the Fifth Committee 
session on peacekeeping, the representative from Tanzania noted: 
As we stated in the past, the African Group would like to stress that, the consideration 
of the peacekeeping budgets should not be taken as a simple costs reduction exercise 
but rather a responsible mandate implementation-resource allocation and policy 
guidance driven exercise. (Kisoka 2016) 
Further, although the emphasis is on informal consultations and consensus building, 
some have critiqued the nature of consultations, and the back door and secretive 
nature of the Fifth Committee. In this relation, the Tanzania Representative also noted: 
In conclusion, the African Group reiterates its longstanding position that the work of 
this Committee should be conducted in an open, transparent and all-inclusive manner. 
The Group therefore wishes to reassure you of its readiness to engage with other 
delegations in a constructive [manner] and of course with application of innovative 
ideas, with a view to achieving a positive outcome on all agenda items before end the 
month. We would like to encourage other delegations to do their part including 
avoiding some unnecessary tactics which may negatively impact the work of the 
Committee and the population in the ground. (Kisoka 2016: 3) 
He was not alone in his critique of the nature of consultations. The European Union 
representative made the following observation in his closing statement at the same 
session: ‘Again the Committee has been unable to conclude this peacekeeping session 
within the time allocated. There is a strong shared feeling that four weeks is not 
enough to deal with the complex matters at hand and the massive amount of work 
that the approval of each individual peacekeeping budgets entail’ (Vrailas 2016: 3). 
Other problems lie not with the decision-making process but with the procedures 
themselves. For instance, unlike other UN programme budgets, which cover a calendar 
period of two years, the budget period for peacekeeping operations is one year, 
running from 1 July to 30 June, which limits a medium-term perspective. Overlaying 
this, as peace operations are established according to need, they are often out of sync 
with the budget period. Regardless of the date of the resolution, typically field 
missions receive an instruction from the Controller’s Office in August of every year to 
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start planning the budget the following June; Liberia’s first mandate was September 
2003 and with some exceptions has been renewed annually,41 meaning budgetary 
planning has consistently been out of sync with when the mandate is typically 
received, in September.  
To elaborate: for UNMIL in a typical year, say 2012/13, when I started the substantive 
part of my fieldwork, the code cable from New York instructing the mission to begin 
planning for the 2013/14 budget document arrived in August 2012. This came as the 
Mission was completing its reporting for the 2011/12 budget year. Hot on its heels, the 
Mission received the S/Res 2066 with the mandate in September 2012 which, among 
others, endorsed the Secretary-General’s recommendations42 for reducing UNMIL’s 
military and police strength (United Nations Security Council, 2012b). It was also 
understood in that resolution, but not elaborated, that civilian personnel and tasks 
would also be cut. UNMIL, broadly used this and the other directives contained in the 
resolution to plan its Results-Based Budgeting (RBB)43 activities and related staffing 
and costing requirements, not for that year, but the following one, i.e. the financial 
period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014. In the meantime, some back-pedalling was 
required to adjust for the cuts requested in the new mandate, requiring the 
curtailment some activities, especially given that the 2012/13 budget, including 
staffing levels and priority areas, had been prepared against the September 2011 
resolution. 
The next section elaborates on some of the implications of these processes, especially 
as they relate to the (arguably problematic) production and reproduction of texts like 
the resolutions and RBB, which underlie peacebuilding practice.  
                                                          
 
41
 When decisions are imminent (such as decisions to change the nature of the mission), or a crisis (such 
as Ebola), mission mandates may be revised within shorter timeframes. 
42
 Contained in his reports S/2012/230 and S/2012/641. 
43
 The Results Based Budgeting (RBB) process determines peacekeeping’s operations budgets for a given 
financial year and results in the main document that highlights a peacekeeping mission’s key priorities, 
expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and outputs. It essentially turns a three- to six-
page Security Council resolution containing the mission’s mandate into a nearly 100-page document, 
detailing the mission’s plan for interpreting and delivering on the mandate, including planned results 
and required financial resources military and police personnel, international and national staff, and 
United Nations Volunteers. 
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8.2. Interpreting and implementing peacekeeping mandates 
Three things happened shortly after I arrived in Liberia to work with UNMIL (which I 
will also refer to as ‘the Mission’) in August 2012. First, I was asked to submit my unit’s 
inputs to the performance report for the previous budget year (which ran from 1 July 
2011 to 30 June 2012), which for the most part entailed counting and verifying the 
evidence for a certain number of meetings and a variety of other activities (i.e. 
‘outputs’) and writing some accompanying narrative. These theoretically contributed 
to particular ‘expected accomplishments’ and ‘indicators of achievement’ that my unit 
had committed to. This was my first encounter with the ubiquitous RBB process 
(discussed above) and at the time all I could think was ‘surely there must be a better 
way of accounting for time spent and impact of engagement than counting the 
number of daily situation reports and notes-to-files (i.e. short notes) on a given 
activity’. The second thing that happened was that UNMIL received S/Res 2066, passed 
on 17 September 2012, which renewed UNMIL’s mandate for another year, under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Thirdly, I was requested to contribute 
my unit’s inputs for the 2013–2014 RBB cycle, following receipt of the budget 
instruction as noted in the previous section. 
At the time I did not draw any correlation between the RBB process and the Security 
Council resolution. I did not even read the resolution, upon which, I later came to 
realise, my job was entirely dependent. I was, however, compelled to read the 2013 
resolution (S/Res 2116) the following year, because by then I was working expressly on 
regional and inter-mission cooperation (R/IMC) issues, and more closely with the 
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (OSRSG), and it was my 
job to know exactly what our mandate for IMC was. It also took me a while to 
understand that the question ‘what is our mandate for IMC?’ actually meant, ‘what 
does the latest Security Council resolution say about inter-mission cooperation and 
how are we, as a Mission, going to interpret it?’ Subsequently, I became quite 
concerned with the detail of mandate language for reasons that will be discussed 
below. But even then I did not consider this seeming imposition of the mandate from 
‘on high’ as particularly problematic. After all, while it was true that the document had 
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come from above, it also seemed that UNMIL had countless avenues and opportunities 
to influence perspectives, given that the Mission was the main source of information 
for decision-makers in New York, through daily and weekly reporting, regular reports 
of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the situation in Liberia 
(substantively written by the Mission), performance reviews, code cables, and 
reporting on benchmarks, as well as regular interactions with relevant desk officers in 
New York. Not least, the Mission had primary responsibility for the aforementioned 
RBB process. Surely this provided the Mission an ideal opportunity to put its more 
nuanced stamp on the mandate? 
I became increasingly aware, however, of the tension between the perception among 
colleagues that the evident strictures of the mandate meant that we in the field (or on 
the ground) had seemingly little control over critical decision-making processes, and 
increasing awareness that the production of the RBB more often than not felt like an 
exercise in trying to interpret the mandate in a way that would enable us to get away 
with doing, or not doing, particular things. As such, much time was spent poring over 
mandate language to see if there was any room for manoeuvre (i.e. how we could 
disguise what we were doing that was not part of our mandate and get away with it, or 
how we could describe it in such a way that it could be conceivably be considered as 
being undertaken in fulfilment of mandate requirements). A case in point was 
language on cross-border DDR, which will be discussed in Section 8.3 below and 
elaborated further in the next chapter. 
This led me to thinking about the relationship between UN field missions and 
Headquarters’ personnel (UN Secretariat desk officers in New York, and UN Member 
States themselves). In relation to our New York colleagues, I wondered, surely our 
messaging was their messaging? How could we on one hand provide the information 
that informed the resolution and other directives from New York and then complain on 
the other about the result of the messaging? More broadly, if we, the experts and 
technicians on the ground, were feeding our expertise and knowledge into decision-
making processes, as surely our handlers in New York were passing this information on 
to the powers-that-be, albeit in a more polished and informed format, why were we 
still struggling with the strictures of the mandates passed down to us in the 
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resolutions? Specifically, in the context of my PhD I wondered why this was seemingly 
not the case and about the implications thereof. 
Examining this issue requires a closer look at the UN Secretariat, headed by the 
Secretary-General, and may be considered the closest thing the world has to an 
‘independent international civil service’ (Jonah 2007: 160). Within the Secretariat, 
DPKO has responsibility for ‘planning, preparing for, and conducting UN peacekeeping 
operations in accordance with mandates provided by member states, usually through 
Security Council Resolutions’ (Weiss and Thakur 2010: 69), and it 
provides political and executive direction to UN Peacekeeping operations around the 
world and maintains contact with the Security Council, troop and financial 
contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of Security Council 
mandates. The Department works to integrate the efforts of UN, governmental and 
non-governmental entities in the context of peacekeeping operations. DPKO also 
provides guidance and support on military, police, mine action and other relevant 
issues to other UN political and peacebuilding missions. (United Nations, n.d.) 
Within DPKO, which is headed by an Under-Secretary-General, there are four main 
offices. The Office of Operations (DPKO/OO), headed by an Assistant-Secretary-
General, provides political, strategic policy and operational guidance and support to 
the missions. It is divided among four divisions – Africa I (East Africa and the Horn); 
Africa II (West and Central Africa, under which UNMIL and UNOCI fall); Asia and the 
Middle East; and Europe and Latin America. Within DPKO, the Office of the Rule of Law 
and Security Institutions (OROLSI) aims to strengthen the links between, and 
coordinates the Department’s activities in the areas of, police, justice and corrections, 
mine action, DDR of ex-combatants and security sector reform (SSR), and includes 
police officers seconded by their governments. The Office of Military Affairs (OMA) 
works to deploy the most appropriate, efficient and effective military capability in 
support of United Nations objectives and also includes officers seconded by Member 
States. Finally, the Policy Evaluation and Training (PET) Division provides an integrated 
capacity to develop and disseminate policy and doctrine; develop, coordinate and 
deliver standardized training; evaluate mission progress towards mandate 
implementation; and develop policies and operational frameworks for strategic 
cooperation with various UN and external partners (United Nations, n.d.).  
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The Africa II Division, which is responsible for developing overarching integrated 
strategies for Liberia as well as Côte d’Ivoire, provides strategic direction on cross-
cutting, mission-specific and political issues, as well as day-to-day operational support, 
including guidance on policy and operational issues; and coordination with other 
DPKO-Department of Field Support (DFS) offices, as well as other departments, 
agencies, funds, programmes and regional entities. It also has responsibility for 
devising, promoting agreement on and implementing integrated solutions to the 
political and operational challenges of Department-led operations44 and conveying 
relevant concerns to Member States and other relevant partners, and vice versa. It 
leads integrated planning for new Department-led operations and coordinates 
transitions, as well as consolidation and exit strategies for existing operations. It 
further fulfils the reporting obligations of the Secretary-General to the Security Council 
for Department-led operations (Integrated Training Service - Policy Evaluation and 
Training Division 2015: 13).  
Africa II DPKO/OO staff are supported in their tasks by the West Africa Integrated 
Operations Team (IOT), a ‘cross-functional team . . . that perform[s] a range of core 
tasks related to the integrated operational, including political, guidance and support’ 
to West African peacekeeping missions, incorporating other offices in the Secretariat 
(Integrated Training Service - Policy Evaluation and Training Division 2015: 13).  
For the most part, rank and file field mission staff remain blissfully unaware of the IOT 
and Africa II, but for others, particularly those in Front Offices of the SRSGs and his 
Deputies, these entities are both the source of critical information and essential 
guidance, and a seemingly endless number of ‘requests from New York.’ Often, the 
requests are sent by email, but more weightily, they may arrive in the form of a code 
cable – a memo seemingly emanating from, or at the least signed off by, the USG of 
peacekeeping himself, requesting or delivering information on any number of Mission 
activities. Whenever the cable is a request for information, the Mission hurries to 
respond, agonising over each phrasing, sentence and punctuation mark, as the reply 
                                                          
 
44
 It should also be noted that alongside DPKO is the Department of Political Affairs (or DPA), which 
provides a range of activities including political analysis, and in some cases (for instance Somalia) 
backstops Special Political Missions, which are another form of peace operations. 
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passes from the drafter, usually a junior officer, to his or her immediate supervisor, to 
the head of section, to the head of pillar and ultimately to reviewers in the SRSG Front 
Office who, as the day-to-day interlocutors with the IOT, have the best sense of what 
type of response and therefore content is required. 
This ritual of report writing, and it is indeed a ritual, is replicated across the length and 
breadth of documents processed for transmission to New York, with several effects. 
Chief among these is the sieving out of sometimes critical detail and nuance, in the 
effort to supply information the Mission interprets New York wants or needs to know. 
A case in point is the regular Secretary-General’s report on the situation in a given 
country to the Security Council (the ‘SG report’, delivered in Liberia’s case twice yearly, 
or as mandated by the relevant resolution). The code cable from New York regarding 
the report arrives with suggested topics of focus and recommended word counts for 
each section. This is then sent out by OSRSG or the Political Affairs Section, which in 
Liberia is responsible for compiling the reports, to the relevant sections for input. The 
sections then send the request to the relevant desk officers, who work on the given 
issue and could accordingly write pages and pages on critical recent developments but 
are asked to relegate their inputs to at most a couple of paragraphs. This then gets 
sent up the chain as previously discussed, to be whittled down and harmonised to 
make it part of the greater whole, with the juicy and arguably more important aspects 
invariably left on the cutting room floor.  
An example from an input I submitted for the February 2016 SG report: 
I welcome the continued efforts by the Governments of Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia to 
improve their coordination on border stabilization. This includes convening the second 
Joint Council of Chiefs and Elders Meeting (JCCEM) in Guiglo, Côte d’Ivoire from 16–18 
January 2016, which aimed to strengthen cooperation between administrative 
authorities and traditional leaders in the border region. The JCCEM follows the first 
such meeting in October 2013 and builds on the Quadripartite process reinvigorated in 
March 2015, after the Ebola epidemic had abated.  
I also welcome the resumption of voluntary repatriation of Ivoirian refugees on 16 
December 2015, following a Tripartite meeting from 9–10 December 2015. My SRSGs 
for UNOCI and UNMIL played an active role, including paying a joint visit to Little 
Wlebo Refugee Camp in Maryland on 2 December 2015 to encourage refugees to 
return home following peaceful Ivoirian Presidential elections in October 2015. These 
developments underscore the progress made in the region towards resilient peace. I 
would encourage the two governments to continue to create a safe and secure border 
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environment to facilitate ongoing voluntary repatriation of refugees and to mitigate 
against the alleged border violence that I reported in my previous report. In this 
regard, I note with concern the attack on 2 December 2015 on two FRCI camps in the 
town of Olodio in southwestern Côte d’Ivoire, approximately 15–20 km from the 
Liberian border town of Yobloken, and which resulted in the movement of 10 Ivoirian 
families into Liberia. 
What was eventually published was the following: 
I welcome the continued efforts by the Governments of Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia to 
improve coordination on border stabilization, in particular by convening the second 
meeting of the joint council of chiefs and elders, in January, which built on the 
quadripartite process reinvigorated in March 2015 after the Ebola epidemic had 
abated. I also welcome the resumption of the voluntary repatriation of Ivorian 
refugees in December. These developments demonstrate the progress made in the 
region towards resilient and sustainable peace. I encourage the two Governments to 
continue to build a safe and secure border environment to facilitate the ongoing 
voluntary repatriation of refugees and to mitigate concerns with regard to border 
violence, as set out in my previous report. (United Nations Security Council 2016c: 17) 
I highlight this particular example because while (uncharacteristically!) much of my 
original submission was incorporated, in my view, some of the most critical aspects 
were cut out. This included the point that attacks in the proximity of the Liberian 
border were still taking place, missing an opportunity to flag an ongoing problem, 
especially as another attack took place shortly after the report was published. As far as 
UNMIL was concerned, the attacks did not have a cross-border dimension but UNOCI 
cited that Ivoirian government sources believed they were being carried out by 
(Ivoirian) militias still residing in Liberia. Either way, initial on-the-ground analysis of 
the attacks pointed to ongoing resentment between border communities and the FRCI, 
which as noted in the previous chapter was still considered an army of occupation, but 
also indicated a different dimension of motivation, related to competition between 
FRCI and border youths over the ‘fees’ for illicit border crossings, given that the 
Liberian–Ivoirian border at the time was still closed due to Ebola restrictions. I would 
argue that not being able to highlight or at least signpost these issues in the Secretary-
General’s report, which is a major reference document for a range of peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding actors, kept such issues from being considered as important areas 
of intervention, which, as we will see in the next chapter, may have contributed to 
keeping economic motivations off the regional peacebuilding agenda, despite on-the-
ground peacebuilders’ best efforts. 
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A similarly skewed process is evident in the RBB process, discussed in the previous 
section. By the time suggested inputs are put through the wringer of the reviewing 
ritual, the final outputs that field officers are meant to use to guide their work are 
sometimes hardly recognisable from what they suggested in the first place, leaving 
them at a loss as to how to go about implementing activities that they are still 
responsible for, and querying the value of both their inputs and the resulting 
programme of work.45 With slight adjustments business largely continues as usual, 
however, with staff continuing to carry out non-mandated activities, stretching their 
relevance to justify ongoing reporting against the old budget but seemingly in line with 
the new mandate. 
The preceding discussion highlights a two-fold problem. Firstly, it demonstrates the 
structural constraints that guide mandate resolution configuration, and secondly it 
shows that even if people on the ground have an accurate reading of the situation (for 
instance ex-combatant motivations, as will be shown in the next chapter), the ways in 
which texts are produced and reproduced do not lend themselves to ensuring that this 
accurate reading is presented or prioritised.  
On the other hand, assuming that the new mandate was the best negotiated outcome, 
given the advice from the IOT and informed deliberations by the Security Council, 
having all the information at their fingertips and a more strategic global perspective 
than the mission, whose staff after all need to continue to justify its existence to keep 
themselves in a job, then the field staff’s stubborn adherence to business as usual 
could be considered a waste of valuable (and scarce) resources for peace operations. 
This could especially be considered the case as the same mission staff are responsible 
for reporting against their accomplishments, essentially evaluating themselves, thus 
able to hide or highlight certain activities as they deem fit. 
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 This conclusion was derived following countless discussions with colleagues about the RBB process, 
particularly during stocktaking exercises, when several ‘RBB orphans’ have been identified, the result of 
either such extensive language modification that they are unidentifiable to the section that proposed 
them in the first place, or outputs proposed by someone higher up the chain that a given unit does not 
feel it has the capacity, interest or belief in its relevance to implement. 
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I have gone into this in some detail to highlight that despite the depth of expertise 
both within peace operations and in the Secretariat in New York, some of the ways in 
which ritualised ways of working within the UN, with these examples of report-writing 
and RBB preparations, can and do stifle innovation and the ability to address critical 
issues, as will be shown in the next section and chapter. 
This section concludes with an issue that seeks to reinforce the problematic of texts, 
that is UN’s preference for templating – which constrains critical assessment and 
adaptation to the challenges and particularities of a situation. One possible exception 
to this has been the evolving approach to regional and inter-mission cooperation as it 
relates to the peace operations in West Africa, as will be discussed below, but even 
this is affected by this problematic adherence to templating.  
Nadin (2014) notes, ‘[t]he problem with many UN peace operations is that they rely 
too heavily on template approaches, rather than country-specific ones.’ For instance, 
in relation to the three MRU missions, UNAMSIL, UNMIL and UNOCI, a cursory analysis 
of the operative clauses46 of the respective resolutions establishing each mission bears 
this out, as we find that the language is remarkably similar between them, as 
demonstrated in Table A5.1 in Annex 5: Examples of common mandate language across 
missions and over time. Apparent from an analysis of the resolutions for these three 
missions is that from year to year, much of the mandate language remained almost if 
not exactly the same, both within and across missions, save if something momentous 
was expected to or did happen that year, such as presidential elections or the closure 
of the mission. This is demonstrated even more clearly in relation to the resumption of 
conflict with a cross-border dimension in Table A5.2, also in Annex 5: Examples of 
common mandate language across missions and over time, which specifically examines the 
language on regional and inter-mission cooperation in successive years from 2012 to 
2015 within UNMIL. This may not seem problematic, especially if relating to the same 
country. But in a context where mandates are given annually, if not more frequently, 
this raises the question as to the extent to which stock of progress is being taken, or 
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 UN resolutions generally comprise preambular paragraphs, which present the background to the 
action part of a resolution, and operative paragraphs, which express the opinions of Member States and 
contain the action that they are agreeing to take (United Nations n.d.). 
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indeed whether any progress is being made, or, if issues are no longer included, 
whether it is because they have been successfully resolved or have just fallen by the 
wayside due to financial or other considerations discussed in Section 8.1.  
Where some dynamism is evident it serves to highlight some of the critiques raised in 
Chapter 4. For instance, Table A5.1 highlights the promotion of a western liberal 
democracy model, chief among which is ‘support for democratic elections.’ The 
comparison of the mandates also demonstrates the increasingly all-encompassing 
nature of peace operations. For instance, in 1999 when UNAMSIL was established, 
Chapter VII of the UN charter was referenced specifically in operative paragraph (OP) 
14 to note that in the discharge of its mandate, ‘UNAMSIL may take the necessary 
action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its 
capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent 
threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Government 
of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG’ (United Nations Security Council 1999: 3). In contrast, in 
2003 and 2004 for UNMIL and UNOCI respectively, the phrase ‘Acting under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations’ prefaced the operative clauses in their 
entirety (United Nations Security Council 2003: 3; United Nations Security Council 
2004: 2). This increasingly expansive notion of multidimensional peacekeeping is not 
all negative, however, as the changes also demonstrate a response to lessons learnt 
from previous experience. Thus, for instance, the Liberian and Ivoirian mandates for 
DDR factored in the specific and separate needs of women and children, learning from 
the Sierra Leone situation, and they. At least in the UNOCI resolution, also took a 
broader view of security sector reform from police and military reform, to include 
justice and rule of law.  
Additionally, the language in the three missions’ Security Council resolutions from 
start-up onwards emphasised the regional effects of conflict, and the importance of 
regional efforts to mitigate them, in coordination with the relevant peace operation 
and sub-regional organisations. The language, however, was subject to similar 
limitations as the preceding discussion. These are elaborated in the next section, which 
also highlights some of the on-the-ground impacts of text production for regional 
peace and security efforts, although these will be developed further in Chapter 9. 
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8.3. Mandating regional peace and security: regional and inter-
mission cooperation 
As mentioned above, cooperation on regional peace and security is one area in which 
evolving peacekeeping thinking has been apparent in Security Council resolutions but 
also serves as a useful example of how templating and circular reporting can constrain 
on-the-ground peacebuilding practice. As Table A5.1 in Annex 5 shows, and as 
discussed in previous chapters, regional security concerns were recognised in the 
Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire peacekeeping mandates from the start. As 
already indicated, these included strikingly similar language across the missions, as the 
following clauses from the different start-up resolutions demonstrate (emphasis 
mine):  
‘Determining that the situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat to international 
peace and security in the region’ (United Nations Security Council 1999: 1); 
‘Determining that the situation in Liberia continues to constitute a threat to international 
peace and security in the region, to stability in the West Africa subregion, and to the peace 
process for Liberia’ (United Nations Security Council 2003c: 3); and 
‘ . . .determining that the situation in Côte d’Ivoire continues to pose a threat to international 
peace and security in the region’ (United Nations Security Council 2004: 2). 
And again: 
‘Noting that lasting stability in Liberia will depend on peace in the subregion, and emphasizing 
the importance of cooperation among the countries of the subregion to this end, as well as the 
need for coordination of United Nations efforts to contribute to the consolidation of peace and 
security in the subregion’ (United Nations Security Council 2003c: 3); and 
‘Noting that lasting stability in Côte d’Ivoire will depend on peace in the subregion, especially 
in Liberia, and emphasizing the importance of cooperation among the countries of the 
subregion to this end, as well as the need for co-ordination of the efforts of the United Nations 
Missions in the subregion to contribute to the consolidation of peace and security (United 
Nations Security Council 2004: 2). 
Notwithstanding this seeming copy-and-paste, a closer look at the operative clauses 
does demonstrate evolving thinking related to the importance of a regional 
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perspective. For instance, the 1999 UNAMSIL resolution ‘stressed the need for close 
cooperation and coordination between ECOMOG and UNAMSIL in carrying out their 
respective tasks’ (United Nations Security Council 1999: 1). In the 2003 Liberian 
resolution, taking a stronger stance, the Security Council reiterated ‘its demand that all 
States in the region cease military support for armed groups in neighbouring countries, 
take action to prevent armed individuals and groups from using their territory to 
prepare and commit attacks on neighbouring countries and refrain from any actions 
that might contribute to further destabilization of the situation in the region, and 
declare[d] its readiness to consider necessary, ways of promoting compliance with this 
demand’ (United Nations Security Council 2003c: 5). The 2004 UNOCI resolution also 
contained robust references to regional cooperation, including requesting the 
Secretary-General to ‘encourage the United Nations missions in West Africa to share 
logistic and administrative support, to the extent possible . . . in order to maximize 
effectiveness and minimize the cost of the missions’ (OP3). It also requested UNOCI to 
‘carry out its mandate in close liaison with the United Nations missions in Sierra Leone 
and in Liberia, including especially in the prevention of movements of arms and 
combatants across shared borders and the implementation of disarmament and 
demobilization programmes’ (OP4). Additionally, it called upon UNOCI to ‘assist the 
Government of National Reconciliation in monitoring the borders, with particular 
attention to the situation of Liberian refugees and to the movement of combatants’ 
(OP6c); ‘coordinate closely with the United Nations missions in Sierra Leone and in 
Liberia in the implementation of a voluntary repatriation and resettlement programme 
for foreign ex-combatants, with special attention to the specific needs of women and 
children’ (OP6f); and ensure that the national DDR programme took into account a 
regional approach (United Nations Security Council 2004a: 2–3). 
This language spread to the resolutions renewing the mandates of the other two 
missions as well. For instance, S/Res 1537 (2004) requested UNAMSIL to ‘share its 
experience with the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the United Nations 
Operation in Côte d’Ivoire and to carry out its mandate in close liaison with them, 
especially in the prevention of movements of arms and combatants across borders and 
in the implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
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programmes.’ The Secretary-General and the Security Council went a step further, as 
by 2004 it was apparent that a more strategic approach to collaboration was 
necessary, rather than ad hoc reinforcement in the various resolutions. In his March 
2004 report on UNAMSIL the Secretary-General indicated his intention to ‘submit 
recommendations to the Security Council concerning mechanisms and activities that 
could be introduced to facilitate inter-mission cooperation and cross-border 
operations between the three United Nations peacekeeping missions in the West 
Africa subregion’ (United Nations Security Council, 2005a: 1). This resulted in the 
‘Report of the Secretary-General on inter-mission cooperation and possible cross-
border operations between the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, the United 
Nations Mission in Liberia and the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’, 
submitted to the Security Council in March 2005, which described existing inter-
mission cooperation (IMC) activities and identified possible areas for future 
cooperation in the areas of information-sharing and joint planning; military operations; 
DDR and arms control measures; civilian police operations; human rights; child 
protection; humanitarian assistance; civil affairs; rule of law; public information; 
administration; and logistics. An immediate impact of this was the inclusion of IMC 
arrangements in the next sub-regional peace operation’s mandate resolution, which 
was for UNOCI, S/Res 1609 (2005), wherein OPs 4–6 authorised the Secretary-General 
to redeploy police and military units between UNAMSIL, UNMIL and UNOCI to ‘address 
challenges that could not be handled within the authorized personnel ceiling of a given 
mission’ (United Nations Security Council 2005: 5), albeit with certain conditions, and 
with consideration of the associated political, operational and legal implications.  
It should be noted, however, that while the report’s recommendations were wide in 
scope, in subsequent resolutions the Security Council prioritised military cooperation 
and arrangements with troop-contributing countries. In any case, with the closure of 
UNAMSIL in 2005, and domestic preoccupations such as national elections, the 
language of inter-mission cooperation largely fell by the wayside, and at the height of 
the 2010–2011 Ivoirian post-electoral crisis the resolution-making process was not 
dynamic enough to capture the importance of cross-border collaboration in successive 
UNOCI resolutions immediately following the crisis, including 1962 (2010) and 1968 
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(2011), beyond a focus on the sharing of military components and equipment. S/Res 
1980 of 28 April 2011 went a bit further, calling upon ‘the authorities of Côte d’Ivoire 
and Liberia to coordinate their action’ and further encouraged ‘UNOCI and the United 
Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), within their respective mandates, capabilities and 
areas of deployment, to assist respectively the Governments of Côte d’Ivoire and 
Liberia in monitoring their border, with particular attention to any cross border 
movement of combatants or transfer of arms’ (pp. 2–3). Soon after, S/Res 1981 of 13 
May 2011 requested the Secretary-General to keep it informed of measures taken and 
coordination efforts by 
UNOCI and UNMIL to assist respectively the Governments of Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia 
in monitoring their border and surrounding areas, including on how the redeployed 
assets are assisting in this effort, with particular attention to any cross border 
movement of combatants or transfer of arms, and in this regard encourage[d] UNOCI 
and UNMIL, within their mandates and limits of capabilities and areas of deployment, 
to assist respectively the Governments of Côte d’Ivoire and of Liberia jointly in 
disarming those endangering national reconciliation and the consolidation of peace. 
(United Nations Security Council 2011a: 2) 
These and two subsequent resolutions on Côte d’Ivoire (S/Res 1992 of June 2011 and 
S/Res 2000 of July 2011) still focused disproportionately on military hardware, 
however, and a more dynamic approach had to wait for UNMIL’s resolution a couple of 
months later (S/Res 2008 of September 2011) to spotlight the issue in a more holistic 
manner. This resolution included four operative clauses relating to regional peace and 
security, including reaffirming IMC arrangements (and calling on troop-contributing 
countries (TCCs) to support efforts); the need for the two missions to coordinate their 
border strategies and operations ‘in order to contribute to sub-regional security and to 
prevent armed groups from exploiting the seam of political boundaries’; the need for 
the donor community to support responses to the influx of Ivoirian refugees; and 
encouraging ‘ECOWAS, with the support of the United Nations Office for West Africa 
(UNOWA) to develop a sub-regional strategy to address the threat of the cross-border 
movements of armed groups and weapons as well as illicit trafficking, with the 
assistance of UNMIL and UNOCI, as appropriate’ (United Nations Security Council 
2011b: 3–4). 
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Once it was on the agenda, however, as with other issues, from one year to the next, 
the language remained largely unchanged and was in fact largely replicated between 
UNMIL and UNOCI resolutions. Table A5.2 in Annex 5: Examples of common mandate 
language across missions and over time demonstrates this, with a summary of regional 
and inter-mission cooperation language in UNMIL resolutions since the 2010–2011 
Ivoirian electoral crisis. The text is extensively reproduced in the table to give the 
reader an appreciation of the repetitious nature of the mandate language. The 
language for UNOCI’s resolution for 2012 is included in the same table in blue, to 
demonstrate the similarity in language once regional issues had been factored in. 
As mentioned above, similarity in language is not necessarily problematic – in fact, in 
relation to inter-mission cooperation, it was important for UNMIL and UNOCI to have 
common mandates, enabling them to provide common support both to their host 
governments and enhance their inter-mission cooperation arrangements. Calling upon 
them year on year to continue to address certain issues continued to highlight the 
importance of those issues. As will be discussed in the next chapter, however, 
regarding IMC, common and repeated mandate language was not sufficient, or indeed 
appropriate, to address the issues, related in part to some of the issues discussed 
above, including lack of independence to plan on the ground, and out of sync planning, 
budgeting and reporting cycles.  
These critiques notwithstanding, there was some limited evolution in IMC mandate 
language, but which had both positive and negative effects. At first, when sub-regional 
cooperation was mandated following the Ivoirian electoral crisis, it omitted the two 
governments from its considerations, even though the Liberian Government was 
already playing host to hundreds of thousands of refugees. This was later amended 
with responsibility increasingly falling on the two governments, with the missions in a 
supporting role (accordingly, governmental efforts are discussed in Chapter 10). 
Conversely, in the initial stages, a prominent role for sub-regional organisations, 
particularly ECOWAS and MRU, was highlighted (discussed in greater detail in the next 
chapter), but this tapered off in subsequent UNMIL resolutions – although they were 
still included in the UNOCI resolution, potentially creating an imbalance in the focus. 
Further imbalance was potentially created in that S/Res 2283, which authorised 
 168 
 
 
 
UNOCI’s final resolution, continued to prioritise IMC, albeit with a reduced role for the 
two missions (United Nations Security Council 2016a), whereas it nearly completely fell 
off UNMIL’s interim resolution, S/Res 2308 in September 2016 (United Nations 
Security Council 2016b), and was included mainly with reference to the regional quick 
reaction force (RQRF) in its final resolution, S/Res 2333 in December 2016 (United 
Nations Security Council 2016c).  
Two things are further worth noting here. Firstly, the consistent call for the 
disarmament of ‘foreign armed elements on both sides of the border’ was exceedingly 
narrow, limiting insecurity to threats from cross-border mercenaries; thus, the scope 
provided for an on-the-ground response was correspondingly narrow, for instance, 
cross-border joint military patrols. In the mandates IMC was mostly spelt out in 
relation to cooperation on military matters, especially equipment, even though these 
were largely redundant as UNOCI claimed the lion’s share of flight time with the 
helicopters, to the extent that UNMIL barely considered them an available asset. 
Further, it was widely recognised in-mission that the much-mentioned ‘Regional Quick 
Reaction Force’ did not have a rapid enough deployment capacity to support UNMIL if 
this was ever urgently required. Yet, as Table A5.2 demonstrates, later resolutions – 
including UNMIL’s latest, as noted above – increasingly emphasised this ‘hardware’ of 
peace and security – military equipment and troops – as opposed to the software of 
social cohesion and confidence building.  
It is also worthwhile to note that this militarisation also increasingly encompassed 
humanitarian issues. Subsequent to the 2013 resolution, when there were still over 
30,000 Ivoirian refugees residing in Liberia, refugees were only mentioned in relation 
to armed elements (or at least in the same breath: ‘support the disarmament and 
repatriation of armed elements on both sides of the border and the voluntary return of 
refugees in safety and dignity’), whereas previously they had been listed as a separate 
humanitarian issue.  
While many of these issues relate to mandate language, IMC peacebuilding practice on 
the ground also struggled to implement potentially innovative but inherently 
complicated approaches, such as cross-border DDR, which the resolutions also 
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consistently called for after 2012 but went unaddressed. Again, this will be discussed in 
greater detail in the next chapter, but relating it to the above discussion, this could be 
seen as a result of a lack of capacity on the ground47 to creatively address the issue, 
aided by the lack of an effective and accountable system for planning and reporting 
against the mandate.  
A related constraint was that though laudable, IMC was taking place within the context 
of two different missions, which had very different relationships with their host 
governments (and indeed host governments with widely differing capacities). Further, 
in keeping with their host governments, the missions also had different readings on 
regional security, as will be discussed in Chapter 10, wherein the Liberian Government 
was concerned with promoting (internal) security, while the Ivoirian Government 
couched border-related insecurity as an issue of ‘defence’ against external threats. The 
differing perspectives on border attacks in 2015 and 2016 as discussed above are a 
case in point (with Liberia understanding it to be an Ivoirian issue but Ivoirians still 
claiming a cross-border dimension). Further, although coordinated planning took pace 
in terms of IMC activities on the ground, this was in the context of different mandate 
implementation priorities, such that this planning did not extend to planning for 
common RBB outputs, for instance. (An example of the resulting mismatch is that one 
year one mission committed to undertaking three joint border assessments with the 
other mission, while the other had only listed one joint assessment for the same year.) 
These few examples demonstrate the layer of complexity facing peace operations’ 
efforts to think beyond national borders, in addition to the day-to-day constraints 
posed by working within the peacekeeping/peacebuilding spectrum. 
8.4. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a backdrop for the discussion in the 
next two chapters about peacebuilding responses to the regional combatant 
motivations discussed in the preceding two chapters, by elaborating on the context 
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 I am unfortunately able to put myself squarely in the frame regarding this issue, as one of the persons 
at UNMIL who would have been responsible for the implementation of this directive!  
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within which these responses are framed. It brings home some of the critiques of 
peace operations elaborated from the literature in Chapter 4, including an overly 
managerial approach, lack of engagement with systemic structural causes of conflict, a 
preoccupation with liberal democracy, and planning predicated on short timeframes 
with rigid parameters. 
It further expounded on the factors that influence the creation of the primary textual 
policies that govern and guide peace operations, that is Security Council resolutions, 
from which peace operations derive their mandates. Further, it discussed the 
relationship between various levels of peacebuilders with these texts, and the 
discourses that arise and are perpetuated or are avoided by this interaction. 
In many ways, the discussion above resonates with ‘policy as text’ and ‘policy as 
‘discourse’ debates (Ball 1993: 10, 11). Although speaking at the level of the state, Ball 
(1993, 2000) is instructive here, noting that in relation to ‘policy as text’ we can 
consider  
policies as representations which are encoded in complex ways (via struggles, 
compromises, authoritative public interpretations and reinterpretations) and decoded 
in complex ways (via actors' interpretations and meanings in relation to their history, 
experiences, skills, resources and context) . . . [thus] it is crucial to recognise that the 
policies themselves, the texts, are (a) not necessarily clear or closed or complete. The 
texts are the product of compromises at various stages at points of initial influence, in 
the micropolitics of legislative formulation, in the parliamentary process and in the 
politics and micropolitics of interest group articulation. . . . (b) Policies shift and change 
their meaning in the arena of politics . . . Policies are represented differently by 
different actors and interests . . . At all stages in the policy process we are confronted 
both with different interpretations of policy, and with what Rizvi and Kemmis (1987) 
call 'interpretations of interpretations’. (Ball 1993: 11) 
Ball goes on to note that while policies (in this case peace operations’ Security Council 
resolution/mandates) do not normally explicitly tell you what to do, they do create 
circumstances in which the range of options available in deciding what to do are 
narrowed or changed, requiring a response to be put together (for instance the RBB 
budget document), constructed in context and off-set against other expectations (Ball 
1993: 12).  
At the same time, the above discussion should also compel us to think about ‘policy as 
discourse’:  
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discourses are about what can be said, and thought, but also about who can speak, 
when, where and with what authority. Discourses embody the meaning and use of 
propositions and words. Thus, certain possibilities for thought are constructed. Words 
are ordered and combined in particular ways and other combinations are displaced or 
excluded [and within these constraints] we take up the positions constructed for us 
within policies’. (Ball 1993: 14) 
There are two perspectives we can gain from viewing policy as texts and policy as 
discourse. One is that ‘texts matter, because they contain policy, but we cannot 
predict or assume how they will be acted on, what their immediate effect will be, what 
room for manoeuvre actors will find for themselves’ (ibid.). Secondly, ‘there are real 
struggles over the interpretation and enactment of policies. [b]ut these are set within 
a moving discursive frame which articulates and constrains the possibilities and 
probabilities of interpretation and enactment (ibid.). 
In relation to this, UN Security Council resolutions are akin to the ultimate policy and 
discursive texts. As the UN editing guidelines for resolutions innocuously puts it: ‘Once 
adopted, these important international instruments belong to the world. Many of 
them will be cited for years, even decades, to come’ (United Nations n.d.: 1). Subjected 
as they are to extensive negotiation between powerful member states with highly 
differentiated interests and at the same time subjected to practical financial and other 
considerations, it is not difficult to understand why the resulting Security Council 
resolutions are perceived by peacebuilders on the ground as (sometimes 
unreasonable) ‘mandates from on high’, giving them the impression that their actions 
are constrained by decision-making beyond their control. Be that as it may, there is no 
shortage of regularised reporting from field-based peacebuilders to the Secretariat in 
New York and onward to member states, which means that these same policies are 
significantly informed – at least theoretically – by regular reporting from field missions 
to the Secretariat. As discussed in the preceding sections, however, in the progressive 
formalisation of the text – that is, from the translation of this casual daily and other 
periodic reporting into strategic policy advice, via progress reports of the Secretary-
General or budget or performance reporting documents, leading ultimately to a peace 
operation’s resolution adopted by Security Council – a significant amount of nuance 
and detail is lost.  
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Also, as discussed in the preceding sections, this process of progressively formalising 
text results in at least two mutually reinforcing problematic outcomes. Firstly, at all 
levels, from member states downwards, UN peacekeeping mandates appear subject to 
a circular approach that results in the standardisation of language at headquarters, 
which return the same well-trodden and eventually ignored phrases time and again in 
resolutions, and heavily negotiated mandates that do not necessarily reflect the on-
the-ground realities and priorities and are not dynamic enough, except in extreme 
cases, to react to the often rapidly changing dynamics that characterise peace 
operations’ settings, such as those in which regional combatants operate. Secondly, 
regular results-based budgeting and reporting practices at field level results in a ‘navel-
gazing’ approach that leaves little scope for innovative or out-of-the-box thinking. It 
would be a mistake, however, to conclude that on-the-ground peacebuilders are 
powerless receivers of policy. Indeed, again as has been discussed, within their 
limitations field-based peacebuilders exercise their (albeit limited) power by 
undertaking a range of subversive actions, including ignoring more problematic aspects 
of mandates or disguising business-as-usual activities within standardised reporting 
language, all aided by the same pre-framed policy discourses. As such, the outcome is 
the same: implementation on the ground is hampered by ritualised, self-limiting 
activities, which allow the same types of activities to persist without much incentive to 
champion real change or attempt innovative, response-driven initiatives.  
This is particularly problematic in a context where, to overcome perceived constraints 
of contemporary peace operations, critics have highlighted the importance of creative, 
context-specific policy guidance from the Secretariat. For instance, Nadin (2004) 
advocates for ‘designer missions’, which ‘prioritise certain tasks at certain stages in the 
mission’s lifecycle, while retaining a political core at all times’ and for ‘[s]treamlined 
mandates built on the basis of flexibility and context-sensitivity’. More specifically, the 
2000 Brahimi report tasked the Secretariat to ‘tell the Security Council what it needs to 
hear, not what it wants to hear. In situations in which impossible missions have been 
approved because of confused, unclear, or severely underresourced mandates, the 
Secretariat has to say “No” to the Security Council’ (Weiss and Thakur 2010: 68). It also 
argued ‘that the UN needs to develop a culture of providing advice that is sound, is 
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based on a thorough assessment of options, is independent of what might be 
politically popular or might fit the preconceptions of the decision makers, and is free of 
fear of consequences for politically neutral officials’ (ibid.: 68). It is apparent that more 
than 15 years after this threshold report, this is still not happening. 
Ball (1993: 14) observes, ‘[w]e do not speak a discourse, it speaks us. We are the 
subjectivities, the voices, the knowledge, the power relations that a discourse 
constructs and allows. We do not “know” what we say, we “are” what we say and do. 
In these terms we are spoken by policies, we take up the positions constructed for us 
within policies’. What does this all mean in practical terms? As noted at the start of 
this chapter, in contrast, or perhaps more appropriately further to, Autesserre’s (2014) 
concern that on-the-ground peacebuilders do not sufficiently prioritise understanding 
local realities, the above highlights that the structure of peacebuilding, especially that 
embodied by the regular production of texts, contributes to limited effectiveness. The 
next chapter picks up this theme, looking at the impacts on the ground of 
peacebuilders taking up the positions constructed for them in their implementation of 
policies, and in particular what they say and do (i.e. their practice) in their efforts to 
translate the mandates in relation to the on-the-ground realities of regional combatant 
motivations and to address cross-border and sub-regional conflict. 
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9. Roadmaps, frameworks and falling short of a strategy: 
peacebuilding responses to border insecurity  
As discussed in previous chapters, the Ivoirian electoral crisis began in November 2010 
when President Gbagbo refused to concede that the elections had been won by his 
opponent, Alassane Ouattara, and lasted for five months until Gbagbo was 
apprehended in April 2011. The UN Panel of Experts for Côte d’Ivoire estimated that 
4,500 Liberian former combatants had been involved in the fighting, and in June 2011, 
about 220,000 Ivoirian refugees were still seeking shelter in Liberia in refugee camps 
and host communities along the border. While this had dropped to 67,308 refugees by 
May 2012 (UNHCR 2012), the situation remained unstable, with periodic cross-border 
attacks, including the one on 8 June 2012 during which seven UNOCI peacekeepers 
were killed (again, see Table A1.2 in Annex 1 for a summary of cross-border attacks 
since the 2010 crisis).  
As mentioned in Chapter 8, following the post-electoral crisis, both the UNMIL and 
UNOCI Security Council resolutions regularly reinforced the importance of inter-
mission cooperation and cross-border stabilisation. They variously called on the 
Ivoirian and Liberian Governments to develop a shared strategy to stabilise their 
common area, including cross-border DDR; recommended the sharing of military 
assets, including helicopters for border patrols and subsequently a regional quick 
reaction force, based in Côte d’Ivoire; requested the international community to 
support refugees; and called on ECOWAS and the MRU to develop a sub-regional 
strategy to address the threat of the cross-border movements of armed groups and 
weapons as well as illicit trafficking (United Nations Security Council 2012b, 2013b, 
2014a, 2014b, 2015, 2016a). In response to the crisis and their mandates the two 
Missions accordingly stepped up their cooperation, which fed into the development of 
a joint roadmap aimed at coordinated support for security and border control, 
mirrored community violence reduction activities, support for strengthening state 
authority, and sustainable return and reintegration, among others (UNMIL/UNOCI 
2012). This evolved into an ‘Inter-Mission Cooperation Framework of Engagement’, 
signed in July 2014 by the SRSGs of UNMIL and UNOCI, comprising five pillars: (i) 
enhancing border security and stabilisation; (ii) supporting regional peace and security 
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efforts and mechanisms; (iii) promoting reconciliation; (iv) addressing humanitarian 
needs and conditions for sustainable returns; and (v) strengthening information 
sharing and analysis (UNOCI/UNMIL 2014). 
These initiatives represented some of the missions’ efforts to support their host 
governments and translate the mandated IMC tasks into peacebuilding practice on the 
ground. The extent to which they were able to do so is the subject of this chapter and 
the next. As such these chapters aim to address sub-questions two and three which 
query, respectively, the extent to which international peacebuilding institutions take 
into consideration regional combatants’ motivations when developing peacebuilding 
and regional stabilisation strategies, and the extent to which the resulting strategies 
have been effective in promoting regional peacebuilding.  
9.1. Enhancing border security and stabilisation 
The affiliation between Ivoirians and Liberians at certain borders is very strong. After Côte 
d’Ivoire’s [first] war a lot of Liberians stayed in the west [of Côte d’Ivoire] for the elections and 
in case they would be needed for a plan ‘B’ (i.e. in case Gbagbo would need them). They stayed 
in western Côte d’Ivoire making money by farming and trading cocoa, and refused to come 
back, despite UNMIL missions at the time to encourage them to return when they had rapid 
employment programmes. However, plan B came and went and with Gbagbo ousted many of 
them came back. When asked about why they were in Côte d’Ivoire they claimed they were on 
a ‘rescue mission’ to support their ‘brothers’ across the border (this is the Krahn on the Liberia 
side, who Gbagbo supported [as MODEL] during Liberia’s war from 2002, and the Guéré [on the 
Ivoirian side]. This may seem incongruous but in the wake of Gbagbo’s ousting, they are now 
returning the favour and hosting many Ivoirian militias in their home communities, who’ve fled 
Liberia with Ouattara coming to power, especially as Ivoirian DDR is yet to start. 
- UNMIL Reintegration Officer, 2 March 2012 
9.1.1. Militarised approaches 
The above quote, taken from an interview with an UNMIL staff member in March 
2012, who had worked on DDR and subsequently on residual reintegration 
programmes with UNMIL, is highly resonant with the myriad narratives elaborated by 
Liberian ex-combatants in Chapters 5 and 6. It simultaneously highlights the ‘kinship’, 
‘brothers-in-arms’, and ‘mission’ (escalated to that of a ‘rescue’) narratives. But it 
concurrently references economic motives (‘They stayed in western Côte d’Ivoire 
making money by farming and trading cocoa, and refused to come back’) and rational 
cost–benefit analysis – preferring the income they were getting from farming and 
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trading cocoa over ‘short-term rapid employment programmes’ offered by UNMIL.48 It 
also references the (then) yet-to-begin Ivoirian DDR programme, the inference being 
that the economic benefits to be derived from that activity would be a significant pull 
factor for Ivoirian militias to return to Côte d’Ivoire. Through this and other 
conversations, it was clear that UNMIL and UNOCI staff were quite in tune with on-the-
ground perspectives and narratives, and conscious of the need of a holistic approach 
to address these. Yet consistently, the resulting focus and energies did not appear to 
reflect these accordingly, with entreaties to ‘address the root causes’ of cross-border 
conflict and tension not appearing in the mandates until UNOCI’s June 2014 resolution 
(United Nations Security Council 2014: 6; 10). 
Instead, UNMIL and UNOCI approaches to achieving border security and stabilisation 
remained militarised, responding largely to a narrowly understood mercenary 
narrative. A prime example of this was Operation MAYO (OP MAYO). OP MAYO was 
initially established by UNMIL and UNOCI in 2006 as a dual phase operation that 
brought together Mission and national security counterparts to undertake joint border 
patrols, followed by structured cross-border meetings intended to strengthen 
coordination and information sharing. Similar activities were undertaken with national 
security counterparts in Sierra Leone (Operation LOKO) and Guinea (Operation 
SESKIN). While it did not have a high profile in intervening years, the post-electoral 
crisis exposed the need for increased coordination between UNMIL and UNOCI 
military, police, and civilian components to support the Ivoirian and Liberian 
Governments to stabilize the situation more effectively, including a focus on 
addressing the factors underlying the conflict. Accordingly, in 2012, as part of the IMC 
Roadmap, UNMIL, UNOCI and the respective UN country teams (UNCT) agreed on 
terms of reference (ToRs) for OP MAYO, which included enhancing civilian 
participation as a means of stimulating cross-border civilian dialogue and building 
confidence between Liberian and Ivoirian civilian and security authorities. In this vein, 
                                                          
 
48
 This is not captured in the quote, but the staff member is referencing preferences stated as far back as 
2008, when UNMIL staff undertook missions to western Côte d’Ivoire to encourage Liberian ex-
combatants still residing in Côte d’Ivoire to return to Liberia and take advantage of the soon-closing 
residual reintegration programmes following the official close of DDR programmes. 
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a revitalized CONOPS for OP MAYO was adopted in June 2012.49 From this period up 
until 2014, UNMIL and UNOCI undertook regular mirrored border patrols, followed by 
joint meetings, aimed at bringing together the military, civilian and police components 
of both missions, as well as, increasingly, both Governments’ security agencies, local 
officials and traditional and community leaders. 
On 14 November 2013, I attended an OP MAYO meeting at the Prollo border crossing 
point, between Maryland County in Liberia and Tabou Prefecture in Côte d’Ivoire. 
Other participants included UNMIL and UNOCI uniformed personnel (Force, Military 
Observers (MILOBs), Police) and civilian staff; Ivoirian security personnel (Forces 
Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), Gendarmerie, Police and Customs) and local 
authority (the sous-préfet of Tabou); Liberian security personnel (Bureau of 
Immigration and Naturalization (BIN), Police, National Security); and UNHCR staff. At 
the meeting I was struck by how great the chasm was between rhetoric and reality. For 
instance, despite the first item on the agenda being a ‘joint patrol briefing’, 
coordination between UNOCI and UNMIL security forces was poor during the patrols, 
which resulted in each undertaking a different scale of patrolling operations, rather 
than them being joint, or even mirrored. This was exacerbated by continued problems 
with their ability to communicate with one another while on patrol, and the two 
groups were not aware of the details of each other’s radio frequency and areas of 
coverage. This was despite lauding of innovative joint patrolling in regular reporting.  
Secondly, I noted the highly skewed composition of participants in favour of uniformed 
personnel: despite the explicitly referenced need to grow civilian participation, there 
were about 40 uniformed participants and only five civilian participants, four of whom, 
including myself, were associated with the UN and only one (Ivoirian) civilian authority, 
but no Liberian administrative authority, which I was told had not been represented 
for the last three meetings. Further, even among uniformed personnel, there were 
only three representatives from Liberian security agencies. Moreover, despite a more 
robust Ivoirian security personnel presence, their active participation in the meeting 
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 Interview with UNMIL staff member, August 2013. 
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was limited (with the exception of one FRCI officer). Partly this was because the 
participants’ areas of operations, and thus authority, were limited (e.g. the BIN officer 
present was the Commander for that particular Liberian border post and could not 
speak of BIN operations in a wider context). 
Finally, I observed that although overall the military observers described the security 
situation in their patrol areas as peaceful, they also started to narrate a host of 
concerns fed back by communities visited, relating to lack of potable water, healthcare 
facilities, access to markets, and so on. These were cut short by the chairman (an 
UNOCI military officer), as irrelevant, as not pertaining to physical security threats, to 
me a stark reminder that despite lip service to the contrary, much of the focus 
remained on physical security rather than human security. Further, I thought that if 
civilian concerns were given greater priority, it would encourage civilian authorities to 
participate more and provide a useful opportunity for border communities to 
communicate pertinent issues, particularly given their lack of access and trust in those 
same authorities. In all, the meeting felt like a wasted opportunity. It was organised 
and chaired by military peacekeeping personnel, as opposed to police or even civilian 
staff, which automatically retained a focus on physical security rather than root causes; 
the focus of the meetings was to relate any physical security concerns or threats, and 
human security issues were not entertained. It was also dominated by UN personnel, 
providing little opportunity for national counterparts to be involved. It was apparent 
from attending that meeting and reading the preparation documents and minutes of 
numerous other meetings that the structure and content of the meetings retained a 
narrow focus, with the main aim of the patrols being to collect information about 
various incidents, rumours about the presence of militias and mercenaries, with 
agenda items focusing on the security situation and the state of militia/mercenaries in 
the border area, as well as illegal border crossing, arms and drugs trafficking, and the 
state of refugees (in the context of the suspected presence of militia and mercenaries 
among them, discussed below).  
Yet, as a relatively simple activity to undertake, the bi-monthly OP MAYO meetings 
were presented externally as the ‘gold standard’ of the evolving inter-mission 
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cooperation between UNMIL and UNOCI, and often reported as a prime example of 
not just joint security operations between the two countries but also as a forum for 
coordination to address root causes of the conflict. The meetings eventually fell by the 
wayside as the peacekeeping military components in both countries were drawn 
down, while civilian IMC officers50 sought to both transition the structure to national 
counterparts and make it more inclusive. The main avenue for doing this was to 
transition to the Mano River Union’s Joint Border Security and Confidence Building 
Units (JBSCBUs) which, as section 9.2 shows, was rife with its own shortcomings. 
This focus on physical security was also replicated by national actors, particularly 
Operation Restore Hope, led by the Armed Forces of Liberia, as discussed in the next 
chapter. Nonetheless, seemingly cognisant of the limitations of such approaches, the 
missions, UN agencies, funds and programmes (AFPs), and several non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) did make efforts to broaden the perspective. These efforts 
demonstrated a broad understanding of human insecurity (particularly food and 
economic insecurity) as a root cause of conflict, expanded to include not just 
participants of the conflicts but border communities as a whole. In these programmes 
the logic of the ‘micro-region’ elaborated in Chapter 6 was welcomingly apparent but 
even so, the resulting programmes demonstrated a misplaced focus. They also 
demonstrated many of the typical shortcomings of development programmes, but to 
dwell on these would be outside the scope of this thesis. Instead, the following brief 
discussion focuses on those practices, habits and narratives that limited effective 
engagement with regional combatants’ narratives. It elaborates on initiatives 
undertaken by the UN AFPs who, together with UNMIL and UNOCI in their respective 
host countries, operate under a One UN framework. In 2016 there were at least six 
UN-associated border stabilisation-related projects being implemented. There is not 
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 IMC coordination in UNMIL was the responsibility of the Regional and Inter-Mission Cooperation 
Support Unit (RIMCSU), which was proposed in UNMIL’s budget proposal for 2013/14 ‘to enhance the 
Mission’s strategic focus on regional issues and structured coordination of IMC, as well as to address, 
through an integrated approach, all border related issues, including both security related and underlying 
stabilization issues, in close coordination with national actors and relevant members of the UNCT’ 
(RIMCSU draft TORs). The following year it was merged with the Field Support Team, while UNOCI set up 
its Field Coordination and Inter-Mission Cooperation Unit. 
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the space to go into each, so the next section considers one of the earliest iterations, 
with pertinent observations on the other initiatives. 
9.1.2. Beyond militarised approaches: towards a human security perspective 
In 2012, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) conducted 
a cross-border food security assessment, financed by UNDP, subsequently published as 
the report, ‘On the Borderline: A Report for Food Security on the Liberian-Ivoirian 
Border’, which was also informed by research undertaken by the Norwegian Refugee 
Council (NRC) and the Danish Refugee Council (DRC). It highlighted the need to address 
underlying poverty, as well as ethnic discord, land tenure issues and lack of social 
cohesion, which it contended would fuel future wars and instability if not addressed 
(Food and Agriculture Organization 2012). In relation to food security particularly, it 
noted ongoing land disputes and the interruption of cross-border trade leading to 
dysfunction in markets in both countries.  
The recommendations highlighted the importance of rehabilitating markets, 
construction and distribution of storage facilities, and the creation, harmonization and 
dissemination of agricultural technologies in Liberia, as well as the implementation of a 
continuous market Monitoring System in the region (Food and Agriculture 
Organization 2012). This resulted in the development of a three-year (2013–2016) 
Cross-border Action Plan for food security and nutrition, endorsed by both UN 
missions, with three cross-cutting objectives related to food security, land tenure and 
social cohesion. The European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 
(ECHO) provided initial funding for the project, which was subsequently implemented 
by FAO and the DRC on the Liberian side.  
In reading the report and the strategy that resulted from the assessment, several 
observations could be made. In the first place, it appeared (at least to me) a case of 
fitting the solution not to the problem but to the capacity of the organisation. For 
instance, while the report identified such issues as ethnic discord, land tenure issues 
and lack of social cohesion contributing to ongoing instability, its solution was wholly 
related to agriculture programmes – not surprising given FAO’s focus but somewhat 
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problematic, because although this provided a nod to economic motives, it did not 
consider this in the context of its own findings. For instance, in the report FAO notes: 
‘Many of the Liberian mercenaries that were involved in the fighting during the post-
election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire were recruited in illegal mining areas in Grand Gedeh 
(South-East Liberia). These are places of potential exploitation, trafficking, and 
mobilization of youth for participation in conflicts, whenever the opportunity arises.’ 
But subsequent programming did not take these livelihoods into consideration, nor did 
they include any explicit strategy to incorporate the problematic ‘mercenaries’ in their 
programmes. 
In relation to this latter point, the same UNMIL staff member quoted at the start of 
this section went on to note: 
[returnees and high risk youth] don’t get automatically incorporated in the 
programmes because as relative strangers and former militias people are sceptical 
about including them in traditional structures such as farming groups which often 
make up the base for training. Returning militias do not have the social capital and are 
not part of the social networks so miss out on opportunities in training programmes 
where recruitment is not an open process.  
This highlighted a two-fold problem with the nature of programmes subsequently 
developed, which largely focused on boosting subsistence farming surpluses for local 
markets. While an important development initiative for the Liberian context, it did not 
address the specificities of cross-border insecurity. For instance, it did not consider 
preferred alternative livelihoods for vulnerable populations (including regional ex-
combatants), such as artisanal mining,51 which, as discussed in Chapter 6, was a 
preferred option for young men with limited social networks, or commercial farming, 
which many had been involved with previously.52 Secondly, although the reports 
highlighted the problem of young rootless men as a cause of conflict, even if they were 
interested in subsistence farming (which as discussed in Chapter 7 was unlikely), it did 
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 The FAO project was not alone in this. At the time of writing there were no appreciable programmes 
aimed at the artisanal mining sector, which has absorbed a significant proportion of combatants 
(including cross-border). 
52
 This was not only in Côte d’Ivoire. In Liberia at least three large-scale commercial rubber plantations 
were taken over and operated by ex-combatants (including cross-border) until the government regained 
control and expelled them from the plantations. 
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not really consider how supporting existing farming networks could serve to further 
exclude ex-combatants. Kinship narratives notwithstanding, ex-combatants, even if 
returning to home towns, were treated with suspicion and fear, as they themselves 
noted when interviewed. As such, lacking the aforementioned networks, which are 
critical in rural agriculture, food security projects were unlikely to include them and 
may have served to alienate them even further. Best practice reintegration 
programming has highlighted the importance of community-based rather than ex-
combatant focused approaches but it is still important for these to include them. 
Many subsequent programmes faced the same constraints. A significant example was 
a US$3.25 million project that arose from the one discussed above, funded by the UN 
Trustfund for Human Security (UNTFHS), involving six different UN agencies, with 
support from UNMIL, implementing a holistic human security project, incorporating 
political, economic, community, food and health security in Liberia’s four counties 
bordering Côte d’Ivoire. Its proposal noted that Liberia’s south-eastern counties 
continued to face challenges of ‘hunger, instability, and low human development, all 
underlying drivers of conflict and thus dangers to continued peace and security’ (UN 
Country Team in Liberia 2013: 2). It proposed a ‘Human Security Initiative’ (ibid.) to 
address the multi-sectorial causes of human insecurity for the most vulnerable and 
neglected populations of the south-eastern Liberia, and which would also support 
efforts of the UNCT and UN Missions in both Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire to achieve long-
term stabilization in the common border region. 
Despite the worthy ambitions, the reality of implementation suffered many of the 
constraints highlighted in the previous section. Chief among these was the ‘business as 
usual’ approach that seemingly characterises UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
approaches, especially as the Trustfund provided part funding, so each agency relied 
on other or prior sources of funding for implementation, and for the most part used 
the extra funding to implement the same projects that they had been implementing in 
other parts of the country but just expanding coverage, at most to the same 
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communities as the other agencies, without committing to a transformative theory of 
change, resulting in more of the same.53  
Another shortcoming of this programme was that it was undertaken only in Liberia, 
without a mirrored approach in Côte d’Ivoire. In 2015, however, the two countries’ UN 
Country Teams developed a comprehensive joint border security and stabilisation 
proposal to be funded by the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). After much wrangling, the 
livelihoods and food security component had to be dropped as being outside the scope 
of PBF funding, in favour of capacity strengthening of border security agencies, and 
improving social cohesion between border communities (thus addressing social 
cohesion narratives, which are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 10). Subsequent 
efforts to provide this component as complementary through UNMIL assessed funding 
had to be dropped for many of the same reasons. This was despite the mandate’s 
entreaty (at least in 2014 and 2015) to address the ‘root causes of conflict’, because, as 
a UN colleague noted during one of the heated discussions on the topic, ‘nowhere in 
the resolution does it say “livelihoods”!’ This was against a backdrop of several social 
cohesion programmes already being implemented, comprising for the most part ad 
hoc cross-border meetings and capacitating security officials with logistical equipment 
with the logic that this would make them more responsive to communities but with no 
real medium- to long-term focus on sustainability and maintenance in either scenario. 
Adherence to a limited set of narratives essentially meant that regional ex-combatants 
were inadequately targeted in stabilisation programming, aided by an inflexible 
approach to peacekeeping and peacebuilding that meant that root causes could not be 
addressed, even after they were included (albeit belatedly and not spelt out) in the 
mandates. Further, while root causes were subsequently highlighted in the mandates, 
this coincided with UNMIL and UNOCI drawdown. In light of this, the two missions 
considered enhancing their approach in relation to another mission directive – to 
support sub-regional organisations – with similarly limited results, as detailed in the 
next section. 
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 This assessment is based on participant-observation of the first year of project implementation. 
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9.2. Support regional peace and security efforts and mechanisms  
In November 2012 UNOWA (now UNOWAS) drafted a position paper, with inputs from 
UNMIL and UNOCI in relation to the Security Council’s request for ‘ECOWAS and the 
Mano River Union to develop, with the support of UNOWA, a sub-regional strategy to 
address the threat of the cross-border movements of armed groups and weapons as 
well as illicit trafficking, with the assistance of UNOCI and UNMIL, as appropriate’ 
(United Nations Security Council 2012b: 5). In it, they proposed a three-track approach 
to feed ‘into the development of a subregional security strategy by ECOWAS and the 
MRU, should they deem it appropriate’ (emphasis mine, rightly highlighting that some 
of the Security Council’s requests were outside the control of the UN and as such 
difficult to measure against the missions’ own deliverables). Track 1 advocated for 
ongoing IMC arrangements between UNMIL and UNOCI, alongside a quadripartite 
coordination mechanism with their host governments (which will be discussed in the 
next chapter). Track 2 would see UNOWA, together with the UN system in the sub-
region, identify concrete ways to assist both the MRU and ECOWAS in addressing 
cross-border related threats and to pursue confidence building measures. Track 3 
would link these initiatives with the wider sub-region, for instance the Sahel, and such 
initiatives as counter-piracy. 
The act of drafting the paper was recognition in of itself of the difficulty in carrying out 
a mandated task (mandated, no less, of three UN organisations – UNOWA, UNMIL and 
UNOCI). It highlighted that what was being requested was not in the hands of the UN 
entities but rather the responsibility of sub-regional organisations (as will be seen 
below, a similar, valid, argument was in relation to the Council’s entreaties to the two 
countries to implement cross-border DDR and a shared strategy for cross-border 
stabilisation). Notwithstanding, the three UN entities were able to consider supporting 
related initiatives by the Mano River Union (MRU), including an MRU Operational Plan 
for Peace and Security in 2012, which was closely followed by a ‘Strategy for Cross-
border security in the Mano River Union’, signed by members’ heads of state in 
October 2013. Developed with extensive support from UNOWA and UNDP, with inputs 
from the UNMIL and UNOCI, this at least was a seeming culmination of the Security 
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Council’s consistent entreaty for a cross-border strategy. The Strategy had six main 
aims: enhancing security cooperation for peace; promoting political and economic 
governance; boosting economic opportunities through infrastructural development; 
improving management of natural resources; security-related interventions aimed at 
violence management; and structural measures, all a nod to root causes of insecurity. 
The two documents were an ambitious undertaking for a four-country54 international 
organisation which received a modest operational budget from member states’ dues 
(often in arrears), and relied largely on external donor funding for programmatic 
activities.55 
Prior to its finalisation UNMIL noted and shared several concerns relating to the 
strategy with its drafters. These included that it lacked several elements of a strategy, 
including a framework to determine how the inventory of problems stated would be 
addressed, who would be responsible and supporting parties, how the interventions 
would be financed and the lack of a timeframe. The mission also cautioned against 
rushing to validate a proposal that would prove difficult to implement, and queried 
how it would link to pre-existing documents, such as the 2012 plan, which also had yet 
to be operationalised. Further, the document did not explain how it planned to 
address or coordinate action to address immediate cross-border security concerns, 
and how these would relate to medium- to longer-term structural issues and 
underlying drivers of conflict that also needed to be addressed. Finally, the mission 
noted that while the strategy envisioned a central role of MRU Joint Border Security 
and Confidence Building Units (JBSCBUs, see below), it did not describe what they 
were or how they were to deliver on what was expected of them in the strategy 
(UNMIL draft comments, October 2013). 
Notwithstanding these substantive concerns, the strategy was signed, with the two 
missions and UNOWA committed to supporting its implementation, in line with the 
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 The reader will recall that the Mano River Union was established in 1973 between Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, with Guinea joining in 1980 and Côte d’Ivoire in 2008. 
55
 Communicated during conversations with MRU Secretariat senior leadership and representatives in 
2015 and 2016. This was especially the case following the Ebola outbreak in 2014 as three of the four 
countries devoted significant resources to combating the crisis. 
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mandate. Particularly, the two missions seized on JBSCBUs as the possible successor 
for OP MAYO. JBSCBUs, mandated by the Fifteenth Protocol to the Mano River Union 
Declaration on Cooperation on Peace, Security and Defence, were originally signed in 
1992 but revised and signed by the four heads of state, now including Côte d’Ivoire, in 
2012. The aim of the JBSCBUs is to bring together a cross-section of local security, 
civilian and traditional authorities, civil society, peacebuilders and leaders from the 
border counties and districts of the Mano River Union and neighbouring countries, as 
relevant, to organise and conduct joint patrols of the borders; develop, facilitate, and 
promote cordial relations between people in the border regions through cultural, 
social and sporting activities; exchange information and investigate reports with regard 
to border security; and resolve minor cases of border security violations, among other 
activities (Mano River Union 2012). While the Fifteenth Protocol notes that 
establishing JUBSCBUs is the responsibility of member states, their inaction prompted 
the MRU Secretariat to take on responsibility for their establishment and maintenance, 
through a Peace and Security Unit, based at the Secretariat Headquarters in Freetown, 
with funding to be obtained through Member States’ contributions (still pending at the 
time of writing in November 2016). Between 2012 and 2014 the MRU facilitated the 
establishment of 13 JBSCBUs, including nine between Liberia and her three 
neighbouring MRU countries, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Guinea; however, their 
activities were curtailed firstly by the lack of sustainable funding and secondly by the 
Ebola crisis. 
Within UNMIL I was tasked with supporting this initiative particularly in the context of 
transition from OP MAYO and UNMIL drawdown, and while the concept had 
possibilities, my engagement gave me many reasons to doubt its sustainability. In 
December 2013, I was invited to attend an NGO validation of the strategy in Freetown 
during which much of the discussion related to complaints from assembled NGOs that 
they had not been involved in the articulation of the strategy which they being called 
on to validate, followed by concerns about funding their involvement in its 
implementation. I attended a second meeting in Abidjan in April 2014 to finalise the 
cross-border security strategy’s implementation plan and present it to potential 
donors. Between then and the time of writing in 2016, none of the projects in the 
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implementation plan had been initiated, save for modest uncoordinated efforts 
(including those of UNMIL) to reactivate the JBSCBUs. In May 2016, I attended the 
third MRU technical and ministerial meeting on peace and security in Abidjan. The 
meeting brought home to me all the potentials and pitfalls of the involvement of a 
sub-regional economic body in peace and security. The three-day meeting, which 
tackled three weighty topics of counter-terrorism, maritime security and enhanced 
border security (including the role of the JBSCBUs) was characterised by participants – 
mostly deputies from the police, immigration, defence, national security, armed forces 
and maritime sectors – alternating between bemusement and confusion about the 
purpose of the MRU in relation to these topics and debating the merits of the body 
having its own counter-terrorism and maritime strategies when relevant mechanisms 
already existed at ECOWAS, AU and international levels, and enthusiastic and 
vociferous debate of the finer points of the Memorandum of Understanding and the 
framework under review. 
On 30 June 2016, I attended yet another MRU meeting aimed at reactivating JBSCBUs 
in Liberia. This was slightly different as it was funded by UNMIL Quick Impact Projects 
(based on a proposal I had supported the MRU Secretariat to submit). I remained 
enthusiastically committed to the JBSCBU concept, yet sitting at the meeting listening 
to the litany of complaints and concerns about the limitations of the units for the job 
at hand, related to the lack of support provided by the MRU, I could not help but 
wonder why we as a mission were so bent on providing support to an institution as 
poorly capacitated as the MRU. Was it simply so we could comply with the Security 
Council’s request for ‘the Secretary-General to provide regular updates on progress 
towards the development of such a sub-regional strategy’, as asked in so many 
mandates? Inasmuch as successive UN peacebuilding reviews (most recently the 2015 
High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations report) placed much stock in 
coordination with regional organisations for maintaining peace and security, adhering 
to such a state-led process as they did (not least in relation to their reliance on 
member states for funding and setting priorities), in contexts such as this, what was 
their real comparative advantage? As desperate as I was, for the sake of my job and 
my thesis, to believe in the value of a regional approach, I could not dismiss how 
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concerned with survival these (particularly smaller) regional institutions were. 
Particularly, it seemed to me, the practice of holding meetings and producing 
strategies and operational plans (all of which they required external support to do), 
and so on, appeared to be self-aggrandising performances to validate their viability, 
rather similar to regional combatants’ posturing. It occurred to me that these 
organisations had as limited engagement with the reality on the ground as UN peace 
operations, if not less so, being much more poorly capacitated, and as such the 
concern of the new regionalisms approach, related to moving away from formal and 
inter-state regional networks and their structures, even such potentially innovative 
ones as the JBSCBUs, seemed to be even more relevant in such spaces.  
Of course, compounding the issue was the missions’ concern with fulfilling their 
mandate to work with sub-regional organisations. But while this provides an example 
of UNMIL working to achieve a mandate requirement, albeit with possibly limited 
value, there are also examples of the mission failing to make efforts to implement 
mandate requirements, including one directly related to addressing cross-border 
motivations, which would have been potentially of great value. We turn to this in the 
next section. 
9.3. The refugee-DDR conundrum 
As recalled at the start of this chapter, successive Security Council resolutions called 
upon the Liberian and Ivoirian Governments to develop and implement a shared 
border strategy to ‘inter alia support the disarmament and repatriation of foreign 
armed elements on both sides of the border and the voluntary return [or repatriation] 
of refugees’ (United Nations Security Council 2013a: 9, 2013b: 5, 2012a: 5, 2012b: 4). 
Chapter 7 discussed refugee camps as insecure spaces, even as UNHCR and its partners 
often went to great lengths to ensure that they are secure, in no small part by striving 
to maintain the civilian character of camps. Often, however, the two governments and 
the missions (and, apparently, the Security Council) considered the camps to be 
problematic, especially, as discussed in the next chapter, in the face of evidence of 
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mixed populations moving across the borders who were not adequately screened to 
identify and separate armed elements from what became the refugee population.  
As such, support for the disarmament and repatriation of foreign armed elements, at 
least on the Liberia side, became intractably linked with the refugee situation. 
Although UNOCI and UNMIL assessed that Ivoirian militias and Liberian ex-combatants 
were among the refugee influx, no assessment was undertaken to confirm the scale of 
movement. Further, as mentioned before, the Liberian Government’s decision to grant 
prima facie status to incoming refugees further precluded combatants’ identification 
and separation from the refugee population (the exceptional case is discussed in the 
next chapter). While the degree of correlation between the refugee population and 
cross-border violence was unclear, it was evident that an unknown number of ex-
fighters and former Ivoirian security personnel had registered as refugees and were 
living in refugee camps and host communities. Further, Liberian and Ivoirian 
authorities also directly linked a few of those registered refugees living both inside and 
outside the camps to cross-border violence. This anecdotal evidence notwithstanding, 
concern with maintaining the civilian character of the camp made the issue politically 
sensitive for both the Liberian Government and UNHCR, given the potential 
implications for humanitarian, human rights, and refugee protection obligations. 
9.3.1. Provisions for cross-border DDR in the Ivoirian programme 
In July 2012, the Steering Committee of the Ivoirian Technical Working Group on 
Security Sector Reform adopted a policy paper on DDR and a framework for 
implementation. It represented an updated approach to the 2004 legal framework 
provided by the National Demobilization and Reintegration Programme, taking into 
account the post-election crisis. The regional dimension was given prominence as one 
of the four overall objectives, namely to strengthen the stability of the state and the 
sub-region through the development of synergies in the control of trans-boundary 
movements of armed people (the other objectives were reducing the risk of armed 
violence through DDR; promoting social cohesion and peace through community and 
ex-combatant sensitisation; and poverty reduction through sustainable economic 
reintegration and community rehabilitation) (Présidence de la République 2012). In 
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addition to identifying a target population as ‘everyone of both sexes over 18 years 
who participated in the battles following the events of September 2002 and/or the 
post-election crisis of December 2010 as a member of a combat group recognized by 
the supervising Administrative Authority and who wants to return to civilian life’, the 
paper further identified nine target groups, each with specific eligibility criteria and 
definitions. Three categories were of regional significance: resident foreign combatants 
on Ivoirian soil; non-resident foreign combatants on Ivoirian soil, to be repatriated; and 
exiled Ivoirian combatants to be repatriated. Technically, the repatriation would 
include all operations to sensitise, identify, group and return ex-combatants to their 
country of origin. For exiled Ivoirian ex-combatants, their return would also allow them 
to be eligible for reintegration programs. The Policy Paper envisaged that these 
processes would require significant sub-regional collaboration, including the adoption 
and implementation of agreed/coordinated plans for identifying and repatriating ex-
combatants.  
This and related documents seemingly signalled a willingness, at least on the part of 
the Ivoirian government, to consider the Security Council’s request for cross-border 
DDR. The modalities to kick-start these processes were never elaborated, however. 
Even if they had been, on the Liberian side, given that Liberian DDR and even post-DDR 
reintegration programmes had long since ended, it would have been difficult to 
envisage who would be responsible for providing Liberian ex-combatants with 
assistance packages upon their return to Liberia. The preceding discussion as well as 
the mandate language highlights that these efforts should be undertaken by the two 
governments and as such is a contender for discussion in the next section looking at 
state-level initiatives. I have chosen to include it here however because, at least on the 
Liberia side, such an undertaking would have required significant mission engagement, 
as during the formal DDR process.56 Instead, lacking appropriate capacity, the mission 
floundered, hoping that the issue would go away, which it finally did with the formal 
end of the DDR programme in Côte d’Ivoire in 2015. 
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 On the Ivoirian side, the Government, through the national Autorité pour le Désarmement, la 
Démobilisation et la Réintégration des Ex-Combattants (ADDR, or the DDR Authority) took on the 
primary responsibility for funding and implementing DDR programmes.  
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This is not to say that the missions and the region did not have some experience with 
cross-border DDR. In 2003, following the end of Liberia’s civil war, UNMIL and 
UNAMSIL coordinated on options for the repatriation of Sierra Leonean ex-combatants 
from Liberia, albeit to a limited extent, given that DDR in Sierra Leone had ended.57 
Since UNMIL’s inception in 2003, its RRR programme cooperated closely with UNOCI’s 
DDR programme. Following the end of the Côte d’Ivoire conflict in 2007, the two 
missions’ Joint Mission Analysis Cells, together with DDR (UNOCI) and RRR (UNMIL) 
developed bi-annual lists of Liberians who were associated with militia in Côte d’Ivoire, 
and who could possibly pose a threat to Liberia (UNMIL 2011). Further, despite the end 
of DDR in Liberia, some efforts were made to establish special short-term employment 
programmes for ex-combatants returning from Côte d’Ivoire, following RRR 
assessment visits to Guiglo in 2008, in coordination with UNOCI DDR, and meetings 
with Liberian militia leaders.58 By 2012, however, the explicit mandate for RRR had 
ended, with the reduced unit subsumed under the Civil Affairs Section. Nonetheless, 
the section was tasked, in coordination with the RIMCSU to consider the parameters of 
UNMIL’s support in the context of the Ivoirian DDR policy, being implemented by the 
Autorité pour le Désarmement, la Démobilisation et la Réintégration des Ex-
Combattants (or DDR authority, ADDR). 
An UNMIL policy paper subsequently developed noted the importance of practical 
modalities to identify and voluntarily repatriate Ivoirian ex-fighters, including those 
with refugee status, who would subsequently be eligible to participate in Ivoirian DDR. 
In the case of any former fighters registered as refugees, these could have been 
assisted to return to Côte d’Ivoire as refugees being then at liberty to present 
themselves for DDR or other reintegration assistance, according to clear eligibility 
criteria that would have been subject to agreement by the two Governments and 
relevant agencies. 
A main sticking point was UNHCR. In 2012, UNHCR conducted a validation screening 
exercise that qualified all registered refugees as civilian refugees, as they were 
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 Discussion with former UNMIL RRR officer, October 2013. 
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 Interview with former UNMIL RRR Officer, April 2010. 
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unarmed. As registered refugees in Liberia they were entitled to the rights and 
international protections guaranteed them by virtue of their status. UNHCR remained 
adamant that any effort to bring active DDR-related programmes into the camps 
would create serious protection risks for refugees; compromise the civilian and 
humanitarian character of the camps; compromise the security of refugees and other 
persons of concern living in the camps as this may have caused the Liberian security 
apparatus to perceive them as ex-combatants; and blur and frustrate the ongoing 
voluntary repatriation process, potentially eroding the already low level of confidence 
the refugees had in Côte d’Ivoire’s peace process.59 
UNMIL had additional concerns. It was clear from UNMIL assessments that some 
refugees were not sufficiently convinced that the conditions for their safe and 
voluntary return to Côte d’Ivoire were in place. Refugees indicated to both UNMIL and 
UNHCR that they would consider voluntary return to Côte d’Ivoire only when they felt 
that the Government was making genuine efforts to create the conditions necessary 
for their safe return. Refugees also shared fears of abuse by Ivoirian security forces, 
and of being targeted or arrested, if they repatriated. This was considering, among 
other things, evidence of FRCI spoilers. Additionally, visible and genuine progress 
towards reconciliation, DDR and security sector reform (SSR), restoring the capacity of 
and confidence in civilian authorities in western Côte d’Ivoire, and progress with land 
dispute resolution (particularly given the reported occupation of farms and property in 
the west by ‘Burkinabés’)60 were among factors cited by refugees as necessary for their 
voluntary return. It could be assumed that the same concerns applied to former 
fighters, who likely required further assurances upon return with regard to additional 
guarantees of safety, ensuring their incorporation into DDR programmes, subsequent 
monitoring to ensure non-discrimination and non-victimisation, and contingencies for 
those choosing not to repatriate. This was especially bearing in mind the continued 
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 Expressed over several meetings and email exchanges with UNCHR and other interlocutors on this 
issue, including at the October 2013 Joint Council of Chiefs and Elders Meeting (JCCEM) discussed in the 
next chapter. 
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 Based on focus group discussions with refugees in November 2012, March 2013, November 2013 and 
further discussions in February and May 2016. 
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detention at the time of 41 former fighters extradited by the Liberian government in 
2012. 
This situation also had to be set against the reality of the programme in Côte d’Ivoire. 
In 2013 ADDR failed to achieve its ex-combatant reinsertion and reintegration target, 
with 21,413 out of the target 30,000 ex-combatants participating in relevant 
programmes.61 Additionally, while satellite and regional offices were operating in the 
west (including in Dix-Huit Montagnes and Moyen-Cavally regions), in the south-west 
progress was slow, with ADDR only opening a regional office in San Pedro in October 
2013, with further planned satellite offices delayed.62 Also, it was never clear whether 
an explicit strategy existed to support the ADDR’s DDR Policy Paper provisions for the 
repatriation and participation of foreign-based ex-combatants in Ivoirian DDR, 
including eligibility criteria, and credible information on tenable reintegration options 
for a group that, for the most part, violently opposed Ouattara’s presidency and who 
came from areas with few employment options. In any case, relevant engagement 
never materialised. Instead, ADDR eschewed formal channels and made some 
unilateral efforts to identify, target and repatriate former Ivoirian fighters residing in 
Liberia, including clandestine operations among refugee populations and targeted 
profiling (it was rumoured using lists of pro-Gbagbo militia), which was particularly 
problematic. This includes an incident in May 2013, during which an ADDR delegation 
was detained in Zwedru, Grand Gedeh County for failing to advise the Government of 
Liberia of its presence. The breach of protocol left the Liberian Ministries of Defence 
and Justice angered by the lack of prior notice, let alone a request for authorisation, 
regarding the mission. This risked upsetting delicate bilateral relations, which the two 
countries were striving to improve, and which had recently been strengthened through 
the quadripartite framework, with a quadripartite peace and security meeting 
between the two Governments, UNMIL and UNOCI having been held just a month 
previously. Also, given the perceived antagonism against the Ivoirian government by 
the resident population (as evidenced by the angry reception given to a UNOCI and 
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 Conversation with UNOCI DDR Officer. The programme came to an official end in June 2015 although 
it was recognised that residual activities would continue. 
 194 
 
 
 
Ivoirian delegation during a visit to Solo Refugee Camp in Grand Gedeh in March 
2012), the perception that Ivoirian government elements were secretly operating in 
Liberia, and rumoured to be or actually trying to identify pro-Gbagbo ex-combatants 
for unknown reasons, raised concerns that this could exacerbate tensions and perhaps 
even trigger a violent response, particularly among those refugees who even then 
were expressing a preference to remain long-term in Liberia.  
On the Liberian side, however, there were also numerous practical constraints. As 
mentioned above, there was no relevant Liberian Government counterpart entity to 
deal with even residual DDR, and thus there was no natural ‘counterpart’ to whom 
ADDR could channel its requests. While the DDR programme in Liberia was handed 
over to the Vice President’s office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, there was no 
institutional memory and other, perhaps more relevant Ministries, such as Foreign 
Affairs, Justice, Defense or National Security also faced significant constraints. While 
the Liberian Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission (LRRRC) had been 
strengthened to enable it to carry out its responsibilities in relation to Ivoirian 
refugees, in relation to its protection mandate, it also could not be expected to 
coordinate such an activity.  
Ultimately, UNMIL argued that its support to the process could only be limited to 
repatriation and reintegration of former armed elements, rather than the 
disarmament and demobilisation of foreign armed elements, which implied current 
mobilisation. The mission also identified several other areas it felt it could provide 
support. These included assisting in information and sensitisation efforts to enable 
eligible individuals to make informed decisions; facilitating coordination; monitoring, 
analysis and information-sharing; promoting a focus on (alternative) cross-cutting 
issues, such as community violence reduction; and helping to ensure that the 
international legal frameworks and procedures were followed. This support would, 
however, be conditioned on the Ivoirian Government’s ability to provide satisfactory 
assurances of combatants’ safety upon their return.63 Notwithstanding, UNOCI seemed 
determined to support the Ivoirian Government’s clandestine efforts, such that UNOCI 
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staff were temporarily detained alongside ADDR staff in May 2012, having crossed into 
Liberia without informing UNMIL counterparts, demonstrating a lack of coordination 
between the two missions despite ongoing efforts to strengthen IMC. 
Additionally, arising from the mandate, the mission was unable to separate refugee 
issues from foreign militias. While this perhaps presented complications because they 
were considered to be present in the refugee camps, the extent to which these 
populations overlapped was not known, and very little effort was made to ascertain 
this – even though significant numbers of Ivoirians, both refugees and non-refugees, 
were known for instance to be working in the ubiquitous mining camps. One of the 
possible reasons UNMIL was unable to do this and think through practical support was 
lack of capacity. UNMIL no longer had a DDR section, and without an obligation to 
practically align the budget with mandated tasks, UNMIL was not required to make 
provisions for staff with DDR capacity to undertake the activity.  
9.4. Conclusion 
Similar to the cross-border DDR example, the other examples in this chapter – border 
stabilisation and engagement with sub-regional actors – have considered the realities 
of implementing some of the more innovative yet problematic aspects of UNMIL (and 
UNOCI’s) mandate related to regional and inter-mission cooperation, in ways that 
resonate with the discussion in the previous chapter, which problematised both 
textual and discursive policy. Indeed this chapter has highlighted in practical terms the 
(unintended) effects of the ritualised production of texts, as well as ‘the power 
relations that a discourse constructs and allows’ (Ball 1993: 14). From the delayed 
request to address the root causes of cross-border conflict, to uncritically advocating 
engagement with regional organisations, it firstly demonstrates the slow-moving, 
repetitive nature of mandates as they are couched in Security Council Resolutions, 
even in the face of evidence of the need for the contrary. Secondly, the programmes 
flowing from the mandates demonstrate limited engagement with ex-combatant 
narratives and preferences, especially in relation to practical economic empowerment 
options, whether local livelihoods or DDR, even though on-the-ground peacebuilding 
actors were well aware of the need for these.  
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Finally, the reasons for these limitations are related to the habitual practices of the UN 
and its staff, and reliance on pro forma approaches, facilitated by planning and 
reporting processes that do not engender excessive self-reflection or critique. A case in 
point is the cross-border DDR situation. The UNMIL DDR policy paper referenced above 
was adapted into a code cable, setting out the limitations and parameters of UNMIL 
support, and sent to New York. The mandate notwithstanding, from then onwards the 
mission referenced this instead of the mandate in relation to our proposed 
engagement, which eventually came to nought, a potentially missed opportunity, given 
both Liberian and Ivoirian militias’ expectations that they would be able to benefit 
from DDR. 
It should be noted that the preceding is not an exhaustive account or critique of UN 
and sub-regional organisations’ efforts on the ground, but rather an analysis of how 
framing and resulting practice based on the mandates and narrow engagement with 
ex-combatants’ and local communities’ narratives limited the nature and impact of the 
resulting peacebuilding interventions. It should also be read with the caveat that 
despite these limitations, over time the frequency and severity of cross-border attacks 
eased significantly in part, no doubt, to the efforts discussed above, among others.  
These limitations also should be considered in a context where resolutions contain not 
just the mandates for the relevant peace operation but also directives to the national 
government, other UN agencies and stakeholders, which all have their own mandates, 
priorities and capacity constraints. The next chapter considers state-led efforts to 
address cross-border stabilisation, highlighting for the most part that the limitations 
discussed above were not limited to international peacebuilding initiatives, as state-led 
approaches were subject to similar pitfalls and constraints. 
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10. Partial engagement in practice: national responses to 
border insecurity 
This chapter considers the effectiveness of national peacebuilding responses to 
regional conflict, albeit with the support of the UN missions, in relation to the 
motivations articulated in Chapters 6 and 7. In doing so it critically considers 
Autesserre’s assertion that ‘peacebuilding is more effective when it promotes both 
local authorship . . . and local ownership’ (2014: 102). As such, it interrogates 
Autesserre’s supposition that local perspectives and initiatives are the missing link in 
successful peacebuilding practice. Quoting Moore (2013: 121), she notes that local 
authorship relates to the constant solicitation of ‘local input on how to best proceed 
with a given set of goals’, while local ownership entails ‘control over policy creation 
and implementation.’ 
As with previous chapters, this chapter is informed by regional peacebuilding activities 
from 2002 onwards, but largely focuses on Liberian and Ivoirian government activities 
in response to the Ivoirian post-electoral crisis, and subsequent cross-border and near-
border attacks from 2010 to 2016. According to the Panel of Experts for Liberia, 
The attackers constitute a network of Liberian mercenaries and Ivorian militia 
members who operate as ethnically affiliated and aligned ‘gangs’, which have access, 
sometimes competing access, to various financial supporters in neighbouring 
countries. The fact that networks inside Liberia lack hierarchical structure could be 
symptomatic of a lack of coordination at the strategic level, such as among former 
Gbagbo financiers living in Ghana. The availability of military assault rifles and limited 
quantities of heavier weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades shows that financing 
provides the critical catalyst for the incitement of cross-border attacks . . . Liberian 
mercenaries remain ready for mobilization, primarily for personal enrichment, as do 
former Ivorian militia members, who live in refugee camps or in local communities and 
have limited means to participate in the informal economy. Liberian mercenaries fulfil 
a coordination and logistical role, while combatant manpower is derived 
predominantly from former Ivorian militia members. Accordingly, Liberian mercenaries 
and Ivorian militia commanders, who fought together in Côte d’Ivoire, jointly 
command the combatants. (Panel of Experts on Liberia 2012a) 
Although apparently dwelling on the ‘mercenary’ motive, this paragraph in reality 
demonstrates the complex intermingling of motivations, mentioning at the same time, 
the kinship motive (operating as ‘ethnically affiliated and aligned “gangs”’); micro-
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regional factors (living together ‘in refugee camps or in local communities and have 
limited means to participate in the informal economy’, funded by state-in-exile 
‘financial supporters in neighbouring countries’); and associational motivations 
(‘Liberian mercenaries and Ivorian militia commanders, who fought together in Côte 
d’Ivoire’).  
In response to this complexity of motivations, the Liberian and Ivoirian governments 
stepped up their bilateral engagement to address cross-border insecurity and promote 
stabilization. Given the presence of the two UN missions in both countries and their 
mandates to provide support to the two governments for border stabilisation, this 
quickly evolved into a quadripartite arrangement, involving the two governments, 
UNMIL and UNOCI, such that, apart from a bilateral security meeting in May 2012, 
nearly all subsequent border security meetings were held in a quadripartite context. 
Between 2012 and 2016, there were three major quadripartite meetings, in June 2012, 
April 2013 and March 2015, each of which took place following attacks close to the 
Liberian–Ivoirian border, some with a cross-border dimension64 (also represented in 
Table A1.2 in Annex 1), and led to borders between the two countries being closed for 
a time. Critiqued for their largely reactive nature, especially coming as they did 
following alleged cross-border attacks, the meetings were each punctuated by 
communiqués which included, among other matters, agreements on measures to bring 
Liberian and Ivoirian cross-border fighters to justice, joint security operations, and 
cross-border cooperation and dialogue. This sections below discuss the various efforts 
in each of these areas by the Liberian and Ivoirian governments, including why the 
efforts took the forms that they did and the limitations in each case.  
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 It is worthwhile noting that the Panel of Experts on Liberia (2013b) related the motivations for later 
attacks to combatants’ efforts to demonstrate to funders (mostly state-in-exile pro-Gbagbo supporters 
based in Ghana as discussed in Chapter 7) of their ongoing capability to destabilise the border region 
and attract further funding, which had dried up due to misappropriation of previous funds provided, and 
the arrest and extradition from Ghana of some of these funders. 
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10.1. Bringing cross-border fighters to justice 
A major feature of both countries’ efforts was coordination to bring cross-border 
fighters to justice. This included internment, detention, extradition, and, in the case of 
Liberian cross-border combatants, a ‘mercenary trial’.  
10.1.1. Internment of suspected Ivoirian militias 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, it was widely perceived that Ivoirian militias 
were among the refugee influx to Liberia following the electoral crisis. In situations 
where the population influx seeking asylum is considered mixed, the screening, 
separation and internment of suspected armed elements in accordance with 
international law is an important strategy for ensuring UNHCR principles of 
maintaining the civilian character of refugee camps (UNHCR 2006a, 2006b). Prior to 
the 2010 Ivoirian elections, during contingency planning, UNMIL and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) ‘raised the possibility of a “mixed influx”, and the 
need to consider an internment policy for any armed elements entering into the 
country among other asylum seekers, in accordance with international law and in 
order to protect civilian host and refugee populations in the neutral State, and to 
prevent armed elements using neutral territory to regroup, recruit or rearm with the 
intention of returning to the theatre of conflict’ (United Nations Mission in Liberia 
2012: 1).  
In March 2011, following sustained advocacy by ICRC and UNMIL, stakeholders agreed 
to establish an Integrated Task Force (ITF) to consider administrative detention for 
foreign armed elements, in line with international protocols. Definitive action was 
precipitated by the detention of 88 suspected armed elements by the Liberia National 
Police (LNP) on 1 April 2011 for illegal possession of ammunition, following their entry 
into Maryland County, Liberia from Côte d’Ivoire. In the absence of an internment 
facility, they were detained at the central prison in Harper, Maryland’s County Capital 
but in May 2011, the Harper Circuit Court ruled that they were being held unlawfully 
as they had not been charged, and that they should be released to a ‘habitable 
encampment site in a secured environment’ (Panel of Experts on Liberia 2011: 17). 
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Responsibility for this fell to the ITF, led by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and 
including the National Security Agency, relevant line Ministries (including Justice, 
Defence, Agriculture and Health and Social Welfare), the LNP, BIN, State Security, and 
the Liberian Refugee, Repatriation and Resettlement Commission (LRRRC), with UNMIL 
and UNHCR advising (United Nations Mission in Liberia 2012a). A site was identified in 
Weinsue, Bong County, inland from the Ivoirian border, to which the suspected armed 
elements were transferred in June 2011. 
Rescreening determined that 16 of the internees were minors, 53 were armed 
elements, 16 were adult civilians and three were Liberian mercenaries (United Nations 
Mission in Liberia 2012a). The Liberian Government subsequently informed internees 
of their various options, contingent of their renunciation of armed activities: voluntary 
repatriation to Côte d’Ivoire; submission for Refugee Status Determination; seek 
asylum; or ECOWAS residency. In December 2011 the ITF recommended the closure of 
Weinsue by mid-March 2012. According to the Liberian Government, this was because 
the conditions for administrative detention were no longer necessary, given that the 
situation in Côte d’Ivoire had stabilised and rescreening by the Joint Security apparatus 
determined that the majority had renounced armed activity, and on 12 March 2012, all 
the remaining internees were moved from Weinsue and the camp was closed.65 Sixty-
nine of them were granted refugee status and transferred to reception centres. 
Following a request from the Government of Côte d’Ivoire, three were brought before 
the Gbarnga Magisterial Court on the basis of warrants issued the same day, and 
detained in Gbarnga Prison although subsequently released in April 2012 (Panel of 
Experts on Liberia 2012b). 
While officially the Liberian Government concluded that the changing situation 
precluded the need for administrative detention, the Panel of Experts for Liberia note 
in their June 2012 report that the Ministry of Internal Affairs cited ‘lack of funds to 
maintain the camp’ (Panel of Experts on Liberia 2012b: 17) as the reason for its 
premature closure. Furthermore, the overall issue of administrative detention was 
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never institutionalised to respond to the mixed influx and threat to national security 
posed by suspected armed elements, and no further action was taken to identify other 
suspected armed elements for possible internment, whether in Weinsue or elsewhere, 
even though it was clear that militias continued to arrive in Liberia, as mentioned in 
Chapter 7. 
Despite this intelligence, Weinsue was the beginning and end of the Liberian 
government’s experiment with internment. That very few lessons had been learned 
from Weinsue was patently obvious during a contingency planning exercise for the 
Ivoirian presidential elections in October 2015. The only reference information 
available was from a lessons learnt document compiled by UNMIL in 2012. Although 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs had been the lead in the ITF, it had no available 
information or institutional memory about the activity or knowledge of best practice, 
with no staff who had worked on the ITF still in position, and the technical inputs for 
the plan were based largely on information provided by UNMIL.  
10.1.2. Detention and prosecution of Liberian and Ivoirian cross-border 
fighters 
The Panel of Experts (2012a) reported that between June and October 2012, 25 
individuals were detained, almost all of them in Grand Gedeh county, on suspicion of 
being involved in cross-border fighting. Their arrests seemed to be based on limited 
intelligence available to security agencies as well as joint security operations initiated 
in June 2012 (see section 10.2 below). The Liberians were mostly arrested in the 
proximity of refugee and gold mining camps, as well as towns close to the Ivoirian 
border. Some of them were found to be in possession of ammunition and 
sophisticated equipment, such as satellite phones, including items allegedly taken from 
the UNOCI peacekeepers killed in the June 2012 cross-border attack. Some were 
subsequently released, with the Panel believing that at least two continued to plan 
cross-border attacks. Others remained in custody, however, and were subsequently 
charged with mercenarism, murder, rape, arson, illegal possession of firearms and 
theft of property. Still others were charged with criminal facilitation and paramilitary 
activities and transferred to Monrovia, where they remained in pre-trial detention for 
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nearly two years, until the trial of 19 of them commenced together on 15 July 2013 
(see below). It should be noted, however, that this trial was the only one of its kind to 
take place. As such, while the arrests should have deterred cross-border attacks, the 
frequent release of those arrested made a mockery of the process. 
During this period, the Liberian Security Joint Taskforce (JTF) also picked up Ivoirians 
suspected of participating in cross-border attacks. On 24 August 2012, six of them 
were charged with ‘murder, mercenarism, rape, arson, illegal possession of firearms 
and theft of property’ (Panel of Experts on Liberia 2012a: 12). While some were also 
remanded in custody, others were extradited to Côte d’Ivoire. Indeed, extradition has 
been Côte d’Ivoire’s preferred method for dealing with the Ivoirian militias but this has 
raised significant protection concerns about due process and the fate of these militias 
once handed over to the Ivoirian government. For instance, on 23 June 2012, 41 
Ivoirians suspected of carrying out activities against integrity and security in Côte 
d’Ivoire were extradited from Liberia to Côte d'Ivoire. Upon arrival in Côte d'Ivoire, 
they were all detained at the police headquarters in Abidjan before being transferred 
to various prisons across the country. In that connection, six were transferred to 
Abidjan and charged with participation in the attack that resulted in the death of seven 
UNOCI peacekeepers on 8 June 2012. The remaining 35 were transferred to four other 
prisons around the country, and charged various crimes, including genocide, murder, 
assault, aggravated rape, and crimes against humanity (source: UNOCI anecdotal 
reporting). 
The reliance of both governments on extradition of suspected Ivoirian armed elements 
has had adverse implications for international humanitarian principles, such as non-
refoulement. For instance, on 12 February 2014 several media outlets reported that 
between five and 18 Ivoirians, as well as some Liberians, had been arrested in River 
Gee County trying to cross into Côte d’Ivoire (Parley 2014). It was subsequently 
confirmed that 26 individuals (including five Liberians) had been arrested between 7 
and 14 February and variously charged with loitering, mercenarism, terrorism and 
criminal facilitation. Of these 19, all holding refugee status, were repatriated to Côte 
d’Ivoire and placed under arrest, in direct violation of the principle of non-refoulement. 
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Even in cases where they may not have been refugees, extradition of suspects by the 
Liberian Government (for instance, of the 41 Ivoirians suspected of cross-border 
military activity) has been a contentious practice, as human rights practitioners have 
expressed concern about the fate awaiting those individuals extradited to Côte 
d’Ivoire. Further, as discussed in Chapter 7, Ivoirian refugees in Liberia have 
consistently pointed to the ongoing detention of pro-Gbagbo supporters as one of the 
main reasons that they fear returning to Côte d’Ivoire, citing it as evidence of the 
Ivoirian Government’s lack of commitment towards reconciliation. The Liberian 
Government’s willingness to hand over Ivoirian suspects to the Ivoirian authorities is 
also seen by Liberian border communities as evidence of the Liberian Government’s 
pro-Ouattara (and therefore anti-Gbagbo, anti-Krahn, anti-Kru) stance. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, despite calls from various fronts UNHCR did not 
consider it necessary to undertake comprehensive rescreening to ensure ex-
combatants who had not renounced military activity were separated from the civilian 
refugee population. Yet as recently as September 2015 the Liberian government briefly 
detained three refugees in Little Wlebo Camp, Maryland County, following reports 
they were involved in mercenary recruitment or organising armed elements. Nor did 
they permit information on DDR opportunities to be communicated within the camp, a 
potentially short-sighted approach that may have had adverse implications for 
returning ex-combatant refugees who would not have been able to take advantage of 
the comparatively lucrative reintegration packages other than that accorded by their 
refugee status (especially following the formal closure of the Ivoirian DDR 
programme). 
According to the Panel of Experts on Liberia, the Ivoirian Government has also engaged 
in paying off commanders to stop them from organising attacks. While this seemed to 
have paid off in the short run it is not a long-term solution, especially if others are 
ready to pay more or underlying grievances remain unresolved. 
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10.1.3. The mercenary trial 
As mentioned above, the trial of 19 Liberians commenced on 15 July 2013, after some 
of the defendants had been in pre-trial detention for over two years. The defendants 
were soon reduced to 18 as one, Prince Barclay, turned state’s witness, following 
which charges against him were dropped. In making their case, the prosecution relied 
on the testimony of ‘insider’ witnesses, who provided evidence that they were present 
at the time of the attack in Para in 2012 during which the seven UNOCI peacekeepers 
were killed. 
On the stand, the accused uniformly denied being involved in cross-border activities 
and claimed that they had been offered money and to have their charges dropped if 
they testified against their fellow accused. Most denied knowing one another and 
pointed to a range of legal activities they were engaged in to make a living. They also 
complained that excessive force had been used during their arrests and while they 
were in custody, with two claiming that a fellow suspect had been beaten to death. 
They also claimed that the Emergency Response Unit officers who had arrested them 
had taken their gold, money and jewellery, and that the theft of these items was the 
main motive for their arrest. They further claimed that they had been asked to provide 
bribes to secure their release, which they claimed another suspect, ‘Bob Marley’, had 
done. Central to the defendants’ testimonies was the assertion that they did not make 
the statements accredited to them by the prosecution which, they alleged, were in any 
case obtained illegally as they did not have lawyers present; they further argued that 
the prosecution’s case was in substance based on hearsay evidence (information based 
on court transcripts, newspaper articles, and UNMIL summary of court proceedings). 
The defence also tried to show that key States witnesses had been manipulated into 
providing false testimony, in exchange for money that in the end was not forthcoming.  
I had the opportunity to attend a court session in September 2013. I was barely able to 
follow proceedings as the witness’s responses were hardly heard beyond the stand 
and every few minutes the judge had to stop proceedings in order to paraphrase the 
witness’s testimony to the court clerk for recording. On the day I attended, a female 
officer was on the stand, called as a witness by the prosecution to attest to the fact 
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that she was not in a love triangle with one of the accused and one of the witnesses 
which, the defence had proposed, was the reason why the witness had provided 
testimony against the accused. I relate this account because it brought home to me 
how much of a spectacle, bordering on farce, that the trial seemed to have become. 
This was taken to another level when the trial was suspended in September 2013, after 
state prosecutors accused one of the jurors of misconduct, claiming that he had 
committed perjury by lying about his real name, which was subsequently found out to 
be Krahn – which, as explained in Chapter 7, was the same ethnic group as most the 
accused. On 31 December 2013, a few days after the trial resumed, the presiding Judge 
was compelled to suspend the case after the defendants vandalised the court, with 
some stripping naked to protest their ongoing incarceration, their nakedness 
subsequently reproduced in several of the following days’ newspapers. The re-trial 
eventually recommenced on 11 March 2014. At this time the original indictment was 
separated into two, wherein some of the defendants were alleged to have been part of 
the cross-border attacks into Côte d’Ivoire in 2011 and others alleged to have been 
involved in the attack of 2012 during which the UNOCI peacekeepers were killed.  
On 9 May 2014, the Court acquitted five of the 18 defendants charged under the 2011 
indictment, based on a motion for acquittal filed by the defence. On 10 June, the 
prosecution and the defence presented their final arguments. In main, the defence 
contended that the accused were not arrested in Côte d’Ivoire, where the crimes were 
alleged to have occurred, nor had there been any official testimony from the Ivoirian 
government related to the charge. Further, the defence noted that the prosecution’s 
arguments were solely based on hearsay evidence and should accordingly be ignored 
by the jury, and also the evidence produced by the ‘insider’ witnesses was 
uncorroborated (UNMIL reporting). Notwithstanding, the jury returned a ‘guilty’ 
verdict of against all remaining 13 defendants on the same day. The defence 
subsequently filed a motion for retrial, arguing that the weight of the evidence did not 
support the verdict; that the prosecution’s evidence was substantially hearsay; and 
that statements of the accused were obtained illegally. Subsequently, the lawyers 
representing the 13 defendants also raised concerns that the jurors had been bribed 
US$500 each to hand down a guilty verdict. The judge dismissed their motions on the 
 206 
 
 
 
grounds that none of the arguments met the legal requirements for retrial. The judge 
confirmed the ‘guilty’ verdict against all 13 defendants, two charged under the 2011 
indictment and 11 under the 2012 indictment, and the Court sentenced the 
defendants to life imprisonment to be served at Monrovia Central Prison.  
Throughout the trial and subsequently, pressure groups criticised the entire process, 
especially as 12 of the 13 convicted were from Grand Gedeh. As discussed in Chapter 
7, the trial was seen as a direct attack on Grand Gedeans. Numerous newspaper 
articles reported on this aspect, with Grand Gedean lawmakers, diaspora, politicians 
and other citizens weighing in (Parley 2013). The Grand Gedeh Association in the 
Americas (GGAA) issued a statement expressing dismay over the conviction of the 12 
Grand Gedeans, stating that the government had no credible evidence against the 
accused and that the guilty verdict was solely based on the fact that the convicts were 
Grand Gedeans. GGAA also claimed that they formed part of the government’s efforts 
to discriminate against, marginalise and harass citizens of Grand Gedeh as a form of 
punishment for past occurrences and affiliation with former President Samuel Doe, 
and demanded that the Government stop prejudicial actions against them. One GGAA 
member noted, ‘[i]f Sirleaf is serious about justice, I challenge her to create an 
independent war crimes court so that everyone would have an opportunity to litigate 
their innocence or guilt. But witch-hunting Grand Gedeh citizens will not engender 
peace, reconciliation, and justice in Liberia, but disunity and mistrust’ (Karmo 2013). 
Following the sentencing, Representative Munah Pelham Youngblood (Montserrado 
County) stated that the conviction was evidence of victimisation of the Grand Gedeans 
by the Government, observing, ‘[i]t pains me to see people from one ethnic group 
sentenced to life time imprisonment when we have just ended fourteen years of 
senseless war that divided us as people’ (Morris 2014). As discussed in Chapter 7, 
together with other grievances, the trial consolidated Grand Gedean positions against 
both the Liberian and Ivoirian governments, feeding into (or justifying further) cross-
border combatant and border communities’ perceptions of unfair prosecution. 
Postscript to the trial: on 22 September 2016, the Supreme Court upheld the guilty 
verdict and life sentence of nine of the 13 convicts, reversing the guilty verdict of the 
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remaining four due to insufficient evidence. The decision has been met with 
disappointment in Grand Gedeh, with media continuing to report efforts by Grand 
Gedean lawmakers and officials to have the remaining released. According to a 
newspaper article on 25 October, the lead counsel was ‘rallying elders and chiefs of 
[Grand Gedeh] county to mobilize their people to beg President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf 
to grant them clemency’ (Davis 2016). Recalling the language of an excluded citizenry, 
during the same meeting, senior Grand Gedeh politicians reportedly ‘assured that they 
would do everything possible to mobilize their people to beg President Sirleaf to free 
their children.’66 
Relating the situation to the government’s relationship with Côte d’Ivoire, the same 
article reports the defence counsel as saying, ‘Our government was only trying to show 
Côte d’Ivoire that they would compel its citizens to account for the crime they 
committed in that country, and they proved their case.’ A September 2016 newspaper 
article had also reported that one of the government prosecution lawyers had been 
fined US$500 for ‘telling jurors hearing the mercenary case that if they acquitted the 
13 defendants (Grand Gedeans), Ivory Coast would declare war on Liberia’ (Kollie 
2016). 
10.2. Joint security operations 
As was mentioned above, some of the defendants in the mercenary trial were arrested 
by a Joint Task Force (JTF) during dedicated security operations to secure the Liberian 
border. This was part of an operation dubbed ‘Operation Restore Hope’, which the 
Liberian Government initiated on 20 June 2012, following the attacks in which the 
peacekeepers were killed. The JTF comprised the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), the 
LNP’s Emergency Response Unit (ERU), BIN, and the National Security Agency (NSA) 
who were deployed to three of the four Liberian counties bordering Côte d’Ivoire 
(Grand Gedeh, River Gee and Maryland), to mitigate the threats posed by armed 
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 The efforts seemed to have worked as on 30 December 2016 President Sirleaf granted clemency to 
four of the Grand Gedeans convicted of mercenarism. 
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elements by conducting search operations and targeting suspected individuals for 
arrest (Panel of Experts on Liberia 2012a). In support of the JTF, UNMIL increased the 
number of air-inserted foot patrols, and air reconnaissance patrols, including by MI-24 
attack helicopters were also increased.  
During the operation at least 29 individuals were arrested for allegedly carrying out 
mercenary and militia recruitment, cross-border attacks and arms embargo violations 
(Panel of Experts on Liberia 2012a). Further, several caches of arms were discovered 
including a haul in July 2012 that ‘included five RPG rockets, 437 rounds of ammunition 
for automatic weapons, 41 empty AK47 magazines, two empty pistol magazines, 331 
AK 47 rounds and four RPG busters’ (United Nations Mission in Liberia 2012b). The 
Panel of Experts for Liberia noted, however, that while ‘Operation Restore Hope . . . 
provided a counterbalance to the unrestricted mobilization of mercenaries and militia 
members, and incapacitated one network through the arrest of its leaders . . . other 
networks remain active and maintain adequate manpower and access to weapons’ 
(Panel of Experts on Liberia 2012a). 
In an effort to consolidate the modest gains from the joint operations, a border 
security meeting between Liberian and Ivoirian security agencies was held in Abidjan 
from 21–23 November 2012 to agree on a framework for the conduct of an intensive 
10-day patrol from December 2012 to January 2013 to be Phase II of Operation 
Restore Hope on the Liberian side. It was further agreed that both sides should 
commence a joint riverine patrol along the Cavalla River as part of Phase III in order to 
prevent insurgence activities. During these operations, however, the media reported 
that morale among Liberian security personnel was low, especially as they lacked 
logistics and essential supplies. Further, although they were promised a special 
allowance during their deployment this was late or not forthcoming. 
Following the quadripartite meeting in April 2013, AFL and FRCI held a further joint 
planning exercise in September 2013 to plan for future joint operations, which would 
have constituted an ‘Operation Restore Hope III’ on the Liberia side. I attended this 
meeting and the difference in approaches between the two forces was evident. This 
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was embodied in an extended discussion about a joint communiqué summarising the 
meeting’s outcomes, in which Côte d’Ivoire wanted to refer to both security and 
defence, while Liberia insisted that they were only interested in security, as defence 
implied armed militias while they thought they were dealing with criminal elements. 
Despite the agreement to undertake joint operations this never materialised, most 
likely because of lack of funding and a perceived lack of immediate threat, unlike in 
2011 and 2012. Another element of this has been Côte d’Ivoire’s insistence on the 
principle of hot pursuit at quadripartite meetings, and again at the second JCCEM 
(where it was not discussed but ended up on the communiqué), which would enable 
Ivoirian security personnel to pursue suspected armed or criminal elements into 
Liberian territory. 
In March 2016 I attended the third quadripartite forces meeting, hosted by UNOCI in 
Grand Bassam, Côte d’Ivoire. While only the AFL was initially invited, UNMIL 
successfully advocated for the inclusion of LNP and BIN who are frontline responsible 
for border security (although the BIN subsequently did not attend). During the March 
2016 meeting, UNMIL flew the Liberian participants to Côte d’Ivoire and subsequently 
supported the development of an operational planning guidance between the two 
countries by hosting video teleconferences. Post-meeting, engagement has been 
heavily facilitated by UNMIL and UNOCI, but even so, progress stalled, particularly on 
the Liberian side, reportedly due to financial constraints to ultimately undertake any 
exercise, and the extent to which engagement could continue in the absence of the 
missions is uncertain. 
The engagement between the two countries’ security forces highlights a range of 
constraints. The whole exercise has made it clear that bilateral engagement on border 
security is hampered by differential focus, organisational responsibility, and limited 
capacity and resources, among others. For instance, despite repeated efforts it has 
been close to impossible to make FRCI (now FACI)67 understand that the principal 
responsibility for border security in Liberia rests with BIN (now LIS) rather than the AFL 
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 In 2016 FRCI was renamed Forces armées de Côte d'Ivoire (Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire, FACI). 
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who, as already noted, are not permanently at the border and even if they are would 
only serve as a third tier response on request of other security agencies. Yet BIN 
officers in 2016 were not armed, like much of the police (except for the ERU). This lack 
of permanent AFL presence at the border (although in 2016 they were deployed in 
Grand Gedeh but with limited scope) has meant that border security operations have 
been severely constrained. This contrasts with the Ivoirian side where FRCI is deployed 
semi-permanently, although this has not prevented them from being the target of 
periodic attacks, as mentioned above.  
10.3. Strengthening cross-border cooperation and dialogue: Joint 
Council of Chiefs and Elders Meeting  
As agreed in the June 2012 and April 2013 quadripartite meetings, the Governments of 
Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire collaborated to hold the first Joint Council of Chiefs and Elders 
meeting (JCCEM) in Zwedru, Grand Gedeh County from 16 to 19 October 2013. The 
meeting aimed ‘to contribute to the strengthening of cooperation, collaboration and 
coordination for, amongst other things, coherence of information exchanges between 
civilian and security authorities in the border regions of the two countries; enhance 
peacebuilding and stabilization in the region; and establish a platform for continual 
common border dialogue amongst the chiefs of both countries’ borders as well as 
sustain the peace in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire’ (Government of Liberia 2013: 4). It was 
to be ‘the first of regular cross-border meetings aimed at information-sharing and 
awareness raising on potential threats to continued peace and stability and thereby 
regularly alerting appropriate authorities on early warning issues with implications for 
insecurity and violence’, especially given trans-border ethnic affiliations which were 
also ‘cause for concern’ (Government of Liberia 2013: 4).  
The primary participants of the first meeting were upwards of 150 community 
representatives, which included traditional chiefs, women’s, youth group and refugee 
leaders, County Superintendents (Liberia) and Prefects (Côte d’Ivoire) from Nimba, 
Grand Gedeh, River Gee and Maryland Counties on the Liberian side and Dix-huit 
montagnes, Moyen Cavally and Bas Sassandra regions on the Ivoirian side. The idea 
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recognised the importance of involving traditional leaders in ensuring peace and 
security, and especially of utilising the much dwelled-upon cross-border ethnic 
affiliations as a means of promoting cross-border stabilisation. As much as the meeting 
was to give an opportunity to people from both sides of the border to talk to each 
other, it was also supposed to be a confidence-building exercise by the government 
among populations traditionally considered hostile towards the government. The 
decision to hold the first meeting in Zwedru in this context could also have been 
considered a welcome counterpoint to the accusations that the government was bent 
on sidelining the Krahn/Grand Gedeans. The profile of the meeting was raised by the 
decision of the two countries’ heads of state to participate in the closing ceremony.  
Although the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) was in the lead, the meeting was largely 
made possible by the interventions of UNMIL and UNOCI, who had committed to 
supporting it. Representatives, including myself, participated in regular planning and 
technical meetings, contributing to decisions as varied as the participants (including 
insisting on the participation of women and youth representatives from each county, 
not just elders) and facilitating joint visits of technical teams from both countries to 
Zwedru to assess the venue, delegates’ accommodation, travel arrangements 
(including flights), and so on. Within a month of the meeting, various UNMIL sections 
responsible for logistics, security and other support services had to be brought into the 
process, following a request from MIA for support for a range of items, including 
security, roadworks and aviation travel.  
While a useful initiative in principle and even in practice, there were numerous 
problems associated with the planning and execution of the event. Firstly, the dates 
were not fixed until September, which meant a lot of planning did not happen until the 
last minute, and it was clear that Zwedru, despite being the capital of Grand Gedeh, 
was woefully inadequate for holding such a major event (reference the complaints 
made by Grand Gedeh elders in Chapter 7 regarding holding Independence Day 
celebrations there). In Liberia, the technical committee relied heavily on UNMIL both 
in Monrovia and Zwedru for a range of activities, including drafting the concept and 
the programme; logistical arrangements (including transporting water, chairs), for de-
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conflicting flights, etc. Notwithstanding, UNMIL and UNOCI differed on the level and 
type of support they should provide, with UNOCI eventually flying in by air the chiefs 
and delegates, although it had originally been anticipated that they would come by 
road. This highlighted the issue raised in the previous chapter regarding difficulties in 
inter-mission cooperation resulting from differential relationships with host 
governments and different mission priorities, to which we might add differential 
capacities, expectations and priorities of host governments themselves. 
Overall the event itself was overshadowed by the decision by the two heads of state to 
participate in the closing ceremony such that most of the joint planning became about 
the protocols, security, and ceremony of the final day, at the expense of utilising the 
event to develop meaningful exchange between neighbouring communities. The 
meeting itself was also less useful than it could have been. The facilitators were highly 
educated, eloquent individuals, who despite their best efforts could not speak at the 
level of the participants. The first day involved a series of lofty PowerPoint 
presentations by Liberian and Ivoirian government officials, with no opportunity for 
participants to interact with one another or engage meaningfully with the material. 
While subsequent focus group discussions were impassioned exchanges, which yielded 
a range of innovative suggestions (at least in my view), for instance proposals related 
to traditional forgiveness and reconciliation activities,68 these were not reflected in the 
resulting communiqué, which was hashed out between Ivoirian and Liberian 
facilitators and experts and which constituted vague recommendations and 
suggestions, nothing close to what was initially envisioned in the original concept note.  
Although the meeting was meant to be held annually, the next one was not held until 
January 2016, in Guiglo, Côte d’Ivoire. Heavy staff turnover meant that once again 
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 It was interesting that although fostering collaboration between communities and government 
authorities and addressing border insecurity were considered an important aspect of initiatives such as 
the JCCEM, due to the predominance of kinship narratives, national and international peacebuilders did 
not really consider that the regional conflict had resulted in discord within kinship groupings, following 
the strain of years of reciprocal hosting of refugees, and persistent insecurity resulting from cross-
border combatants’ activities in the region, among others. Although these issues were raised 
vociferously in the different focus group discussions, they were not carried forward in the formal 
reporting (by national level counterparts) or the final communiqué. 
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there was very little in-house institutional memory at MIA, which had to rely heavily on 
UNMIL records and capacity, including to facilitate interactions with the Ivoirian 
technical committee. In many ways the second JCCEM replicated the first meeting, 
although the Ivoirian government, being more capacitated, had less involvement from 
UNOCI, but it was similarly rushed (notice of the meeting being given on 29 December 
2015), with an even greater number of PowerPoint presentations, and again much of 
the focus on the pomp and ceremony of the heads of state’s attendance. Tellingly, in 
focus group discussions, participants pointed to the lack of progress in addressing the 
issues raised at the first JCCEM more than two years previously. The resulting 
communiqué was slightly more robust than the first, with recommendations regarding 
refugee repatriation, regularised information exchange, improving cross-border 
livelihoods; strengthening bilateral cooperation; resolving land occupation issues; 
involving chiefs, elders, youth and women in cross-border peace and development 
initiatives; and strategies for youth livelihoods. Post-meeting, the Liberian MIA began 
to develop a project document based on these recommendations, and to solicit funds 
for their implementation. While the government-led initiative has not gained much 
traction to-date, UN agencies have seized hold of the communiqué and are using it as 
their point of reference for developing their own cross-border stabilisation 
programmes, discussed in the previous chapter.  
While such meetings demonstrate some intent on the part of the two governments to 
find innovative ways to address cross-border insecurity, their focus on grand strokes 
and public declarations, with few tangible outcomes and even fewer follow-up 
activities, was a real bone of contention with JCCEM participants, who viewed it as yet 
another example of their governments appearing to make an effort to address their 
grievances, without really doing anything. 
10.4. Conclusion 
The chapter immediately preceding this one examined the limitations of international 
and sub-regional peacebuilding practice, while the one before that considered the 
ways in which peace operations’ mandates are crafted, the considerations that inform 
 214 
 
 
 
how they are translated on the ground, and the circular, potentially limiting logic that 
governs peace operations, especially when set against the motivations that have been 
elaborated in Chapters 6 and 7. Together with this chapter, they demonstrate that the 
responses of national, regional and international actors alike stem from the perception 
that regional fighters comprise a ‘threat’ and accordingly their responses are heavily 
militarised (e.g. increased border patrols; border closures) at the expense of societal 
security considerations such as integrated human security approaches and efforts to 
address the vulnerabilities that facilitate recruitment and that would support peaceful 
resettlement of refugees, and so on. Yet even the militarised responses tend to be 
retroactive and short-sighted, and efforts to plan in advance tend to remain on paper, 
only resuscitated when another alleged cross-border attack takes place. Invariably they 
are thus extremely limited in their scope and impact. 
Another constraint relates to the fact that national level initiatives to address a micro-
regional problem are subject to bilateral engagement. Yet, with regard to Liberia and 
Côte d’Ivoire, this engagement is extremely problematic, as it is mediated by different 
systems, perspectives, views, and concerns. This ranges from language constraints 
(English versus French), to different systems of security governance (for instance in 
Côte d’Ivoire the Interior Ministry is also responsible for security but this is not the 
case in Liberia; further border security is the purview of the military in Côte d’Ivoire 
but in Liberia, as mentioned above, responsibility rests with the BIN (now LIS), under 
the Ministry of Justice). Differing perceptions, and analysis of the nature of the 
problem (i.e. whether the posture should be defence or security) also hinders joint 
approaches. Côte d’Ivoire’s relatively stronger economic position also puts Liberia 
firmly in the role of junior partner.  
With regard to the approaches that relate to prosecution, rather than demonstrating a 
reinforcement of rule of law and justice, they have done the exact opposite. On the 
Ivoirian side it appears that the individuals arrested and extradited have been 
perceived as political prisoners, held expressly for being pro-Gbagbo supporters, one 
of the reasons expressed by refugees for their reluctance to return. The mercenary 
trial in Liberia resulted in an entire ethnic population feeling vilified by the Johnson-
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Sirleaf Government, alienating them even further, and entrenching their anti-Sirleaf / 
anti-Ouattara positions even more firmly.  
Further, while there is increasing awareness of socio-cultural and socio-emotional 
imperatives, as evidenced by the JCCEM, these translate into short-sighted and ill-
informed programmes on the ground, with little follow-up in between, whether 
because of a lack of interest, finance or strategic direction. This has resulted, for 
instance, in a focus on elders and traditional authorities, instead of dynamic youth 
leadership, which might with more authority speak on behalf of ex-combatants, or 
even include them, and has largely ignored the need for ‘youth empowerment’ 
programmes that would meaningfully include vulnerable or at-risk young people most 
likely to engage in cross-border militant and criminal activity. 
Finally, we conclude this chapter with a brief discussion on ‘local’ versus ‘national’ 
versus ‘international’. Autesserre (2014: 25) notes that ‘local authorities and 
populations regularly contest, adapt, and transform international programs, and . . . 
the results of foreign efforts are a hybrid between the intentions of the expatriates 
and the interests of local stakeholders.’ This chapter demonstrates that, similar to 
critiques about international peacebuilding practice, at the level of government, 
peacebuilding practice and effectiveness is hampered by low capacity and interest, an 
unwillingness to learn lessons from past experience, and an inability to adapt to 
developing situations. This is exacerbated by frequent reshuffling of government 
ministry and agency staff, limiting continuity and institutional memory. Additionally, 
the prevailing approaches demonstrate that existing staff are largely lacking 
understanding or analysis of the situation on the ground. This recalls Autesserre’s 
critique of top-down approaches, wherein she argues that too often in policy 
discourse, national level concerns proxy for ‘local’ perspectives (Autesserre 2010: 43): 
as the first and second JCCEMs showed, national level actors may be just as removed 
as international peacebuilders, if not more so, from local-level perspectives. It could be 
argued that the reasons for this stem partly from the cookie-cutter approach espoused 
by external peacebuilders supporting these processes, with limited input from 
frontline local authorities or even local communities. As Autesserre notes, the 
 216 
 
 
 
structure of inequality in the international peacebuilding system generates power 
asymmetries between external interveners and local stakeholders, and shapes the 
perceptions of local people and the interveners’ everyday actions on the ground 
(Autesserre 2014: 40). In a post-conflict context, especially where a peace operation is 
present, international perspectives are insidious at national and even local levels, 
especially where the mission presents a large sense of continuity, such that it can stifle 
or (even inadvertently) force national counterparts to absorb its perspective. 
Accordingly, local is not necessarily national ministry and agency staff and 
practitioners, who are most likely responsive to (and co-opted into) international 
peacebuilding practice. It may not even be local communities, who international and 
national peacebuilders have learnt to ‘consult’, often limited to picking preferences 
from a shopping list of activities, or participating in pro forma evaluation activities.  
This chapter (and to some extent parts of the previous chapter that elucidate on the 
efforts of sub-regional organisations) highlights the potential tensions between formal 
regionalism and informal regionalisation processes that are a feature of the new 
regionalisms approach. In 2012, the Panel of Experts on Liberia concluded that ‘[t]he 
inability of the Government of Liberia to implement a comprehensive strategy on 
former combatants who escaped the Ivoirian crisis means that certain individuals and 
groups will likely continue to be involved in cross-border security issues’ (Panel of 
Experts on Liberia 2012b: 23). If peacebuilding, and indeed formal regionalism, practice 
is to be truly effective then the perspectives of the peacekept, including cross-border 
combatants who are, in regional conflict contexts, the most local and transnational of 
actors, is critical. This requires full engagement with their range of motivations, 
whether this means meaningful investment in marginal livelihoods to address 
economic incentives, or innovative empowerment of border communities to build on 
kinship narratives to promote social cohesion and reconciliation.  
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11. Discussion and conclusion 
The central purpose of this thesis has been to address the following question: Why 
were international peacebuilding efforts ineffective in addressing the phenomenon 
of regional combatants, which contributed to the spread of regional conflict in the 
Mano River Union sub-region of West Africa? In doing so, it sought to enhance 
understanding of the factors that drive regional insecurity in West Africa, and the 
prospects for regional and international peacebuilding approaches to address them. It 
has done this through the lens of a new regionalisms approach, through which regional 
combatant motivations, and corresponding responses by the UN and associated 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding mechanisms were examined. It is informed by cross-
border movements since the start of the Liberian conflict in 1989, while the analysis 
refers extensively to the cross-border movements of Liberians and Ivoirian fighters 
following the Ivoirian electoral crisis in 2010 and subsequent efforts by the UN to 
stabilise the common border between Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. This concluding 
chapter summarises the main findings from the preceding discussions. Section 11.1 
revisits my framework, research questions and corresponding propositions, examining 
the extent to which the analysis concurred with these, and highlighting my 
contributions to the academic and research debates on regional peacebuilding. Section 
11.2 elaborates on the policy implications for regional peacebuilding, while Section 
11.3 highlights additional contributions to methodological approaches to international 
relations. Section 11.4 concludes with some final thoughts.  
11.1. Analytical framework, research questions and propositions 
revisited 
11.1.1. Combatant motivations  
With sub-question 1 I wanted to investigate regional combatants’ motivations for 
moving to fight in neighbouring countries’ conflicts. Proposition 1 asserted that 
regional combatants subscribe to a range of inter-related motivations for participation 
in cross-border conflict, which I theorised is a function of these motivations. As 
demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7, combatant and ex-combatant narratives are crafted 
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and change as these fighters change geographic locations, which provides renewed 
impetus for fighting. In keeping with the literature, my research finds that economic 
imperatives feature prominently in regional combatants’ motivations. These must be 
considered beyond the common ‘mercenary’ tag, however. In the first place, I found 
that combatants themselves invoke the mercenary label as a form of posturing, an 
effort to make themselves and their cause somehow ‘bigger and badder’ and therefore 
to be taken more seriously than they might otherwise be. Secondly, the mercenary 
label obscures the critical material constraints that former fighters face, which relate 
to alternative livelihoods narratives. It is also important to note that the dominance of 
economic motivations notwithstanding, these are hardly ever cited in isolation and are 
in no way considered mutually exclusive or contradictory by ex-combatants 
themselves. As such, a key conclusion of this research is that while economic 
motivations are important, they cannot be simply reduced to the ‘greed’ or 
‘mercenary’ narrative.  
Indeed, ex-combatants have constructed a range of narratives beyond material to 
explain (or justify) their reasons for moving to fight, which are not commonly 
represented in the literature. These include ‘missionary’ imperatives (professional 
soldier on a mission) and improving one’s fortunes (adventurer). These narratives 
speak respectively to combatants’ desire to be seen as potentially productive members 
of society, and to the modernising effects of conflict. Utas noted that in Liberia, the 
war created alternative power structures, and participation in it provided children and 
youths with ‘unprecedented access to power and the trappings of modernity’ (Utas 
2003: 116), which were reversed by the end of the conflict, creating a ‘bedrock of 
dissatisfaction’ (ibid.:42). Seeking opportunities in other contexts could therefore be 
read as an effort to return to this modernising trend.  
Two other narratives, which could be termed ‘relational’, also require critical 
engagement. Firstly, kinship ties (identity narratives) are increasingly referenced in the 
literature, reinforced both by combatants and the communities within which they live, 
and targeted by peacebuilding practice, for instance through social cohesion 
programmes and events. Inasmuch as these are undoubtedly a factor, as shown in 
Chapters 6 and 7, the appeal to socio-cultural motivations is also a deliberate strategy, 
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facilitated by wider community perceptions of ongoing marginalisation and exclusion, 
which provides both a rallying narrative and justification for remobilisation. The thesis 
has accordingly demonstrated that how combatants mobilise cross-border 
communitarian narratives, and to what effect, should also be an important 
consideration for regional peacebuilding practice.  
Additionally, social network motivations (or ‘brothers-in-arms’ narratives) also help to 
underscore the perpetuation of chains of command and combatant association, which 
such programmes as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) endeavour 
to sever, and bring to the forefront questions about how and why such networks 
persist and can be quickly reactivated several years after the end of domestic conflict. 
Attribution to existential reasons, though by only a few combatants, further points to 
the unfinished business of psycho-social healing in post-conflict societies, also an 
indication of the inadequacy of DDR programmes. 
Whatever the motivations, the preceding discussion also serves to demonstrate that 
combatants do exercise agency in their decisions to participate in cross-border 
combat, and through this agency display the capacity to respond to opportunities 
arising in conflict and post-conflict contexts. While peacebuilders on the ground have 
largely recognised this agency, as the next sub-section discusses, peacebuilding 
practice remains constrained from providing an adequate response.  
11.1.2. Everyday peacebuilding in practice 
Sub-question 2 examined the extent to which on-the-ground peacebuilders were able 
to take into consideration the range of combatant motivations that drive regional and 
cross-border conflict in their response strategies. As discussed in Chapter 8, 
peacebuilding practice is constrained from top to bottom, an outcome arising from the 
ritualised production of text and policies, involving the interplay between 
‘Headquarters’ and ‘the Field’ and mediated by unequal power dynamics that privilege 
some discourses while silencing others. As noted above, Chapters 6 and 7 
demonstrated that ex-combatants and their communities ascribe their actions, 
sometimes simultaneously, to a range of motivations. Yet, Chapter 8 showed that, 
through mutually reinforcing policy texts and discourses, embodied first and foremost 
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in Security Council resolution mandates, built on or avoided in results-based budgeting 
processes, regular reporting, strategic reviews, assessment missions and the like, the 
UN, together with other international and regional peacebuilding institutions, 
continues to centre its responses on a narrow set of imperatives that are difficult to 
adjust, at the expense of more potentially relevant foci. Chapter 8 thus concurred with 
Autesserre’s (2014) conclusion that the exclusionary creation of dominant 
peacebuilding narratives can obscure critical context-specific nuances and can enable 
and justify (even problematic) practices (Autesserre 2014: 34). In a departure from 
Autesserre, however, rather than attributing this to peacebuilders not prioritising 
‘intimate understanding of local histories, cultures, or language’ (Autesserre 2014: 33), 
I have argued that the creation of dominant peacebuilding narratives may be 
attributed to the institutional and discursive constraints stemming from peace 
operations’ structures and peacebuilding practices. 
The implications of this narrow set of institutional imperatives were explored through 
Sub-question 3, which questioned the extent to which the resulting strategies 
implemented by peacebuilders have been effective in promoting and sustaining 
regional peace. As submitted by Proposition 3, Chapters 9 and 10 discuss how this 
range of constraints has translated into inadequate responses on the ground both by 
international and national peacebuilders. Chapter 9 demonstrated that international 
and regional institutions involved in West African peacebuilding recognise the reality 
of myriad motivations of cross-border combatants but, like the prevailing literature, 
they concentrate on selective incentives, and almost exclusively tend to label cross-
border combatant activities as ‘mercenary’. As such, their responses stem from the 
perception that regional fighters comprise a ‘threat’ and accordingly their responses 
are heavily securitised (e.g. increased border patrols, border closures) at the expense 
of integrated human security approaches and efforts to address the vulnerabilities that 
facilitate the creation of marginalised identities and subsequent (re-)recruitment. And 
even these securitised responses tend to be reactive, including (or especially) at 
national level, as demonstrated in Chapter 10.  
Further, while peacebuilders demonstrate an increasing awareness of socio-cultural 
and socio-emotional imperatives, these translate into short-sighted and ill-informed 
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programmes on the ground. This stems partly from the cookie-cutter approach applied 
to peacebuilding. This has resulted, for instance, in a focus on elders and traditional 
authorities, instead of dynamic youth leadership, or in the implementation of ‘youth 
empowerment’ programmes that exclude the majority of vulnerable or at-risk young 
people most likely to engage in cross-border militant and criminal activity. Conversely, 
despite an evidenced need other programmes, such as cross-border DDR, do not get 
off the ground. 
11.1.3. Insights from the new regionalisms approach 
As noted in previous chapters, micro-regions are the nexus of marginalised identities 
that straddle both sides of a given border, also characterised by cross-border kinship, 
poorly patrolled borders, and ungoverned and ungovernable populations. The new 
regionalisms approach (NRA) enables us to take these complexities into consideration 
when considering regional peace and security, particularly facilitating a focus on non-
state actors, such as regional combatants, and analysis of their impacts on institution-
led processes.  
The Secretary-General’s 2015 Report on the HIPPO report observed: 
Peace operations offer a unique platform to draw together a wide range of United 
Nations capacities, serve as catalysts for bilateral and non-governmental attention and 
facilitate actions by United Nations and non-United Nations partners. This may be their 
greatest potential to address today’s complex crises, but we are failing to fully realize 
it. One reason is our well-meaning attempt to neatly characterize conflicts and develop 
specific tools for each. However, conflicts rarely comply with categories. Violence 
erupts and subsides, stalemates persist for years, and lapses and relapses occur. Rebel 
groups may use terrorist tactics; national forces may prey on the populations that they 
exist to protect. An effective peace operation must be able to look ahead and 
constantly adjust its response using all United Nations instruments. Similarly, we 
continue to frame mission mandates and postures in national terms, when the 
transnational nature of today’s conflicts threatens entire regions. Transforming 
peace operations into instruments that can address the regional dimensions of 
conflict requires a change in mindset across the Organization. (General Assembly, 
Security Council 2015: 6, emphasis mine) 
This perspective seemingly draws welcomingly closer to a new regionalisms approach 
but as this thesis has shown, the reality in UN peace operations remains a long way off, 
with Chapter 8 particularly discussing the shortcomings of attempts to 'neatly 
characterize conflicts', while Chapters 9 and 10 discussed the impacts of these 
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shortcomings on the ground especially in relation to regional peacebuilding policies 
and practice. This thesis has aimed to provide a way to think about the application of 
NRA in the regional peacebuilding context, by demonstrating how failure to 
adequately interpret and act on the motives behind the cross-border movements of 
combatants contributes to limited success of regional peacebuilding efforts.  
In the MRU, for ex-combatants, this additionally provided fewer incentives to disarm, 
self-identify or dismantle chains of command. Further, the inattention to not just 
human security but political and economic marginalisation, as well as combatant and 
community notions of justice and reconciliation, particularly in vulnerable border 
areas, also meant that not only ex-combatants but other youth also became 
susceptible to (re)recruitment and other ‘anti-social’ activities that threaten long-term 
stability in the Mano River Union. The recent (and allegedly continuing) participation of 
‘foreign’ combatants in cross-border violence means that regional combatants remain 
a potentially destabilising factor for the entire sub-region (and beyond), and respective 
countries and supporting peacebuilding institutions need to collaboratively build their 
capacities to, and develop viable models for, addressing regional combatants’ myriad 
concerns in post-conflict societies. 
While this thesis focused on combatants, it further demonstrated the value of NRA to 
highlight the problematic of other aspects of state/non-state conflictual relationships. 
Even in this thesis, examples of inadequate responses by the state and the UN to cross-
border challenges, beyond regional ex-combatants, are rife. They include summary 
closure of borders, curtailing necessary legitimate trade, and humanitarian 
organisations’ and national governments’ insistence on hosting mixed populations in 
refugee camps, rather than supporting their residence in host communities (which the 
majority preferred, or indeed separating out militias, as per international norms), 
losing opportunities to allow such populations to maintain self-reliance, enhance 
constructive cross-border relationships and consolidate confidence in their national 
governments. 
As shown in Chapters 9 and 10, the failure to consider these regional imperatives 
through the lens of the historical and the social, as well as the economic and the 
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political, as advocated by NRA, necessarily limits the efficacy of responses. The policy 
implications of these findings are discussed in the next section. This is followed by 
some reflections on my methodological approaches in section 11.3. The chapter, and 
indeed the thesis, concludes with section 11.4. 
11.2. Policy implications 
My central research question was fundamentally a policy question. This section thus 
focuses on the resulting policy implications.  
11.2.1. Regional conflicts require regional peacebuilding solutions 
Current notions of peacebuilding seldom consider cross-border recruitment and 
disincentives for disarmament because of opportunities to participate in conflicts 
elsewhere. Whilst the peace-making solutions are increasingly international (for 
instance the respective peace operations in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire), 
the operations themselves are essentially country-bound, with little consideration 
given to the regional dynamics of conflict (although these are well documented), or the 
potential of existing regional conflict-mechanisms, except in a crisis.  
There are signs that peacebuilding is evolving to take steps in this direction. Resolution 
2282 (2016) on the review of UN peacebuilding architecture reiterated the importance 
of UN cooperation with regional and sub-regional organisations, as well as non-state 
actors for preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict 
(in line with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter) and underlined that 
the scale and nature of the challenge of sustaining peace can be met through close 
strategic and operational partnerships between national governments, the United 
Nations, and other key stakeholders, including international, regional and sub-regional 
organizations, international financial institutions, regional and other development 
banks, civil society organizations, women’s groups, youth organizations and where 
relevant, the private sector. (United Nations Security Council 2016a: 6)  
In order to achieve these outcomes, the resolution called on the Peacebuilding 
Commission, an intergovernmental advisory body, to coordinate actions, further 
encouraging it to ‘enhance its efficiency and flexibility’ (p4) by, among others, 
‘enabling it to consider regional and cross-cutting issues relevant to sustaining peace’.  
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Further still, it stressed ‘the importance of partnership and cooperation between the 
United Nations and relevant regional and sub-regional organizations, including the 
African Union, to improve cooperation and coordination in peacebuilding, to increase 
synergies and ensure the coherence and complementarity of such efforts’ (ibid.).  
These are very welcome developments; as Chapter 9 demonstrated, however, a real 
question is whether sub-regional organisations have the capacity or resources to 
meaningfully get involved. Accordingly, such pronouncements need to be coupled with 
a commitment to providing resources as well as sustained support for capacity and 
institutional development. Further, collaboration and engagement cannot remain at 
inter-governmental level – a key argument of this thesis is that peacebuilding too often 
understands regionalism as a top-down institutional process, whereas it is just as 
critical (if not more so) to engage from the bottom-up those (positive and negative and 
ambivalent) regionalisation processes which leave their mark on institutional 
processes. 
The thesis has examined one such process – regional ex-combatants – but has 
highlighted the difficulties they face in being comprehensively engaged. The next 
section elaborates on the implications of this, with some suggestions for mitigation. 
11.2.2. Ex-combatants in a post-conflict world 
Resolution 2282 also emphasised the need to ‘support the participation of women and 
youth in peacebuilding processes’ (ibid.: 8). While commendable, calling for the 
participation of youth groups needs to be nuanced, to ensure that it is not just 
mainstream youth who are called on to participate in peacebuilding projects. 
Marginalised or ‘at-risk’ youth, such as former combatants, must also be factored in, 
which may prove difficult if, as previous chapters demonstrate, their motivations 
remain poorly understood. Veit (2010) in his analysis of conflict in Ituri (Democratic 
Republic of Congo, DRC), details how former fighters tried to engage peacefully in 
post-conflict interventions as part of civil society, but failed to be included. As he 
notes, ‘Without guns… demobilized combatants lacked resources in their relationship 
with other actors’ (2010: 164). Veit concludes that agencies relied on ‘a limited range 
of local interlocutors’ (ibid.: 168), including the national demobilisation commission. 
 225 
 
 
 
Yet in Liberia the corresponding institution (NCDDRR) was decommissioned soon after 
the official end of the DDR programme (see next sub-section) while, similar to the case 
in the DRC, ‘local NGOs with better reputations, established connections, and 
experience in project proposal writing … monopolized the narrow market of 
internationally financed activities’ (ibid.). 
A final comment in this sub-section relates to addressing the ‘root causes’ of conflict. 
In Chapter 8 it was noted that time and again the UN Security Council called on Liberia 
and Côte d’Ivoire to address the root causes of regional conflict, with support from the 
UN. It must be noted that dealing with ‘root causes’ is not a panacea, however, as the 
changing motivations discussed in Chapter 6 demonstrate that factors that initially led 
to the eruption of violence may not be the same as those that perpetuate a particular 
conflict, or for that matter cause it to recur. As Sriram and Nielsen (2004) note 
It is not enough for preventive or peacemaking actors to respond to the original 
‘causes’ once a conflict has begun, since conflicts develop their own logics and 
dynamics . . . Also, the very existence and dynamics of conflict change the economic, 
political, military, and social structure of a country, and preventive actors must be 
prepared to address not only what they identify as the original causes of conflict, but 
also the demands that fuelled the conflict and the grievances that endure long after 
peace has been formally reached. (2004: 6) 
Resolution 2282 further underlined the importance of inclusivity, ensuring that the 
needs of all segments of society are taken into account, and the need for ‘an 
integrated, strategic and coherent approach to peacebuilding, noting that security, 
development and human rights are closely interlinked and mutually reinforcing’ (p4). I 
would also argue that this requires serious efforts to promote national (and regional) 
reconciliation efforts, as well as to promote a justice that is seen as legitimate, 
including across borders, where mutual perceptions of ‘being hard done by’ are able to 
reinforce one another beyond national boundaries. 
11.2.3.  A note on DDR 
One important area that regional peacebuilders need to ‘get right’ is during DDR 
which, as noted above, is one of the few times post-conflict that combatants are a 
dedicated focus of attention. Alden et al. (2011: 2) observe that ‘it becomes clearer 
that the efficacy of DDR is not only dependent on a thorough empirical analysis of the 
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militias involved, but must also interface with a wide range of social, political and 
economic processes within which these armed actors are embedded. Understanding 
the nature, motivations and conduct of militias is crucial to devising a strategic 
approach to demilitarizing these entities and, concurrently, creating the conditions for 
long-term stability.’ They further note that ‘[r]ecognizing these contextual realities and 
integrating them into the substance of a DDR programme in a given post-conflict 
environment enhances the possibilities for the successful development of proactive 
strategies for demilitarization’ (Alden et al. 2011: 2–3). 
UN DDR programmes are trying respond to the various constraints highlighted in 
Chapters 2 and 6, recognising particularly that the reintegration phase is core to long-
term success. Although development partners and the government’s socio-economic 
policies are key in this regard, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
is increasingly including aspects of this phase, including psycho-social and socio-
economic support, within in UN peace operations’ assessed budgets, as well as 
mobilising voluntary funding and national capacity, especially as UNDP, which provided 
core support, has scaled down its activities in this area.69 While a positive 
development, as Chapter 9 demonstrated, such initiatives require both a 
correspondingly supportive mandate and appropriately skilled staff. Further, in the 
context of regional conflict, this will also require appropriate ‘region-wide targeted 
programmes,’ aimed at combatants, supported by ‘interlocking domestic and regional 
agreements’ (Pugh et al. 2004: 130). 
Lastly, as noted in the previous section, often the end of official DDR programming is 
accompanied by a loss in status for ex-combatants. In fact, in Liberia, along with the 
dismantling of NCDDRR which, as noted in previous chapters, resulted in the significant 
loss of institutional memory, this period corresponded with the Liberian Government 
declaring that former fighters should no longer be referred to as ‘ex-combatants’ but 
rather as vulnerable youth. While a commendable attempt to regularise their post-
conflict status, this move robbed ex-combatants of a defined lobbying identity, which 
further contributed to their marginalisation, and likely contributed to regional 
                                                          
 
69
 Interview with UN DDR Section in New York, 6 February 2015. 
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peacebuilders’ failure to continue to comprehensively engage regional ex-combatants, 
especially as the post-DDR period progressed. DDR policymakers must take these 
aspects into consideration when designing programmes, especially those that have a 
cross-border dimension. 
Before concluding this chapter, the next section highlights some further, 
methodological, contributions for the reader’s consideration.  
11.3. Methodological and conceptual contributions to the 
‘regional peace’ research agenda 
11.3.1. A matter of scale 
It is difficult and in fact inadvisable in a PhD research project to maintain a broad 
research focus. We are advised time and again to narrow down our topic. As such, I 
was extremely nervous taking on this project as I conceptualised it, that is, with a focus 
on both combatants and peacekeepers. I worried excessively about whether the 
broadness of the research would water down the analysis. It is up to the reader to 
determine the extent to which this might have been the case but I would argue that 
this topic benefited tremendously from this focus. The central research question was 
concerned with the effectiveness of regional peace operations in relation to the 
perspectives of the peacekept; in order to answer that question I felt it imperative to 
demonstrate that as regional ex-combatants and regional peacebuilders are mutually 
constituting securitising agents and threats (as per Wendt 1987), it was important to 
provide the reader with a comprehensive understanding of both groups. Accordingly, I 
would argue that a methodological contribution of this thesis is the opening up of the 
peace research agenda, and elaborating on the idea that it is highly appropriate, and in 
fact imperative, to consider the peacekept in relation to the 
peacekeeper/peacebuilder and vice versa. Future research agendas along these lines 
might include broadening the spectrum of the peacekept, for instance, an investigation 
of regional conflict entrepreneurs’ and elites’ motivations (beyond narrow political 
economy considerations). 
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11.3.2. In between national surveys and deep hanging out 
Chapters 2 and 5 touched on research methodologies typically used to investigate 
combatant motivations. These are mostly either in the form of large-scale quantitative 
surveys (e.g. Humphreys and Weinstein 2004) or ethnographic, highly personalised 
anthropological exercises (as with Hoffman 2011a). While the former is useful for 
gathering information from a large pool of respondents, it produces limited nuanced 
information; conversely, the latter can result in an excessive focus on the individual 
experience, without contextualising their experience within group and community 
dynamics. This relates to Stewart’s (2002) argument relating to horizontal inequalities, 
wherein she argues that policies that simply address deprived individuals may fail, 
unless accompanied by policies directed towards group inequalities. While my 
resulting approach (structured in-depth questionnaire) was arrived at somewhat by 
expediency rather than design, I found that it was able to at least partially overcome 
both of these limitations. It did not provide generalisable data typical of survey-style 
studies but it did uncover a depth of detail that enabled necessary attention to the 
narrative, or back story, informing these stated motivations – albeit nowhere near as 
detailed as with ethnographic study. At the same time, in capturing similar information 
as the survey method it provided a broader picture of regional combatants and 
enabled them to be situated within wider, more structured studies, enhanced by focus 
group discussions.  
11.3.3. Everyday peacebuilding above and below 
Increasingly, studies of peace operations have turned their attention to employing a 
micro-level perspective beyond the peacekept to the peacekeepers and peacebuilders. 
I was extremely fortunate to be in a position to apply an institutional ethnography 
approach to UN peace operations, and while this may not be possible for every 
researcher, I would advocate for this research agenda to be more actively pursued. 
Here also, I was compelled to broaden the focus; I sought not just to take one end of 
the peace operations spectrum over another (e.g. powerful decision-making processes 
at Security Council level versus international peacebuilders on the ground in field 
offices), but to highlight the connection between them, which I believe was critical to 
tease out the nuances between the interactions that reinforce constrained practices.  
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11.3.4. A constructivist approach to international relations 
Social constructivism in IR has moved in recent years from being one among a number 
of critical IR theories to one that provides a meaningfully alternative theoretical 
perspective on power, and the roles and relationships between states, non-state, 
regional and supra-state actors (see for instance its increased focus from Jackson and 
Sørensen 2003 to Jackson and Sørensen 2006). The application of social constructivism 
in this context emphasised notions of regional peace and security as socially 
constructed through interactions between the various levels of actors. It also enabled 
a focus on discourse – and the extent to which the discourses of securitising agents do 
or do not speak to one another. It further permitted an investigation of the social 
construction of such terms as ‘combatant’, ‘ex-combatant’ and ‘mercenary’ as well as 
of the respondent terms ‘peacebuilding’, ‘stabilisation’ and ‘security’, and to speak of 
these as speech acts, which provides new analytical imperatives. For instance, as 
discussed above, the literature on regional motivations demonstrates that regional ex-
combatants have come to be synonymous with the term ‘mercenaries’, which has 
influenced how regional security has been approached by national, regional and 
international peacebuilding actors. Understanding motivations as speech acts helps us 
to investigate how mutual misunderstanding of the strategic deployment of peace, 
conflict and security discourses, by ex-combatants and peacebuilders alike, limit the 
effectiveness of regional security efforts. 
A constructivist approach further lends itself to a multidisciplinary approach. For this 
thesis, applying political anthropology perspectives to the regional conflict literature, 
particularly in relation to the concepts of regionalism and micro-regions, has been 
invaluable.  
11.4. Concluding thoughts 
This chapter has discussed the above findings and lessons from this thesis in the 
context of my regional peace and security framework, research questions and 
propositions. It highlights that the mobility of armed combatants in and out of West 
African countries also has an impact on the politics of borders, on regionalism and 
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ultimately on regional peace and security. Accordingly, this should have an impact on 
peacebuilding approaches in regions of recent conflict and encourage an approach that 
focuses on fighters as active agents, inasmuch as their choices are being mediated by 
opportunities or lack thereof presented by regional peace processes.  
The dichotomy between transnationalising tendencies (or regionalisation from below) 
and peacebuilding from above needs to be bridged by a better institutional 
understanding of how to mitigate the negative activities by regional combatants and 
similar groups, while acknowledging and promoting the opportunities their actions 
might also bring about. The current configuration of peacebuilding approaches has not 
resulted in the successful reintegration of a highly mobile population, determined to 
take advantage of strong informal cross-border links to improve their prospects, and if 
it remains as it is, is unlikely to improve the prospects for long-term peace. 
Although this is slowly changing, the logic underpinning international peacebuilding 
responses to regional conflict remains limited. The dangers associated with this 
limitation were clearly evidenced along the Liberian–Ivoirian border in the 2010 
Ivoirian elections. This is not an isolated situation. Without claiming that findings from 
this study should be extrapolated to other cases, it must be acknowledged that 
activities of cross-border (or returning) combatants in countries of recent, current and 
potential conflicts continue to be a potentially destabilising factor for entire regions 
beyond the Mano River Union sub-region. Cases in point include Tuareg fighters 
returning from Libya to Mali; Lord’s Resistance Army and related conflicts that have 
affected northern Uganda, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic 
of Congo and Chad; Boko Haram fighters fighting in the border micro-regions 
straddling Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger; and al-Shabaab fighters operating in 
micro-region spanning the Kenya-Somalia border. Inasmuch as some of these 
examples are layered over by violent extremism perspectives, respective countries and 
the peace operations that support them need to collaboratively build their capacities 
to handle these conflicts from a regional perspective that is not limited to militarised 
or securitised responses. These considerations could also serve as future research 
agendas beyond this thesis. Whatever the other imperatives, applying a new 
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regionalisms approach to such studies, focusing on non-state and marginalised actors, 
in relation to peace and security actors and their practice, is likely to make a welcome 
analytical contribution. 
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Annex 1: Cross-border movements 
Table A1.1: Timeline of major movements for cross-border conflict in the MRU 
Date From To Numbers* Who Context 
1989 Côte d’Ivoire Liberia Hundreds Sierra Leoneans, 
Guineans, 
Liberians, 
Burkinabé 
Start of conflict in 
Liberia 
1991 Liberia Sierra Leone Hundreds Liberians, 
Burkinabé, 
Guineans, Sierra 
Leoneans 
Start of conflict in 
Sierra Leone 
1990+ Sierra Leone, 
Guinea 
Liberia Hundreds Liberians, Sierra 
Leoneans 
ULIMO counter-
attack of NPFL 
1998 Sierra Leone Liberia Hundreds Sierra Leoneans, 
Liberians 
AFRC-RUF junta 
repelled by 
ECOMOG 
1998/9 Liberia Sierra Leone Hundreds? Sierra Leoneans, 
Liberians 
January 6 1999 
invasion of 
Freetown with 
support from 
Charles Taylor 
1999 Sierra Leone Liberia Thousands Sierra Leoneans, 
Liberians 
RUF repelled from 
Freetown 
1999 Guinea Liberia Thousands Sierra Leoneans, 
Guineans, 
Liberians 
Launch of LURD 
attack on Charles 
Taylor regime 
2000-
2001 
Sierra Leone Liberia Thousands Sierra Leoneans, 
Liberians 
RUF defeat, end of 
Sierra Leone 
conflict, 
resumption of 
conflict in Liberia 
2001 Côte d’Ivoire Liberia Hundreds Ivoirians, 
Liberians 
Launch of MODEL 
attack on Charles 
Taylor’s regime 
2002+ Liberia Côte d’Ivoire Thousands Liberians, Sierra 
Leoneans 
Start of Ivoirian 
civil conflict 
2008/9 Liberia/ Sierra 
Leone  
Guinea Hundreds Liberians, Sierra 
Leoneans 
Political crisis 
2010+** Liberia Côte d’Ivoire Thousands Liberians, 
Ivoirians 
Post-electoral 
crisis 
* Actual figures not available. Based on estimates from various sources, including International Crisis Group (2002, 
2003a, 2003b); Human Rights Watch (2005); and Group of Experts for Côte d’Ivoire (2011a). 
**incidents after the 2010/11 electoral crisis elaborated on further in Table A1.2 
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Table A1.2: Timeline of cross-border attacks from Liberia following the Ivoirian electoral 
crisis 
Date Place Attackers Fatalities Additional impacts / 
Source 
11 May 
2011 
Blan gold-mining camp 
across border 
14 Liberians 
(POE, Nov 
2011) 
8 civilians Suspects detained in 
Liberia by Liberia 
National Police 
15-16 Sept 
2011 
FRCI checkpoint and 
inhabitants of Ziriglo 
and Nigre 
15–17 
Ivoirians and 
Liberians 
18 people POE, June 2012 
21 Feb 
2012 
Konankro camp, near 
Ziriglo and Tai Forest, 
near border with 
Liberia (Ernestkro) 
‘Mercenaries’ 
(GoE, April 
2012) 
5 POE, June 2012 
24 April 
2012 
Sakré, approximately 
25 km south of Tai, 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Approx. 20 
Liberians and 
Ivoirians (POE 
June 2012) 
7 civilians, 2 
injured 
3,000 displaced 
fifth attack in 10 months 
8 June 
2012 
Civilians and FRCI and 
UNOCI patrols in Sao 
and Para 
Liberian 
mercenaries 
and Ivoirian 
militia 
members 
FRCI + 7 UN 
peacekeepers 
killed 
Q4 meeting held in July 
2012; GoL initiated 
Operation Restore 
Hope; Liberian 
Government arrested 
and subsequently 
charges… 
13 Aug 
2012 
Ivoirian border 
checkpoint and FRCI 
barracks at 
Péhékanhouébli, 
approx. 1 km from 
Liberia B’hai border 
post 
‘17 Ivoirian 
militias and 2 
Liberian 
mercenaries’ 
-- POE, Dec 2012 
13 March 
2013 
Zileby village, near 
Liberian border 
Unidentified 
armed men 
7 persons See next entry 
March 
2013 
20th: attempted attack 
in Tiobly, resulting in 
several injuries 
 
23rd: attack in Petit 
Guiglo;  
Ivoirian 
combatants 
residing in 
refugee camps 
in Liberia 
3 assailants, 1 
civilian and 2 
FRCI elements 
were killed, 
while the entire 
village was set 
ablaze. 
Extensive internal 
displacement (about 
7,000 persons) 
Arrests of Ivoirians in 
Liberia  
 
Q4 meeting in April 
2013; 
 
23 Feb 
2014 
Fété, near Grabo, 9 km 
from Liberian border 
village in River Gee 
Unknown, 
presumed mix 
of Liberians 
and Ivoirians 
?  Displacement into 
Liberia (number of 
inhabitants reduced 
from 2600 individuals to 
98 families) 
 
14–15 May 
2014 
Fété (Grabo) as above French and 
English-
speaking 
attackers, 
targeting FRCI 
3 FRCI soldiers 
MIA; 5 civilians, 
all of Burkinabe 
origin killed 
Extensive displacement 
into Liberia; Ivoirian 
govt requested 
suspension of voluntary 
repatriation and 
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reiterated request to 
relocate camps away 
from border 
Jan, Feb, 
March 
2015 
Various locations in 
close proximity to 
Liberian border 
Ivoirians (but 
alleged cross-
border 
dimension) 
2 FRCI members 
(Jan attack), 
significant 
internal 
displacement 
Q4 meeting in March 
2015 
2 Dec 
2015* 
Two FRCI camps in 
Olodio, 15–20 km from 
Liberian border 
Ivoirians -- Displacement of 10 
Ivoirian families into 
Liberia. 
29 March 
2016* 
FRCI position in Nero 
village 
FRCI-
community 
clash 
-- 1 FRCI soldier injured 
Sources: UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 2013; Panel of Experts on Liberia, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 
2013a, 2013b; UNMIL and UNOCI reporting  
* No cross-border component confirmed but alleged by some Ivoirian authorities. 
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Annex 2: Overview of interviews and focus group discussions 
 
Table A2.1: Summary of formal and semi-formal interviews conducted 
 
UN, international and non-governmental organisations 
Interviewee Location Date 
UNMIL Civil Affairs Officer Monrovia March 2010 
Conservation International Monrovia March 2010 
UNDP Officer Monrovia March 2010 
Landmine Action Senior Officer Monrovia March 2010 
UNMIL Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) 
Officer 
Monrovia March 2010 
UNMIL Senior JMAC Officer Monrovia March 2010 
UNMIL Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Recovery 
(RRR) Officer 
Monrovia March 2010 
March 2012 
UNMIL RRR Officer Monrovia March 2010 
UNMIL Senior RRR Officer Monrovia March 2010 
UNDP Community Security and Social Cohesion Monrovia April 2010 
Landmine Action Officer Monrovia April 2010 
UNMIL RRR Officer Zwedru, Grand Gedeh May 2010 
April 2013 
Save My Future Foundation Zwedru, Grand Gedeh May 2010 
Acelor Mittal Yekepa, Nimba May 2010 
SGS Monrovia May 2010 
UNMIL Civil Affairs Expert Monrovia July 2010 
Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) Monrovia June 2010 
Sierra Leone Embassy Official Monrovia March 2012 
German Agro Action Monrovia July 2013 
Mano River Union Monrovia 
Freetown 
Abidjan 
Oct 2013 
Dec 2013 
April 2014 
UN DPA Official New York January 2015 
UN DPKO DDR New York February 2015 
UN DPKO DDR New York February 2015 
UN DPKO DDR New York February 2015 
Danish Refugee Council Monrovia July 2015 
Côte d’Ivoire Embassy Official Monrovia November 2015 
UNMIL Officer Monrovia March 2016 
ECOWAS official Monrovia September 2016 
 
Liberia Government and agencies 
Interviewee Location Date 
Forestry Development Authority Monrovia March 2010 
Liberia National Commission on Small Arms 
(LiNCSA) 
Monrovia March 2010 
Ministry of Lands Mines and Energy 
(Administration) 
Monrovia April 2010 
Ministry of Lands Mines and Energy (Kimberly 
Process) 
Monrovia April 2010 
Ministry of Lands Mines and Energy (Diamond 
Office) 
Monrovia April 2010 
Senior Official, Ministry of Labour Monrovia May 2010 
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Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (BIN) 
Officer 
Yekepa May 2010 
Liberia National Police (LNP) Officer Henry Town, Gbarpolu May 2010 
Senior Official, Liberia Refugees Repatriation and 
Resettlement Commission (LRRRC) 
Monrovia March 2012 
LRRRC Field Officer Sinje March 2012 
LNP Officer Sinje March 2012 
Border Security Officials Bo Waterside April 2012 
March 2013 
Ministry of Internal Affairs Official Monrovia Sept 2013 
Ministry of Youth and Sports Official Monrovia Feb 2014 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Monrovia March 2016 
 
Other key informant interviews 
Interviewee Location Date 
Former Sierra Leonean Refugee / ex-combatant VOA, Careysburg, 
Montserrado 
April 2012 
Former Sierra Leonean Refugee VOA, Careysburg, 
Montserrado 
April 2012 
Former Sierra Leonean Refugee VOA, Careysburg, 
Montserrado 
April 2012 
Informal discussion with former refugees VOA, Careysburg, 
Montserrado 
April 2012 
Informal discussion with former refugees Tiene, Grand Cape 
Mount 
April 2012 
Informal discussion with former refugees Sinje, Grand Cape 
Mount 
April 2012 
Ivoirian refugees residing in communities Near Ganta, Nimba Nov 2012 
 
Table A2.2: Interviews and focus group discussions on combatant motivations 
Ex-combatant interviews 
Number Location Date 
2 ELWA Junction, Monrovia March 2012 
1 Bo Waterside (Liberian-Sierra 
Leonean border) 
April 2012 
20 West Point, Monrovia April-August 2013 
5 Clara Town, Monrovia May 2013 
25 Zwedru and environs, Grand 
Gedeh 
Aug 2013 – March 2014 
Focus group discussions 
Group Location Date 
Ex-combatant/mining youth Henry Town, Gbarpolu County May 2010 
Ex-combatant/former refugees VOA settlement, Careysburg, 
Montserrado 
March 2012 
Ex-combatant/community 
youth 
ELWA Junction, Monrovia March 2012 
Ex-combatant/’refugees’ Grand Gedeh April 2013 
Ex-combatant/community 
youth 
West Point, Monrovia 21 April 2013 
Ex-combatant only Clara Town, Monrovia May 2013 
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Table A2.3: Key participant observation opportunities 
Event/activity Place Date 
Informal discussion – 
community youth 
Yekepa, Nimba County, Liberia 5 May 2010 
Interviews – community leaders Yekepa May 2010 
Interviews – plantation workers Cocopa Rubber Plantation, 
Nimba County 
May 2010 
(Former) Refugee communities 
and camps: formal and informal 
interviews; informal group 
discussions 
VOA former refugee settlement 
Sinje and Tiene, Grand Cape 
Mount 
Nimba (Communities) 
Grand Gedeh (PTP & Solo) 
Maryland (Little Wlebo)  
February 2012 
April 2012 
 
November 2012 
April 2013 
Nov 2013, February 2016 
Border mining community visits Henry Town, Gbarpolu County 
Bartel Jam, Grand Gedeh 
County 
May 2010 
April 2013 
MRU meetings Civil Society meeting, Freetown 
Border strategy 
implementation workshop, 
Abidjan 
Peace & Security meeting, 
Abidjan/Grand Bassam, CI 
JBSCBU reactivation meeting, 
Monrovia 
December 2013 
 
April 2014 
 
May 2016 
 
June 2016 
 
Joint Council of Chiefs and 
Elders Meetings 
Zwedru, Grand Gedeh 
Guiglo, Côte d’Ivoire 
October 2013 
January 2016 
Op MAYO meeting Pekan Barrage, Maryland/Côte 
d’Ivoire border 
November 2013 
Joint Border Security and 
Confidence Building Unit 
meeting 
Bo Waterside May 2016 
Border county security council 
meetings 
Harper, Maryland 
Zwedru, Grand Gedeh 
November 2015 
January 2016 
Quadripartite meetings Government-UN missions 
meeting Monrovia 
Forces Meeting, Grand Bassam, 
Cote d’Ivoire 
April 2013 
 
March 2016 
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Annex 3: Ex-combatant in-depth questionnaire 
Section 1: Background 
1. Age or year of birth? 
2. Sex? 
3. Place of birth (Village or Town, County/District, Country)? 
4. Tribe/ethnic group? 
5. Languages spoken 
6. Religion 
7. Marital/co-habitation status? Where is partner from? 
8. Level of education completed? 
9. Occupation before the war?  
10. Present occupation 
11. Level of daily/monthly income 
12. Children/number of dependents? 
13. Where were you living before the war started? 
14. Do you have brothers and sisters? Still alive? Where? When last seen? 
15. Parents: are they alive? Where are/were they from? What was their occupation before 
the war? When last seen? 
16. Were you every displaced or a refugee before you joined? 
Section 2: First experience of fighting  
17. Where were you based when you were first recruited to fight? 
18. Which faction were you recruited into? When (year)? 
19. [Had you left school by then?] 
20. How/why did you become involved with this group? 
21. Did you think you would gain anything from participating? If so, what? 
22. What role did you play/what rank were you? 
23. Did you fight for any other faction(s) in this country? 
24. If so, why did you change faction(s)? 
25. When the war (in Liberia/Sierra Leone/[Côte d’Ivoire]) ended, where were you based? 
26. In your opinion who won this war? 
Section 2: Experience of war abroad 
27. Who recruited you to fight abroad? When was this? 
28. What were your main reasons for going across the border to fight? 
29. Were you told anything about what you would gain for participating? 
30. Who did you go with? Did you know them from before? 
31. How many other people [from your country] were also fighting? 
32. Where did you go (region/district)? Which group were you associated with? 
33. What were your main activities? What rank/position were you? 
34. What were you doing prior to your re-recruitment? Where? 
35. Did you go through the DDR programme prior to this? 
36. Why did you come back/stop fighting? 
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37. When was the last time you had contact with the person who recruited you? 
38. Since you have been back has anyone approached you for recruitment to fight 
anywhere? 
39. What have you been doing to earn money since you came back? How many people do 
you support? 
40. If someone was to try and recruit you now would you accept? Why/why not? 
Section 4: Experience of DDR 
41. Did you participate in the DDR programme? If not, why not? 
42. If so, where and when did you disarm? How? 
43. Did you participate in/complete a reintegration programme? If not, why not? (Did you 
complete?) 
44. If so, which programme?  
45. What did you think about it?  
46. Did you find related job afterward? If not, why not? 
47. How do you think most of your fellow ex-combatants are surviving? 
Section 5: Social networks and home or away preferences  
48. With whom do you spend most of your free time? 
49. Who do you live with? 
50. Have you been back to home country/fighting country [as relevant] since you stopped 
fighting there? 
51. Have you been in touch with anybody from there? Why or why not? 
52. If you had the choice, which of the countries you have been in would you most like to 
live and why? 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET  
 
Study title 
Regionalism and Peacebuilding in West Africa 
 
Invitation paragraph 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not to take 
part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will 
involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The aim of this study is to investigate ex-combatants’ motivations for crossing borders to fight 
in West Africa, and the settlement choices they made after the wars they were fighting in 
ended. It will also reflect on whether their choices are an example of informal regionalism that 
ECOWAS and peacebuilders could learn from. The study is part of my DPhil Research. 
 
Why have I been invited to participate? 
As a concerned citizen / former combatant / border official / policymaker, you have been 
invited to participate because I believe you will provide significant insights into the aspects I 
am studying. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
You can decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be given this 
information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to take part you 
are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason'. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
I will be asking you questions and recording our conversation. The interview will then be 
transcribed and made anonymous so that it won’t be possible to trace what you have said to 
me. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? (where appropriate) 
The main disadvantage is that I will be taking up your time. 
 
I will not be asking you specifically about your experiences during the war but some of the 
things we talk about may make you remember difficult events that may affect you emotionally 
or disturb your peace of mind. If this should happen, and you feel that you need some help to 
deal with these issues, I can provide you with the details for/link you up with YMCA Liberia, 
which offers psycho-social support to ex-combatants. 
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What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
The main benefit is that you will be contributing to a study that hopes to further 
understanding of how formal and informal regionalisation processes influence and should 
affect one another. It also hopes to contribute to policymakers’ understanding of promoting 
regional stability. OR (for ex-combatants): you will be contributing to enabling others to get a 
better understanding of what life for you is like today, 10 years after the end of the war in 
Liberia. 
 
Will what I say in this study be kept confidential? 
All information collected will be kept strictly confidential (subject to legal limitations). 
Confidentiality, privacy and anonymity will be ensured in the following ways: questionnaires 
and interview transcripts will only be identifiable by a unique identifier; I shall use pseudonyms 
if I am quoting directly anything that is said, and the pseudonyms will be stored entirely 
separately from the research data. 
 
What should I do if I want to take part? 
Just let me know! 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the research study will be used to write up my PhD thesis.  
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
I am conducting the research as a student at University of Sussex, Institute of Development 
Studies. I am self-funded.  
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
The research has been approved by a Social Sciences Cluster-based Research Ethics Committee 
(C-REC)  
 
Contact for Further Information 
Supervisor: Dr Patricia Justino, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Falmer, 
Brighton BN1 9RE, p.justino@ids.ac.uk; Tel: +44 (0)1273 915752  
 
If you have any concerns about the way in which the study has been conducted, you should 
contact my supervisor, using the above details.  
 
Thank you 
Thank you for taking time to read the information sheet. 
 
Date: 
 
  
 259 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
  
PROJECT TITLE:   
Regionalism and Peacebuilding in West Africa 
  
I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the project 
explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet, which I may keep for 
records. I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing to: 
 
- Be interviewed by the researcher 
- Allow the interview to be audiotaped  
- Make myself available for a further interview should that be required 
 
I understand that any information I provide is confidential, and that no information that I 
disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in the reports on the project, either by 
the researcher or by any other party. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part or 
all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project without being penalised 
or disadvantaged in any way. 
 
Name:  
Signature  
Date:  
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Annex 4: Ex-combatant profile tables 
 
Table A4.1: Respondents’ age groups 
Born in # Monrovia #Grand Gedeh Total 
1960s 3 2 5 
1970s 5 14 19 
1980s 13 9 22 
1990s 4 - 4 
Total 25 25 50 
 
 
Table A4.2: Liberian respondents by ethnicity 
Ethnic Group Number* 
(Montserrado) 
Number* 
(Grand Gedeh) 
Gola 3 2 
Sapo 1 2 
Mano 1 1 
Kru 3 1 
Krahn 2 21 
Grebo 2 4 
Gio 1 10 
Gbandi 1 - 
Lorma - 4 
Vai - 2 
Mandingo - 3 
 
 
Table A4.3: Sierra Leonean respondents by ethnicity 
Ethnic Group Number* 
 
Mende 5 
Temne 3 
Kissi 2 
Mandingo 1 
Limba 1 
Lebanese 1 
Unknown 1 
*More than total of interviewees as multiple ethnicities reported 
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Table A4.4: Comparing Liberia original fighting faction with national data 
Faction Former fighting faction random 
sample (1998–2003)* 
Sample totals 
  Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
AFL 8 1.36 3 7.14 
LPC 14 2.37 2 4.26 
NPFL 150 25.42 19 45.02 
Taylor’s GoL-
Militia/SBU 
186 31.53 3 7.14 
ULIMO 7 1.19 1 2.38 
ULIMO-J 5 0.85 6 14.28 
ULIMO-K 14 2.37 - - 
LDF - - 1 2.38 
INPFL 4 0.68 4 9.52 
MODEL 76 12.88 2 4.26 
LURD 126 21.36 - - 
LUDF - - 1 2.38 
Total 590 100 42 100 
*Pugel 2007 
 
 
Table A4.5: Comparing Sierra Leone original fighting faction with national data 
Faction NCDDR totals Sample totals 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
SLA/AFRC 8869 12.1 1 10 
RUF 24,338 33.1 6 60 
Anti-RUF 37,216 50.6 2 20 
Others 448 0.6 1 [ULIMO] 10 
Total 70,871 100 10 100 
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Table A4.6: Subsequent fighting faction 
 1990–1996 1999–2003 2002–2007 (CI) 2010–2012 
Movement phase 1: NPFL support for RUF invasion of Sierra Leone; Sierra Leone and Guinea support creation of ULIMO against NPFL; ULIMO return to Liberia 
including Sierra Leoneans 
RUF 2    
LUDF/ULIMO 3    
NPFL 1    
Movement phase 2: RUF retreat to Liberia and support Charles Taylor against new insurgency by LURD and MODEL, supported by Gu inea and Côte d’Ivoire 
respectively; Sierra Leoneans move to fight with LURD 
Charles Taylor Special Forces  15   
LURD  4   
MODEL  4   
Movement phase 3: Start of Ivoirian conflict – RUF, pro-Taylor and anti-Taylor militia involvement 
Movement for Justice and Peace (Mouvement pour la justice et la paix, MJP) – ‘rebels’   1  
Ivoirian Popular Movement of the Great West (Mouvement populaire ivoirien du Grand 
Ouest, MPIGO) – ‘rebels’ 
  2  
Lima militia (pro-Gbagbo)   1  
Movement phase 4: Ivoirian electoral crisis (2010–2011) – armed conflict between pro-Ouattara and pro-Gbagbo militias, involving Liberians on both sides 
The Ivoirian Popular Front (Front populaire ivoirien, FPI) – pro-Gbagbo)   2 2 
Pro-Gbagbo militias   4 5 
Young Patriots – pro-Gbagbo    2 
New Forces (Forces Nouvelles FNCI or FN) – ‘rebels’/ pro-Ouattara)   2 3 
Armed Forces of the New Forces (Forces Armées des Forces Nouvelles, FAFN (pro-
Ouattara) 
   1 
Pro-Ouattara militias    1 
Rally of the Republicans (Rassemblement des Républicains RDR) – Pro-Ouattara     
 
1 
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Annex 5: Examples of common mandate language across missions and over time 
Table A5.1: Similarities in mandate issues language across peacekeeping missions – example of the start-up phase of MRU Missions 
Issue S/Res 1270 (1999) establishing 
UNAMSIL 
S/Res 1509 (2003) establishing UNMIL Security Council 1528 (2004) establishing UNOCI 
Decision 8. Decides to establish the United 
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL) with immediate effect for 
an initial period of six months 
 
14. Acting under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations . . .  
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations, 
 1. Decides to establish the 
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the 
stabilization force called for . . . for a period of 
12 months, and requests the Secretary-General 
to transfer authority from the ECOWAS-led 
ECOMIL forces to UNMIL on 1 October 2003 . . . 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations,  
 1. Decides to establish the United 
Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) for 
an initial period of 12 months as from 4 April 
2004, and requests the Secretary-General to 
transfer authority from MINUCI and the ECOWAS 
forces to UNOCI on that date, and decides 
therefore to renew the mandate of the United 
Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) until 4 
April 2004; 
Ceasefire 
agreement 
8(e) To monitor adherence to the 
ceasefire in accordance with the 
ceasefire agreement of 18 May 1999 
. . . through the structures provided 
for 
therein; 
3(a) to observe and monitor the 
implementation of the ceasefire agreement and 
investigate violations of the ceasefire; 
6(a) To observe and monitor the implementation 
of the comprehensive ceasefire agreement of 3 
May 2003, and investigate violations of the 
ceasefire 
DDR 8 (b) To assist the Government of 
Sierra Leone in the implementation of 
the disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration plan; 
(c) To that end, to establish a 
presence at key locations throughout 
the territory of Sierra Leone, including 
at disarmament/reception centres 
and demobilization centres; 
3 (f) to develop, as soon as possible, preferably 
within 30 days of the adoption of this 
resolution, in cooperation with the JMC, 
relevant international financial institutions, 
international development organizations, and 
donor nations, an action plan for the overall 
implementation of a disarmament, 
demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation 
(DDRR) programme for all armed parties; with 
particular attention to the special needs of child 
combatants and women; and addressing the 
inclusion of non-Liberian combatants; 
(g) to carry out voluntary disarmament and to 
collect and destroy weapons and ammunition 
(d) To assist the Government of National 
Reconciliation in undertaking the regrouping of 
all the Ivoirian forces involved and to ensure the 
security of their cantonment sites,  
(e) To help the Government of National 
Reconciliation implement the national 
programme for the disarmament, demobilization 
and reintegration of the combatants (DDR), with 
special attention to the specific needs of women 
and children, 
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as part of an organized DDRR programme; 
Protection of 
UN staff and 
civilians 
8 (d) To ensure the security and 
freedom of movement of United 
Nations personnel; 
13. Reiterates the importance of the 
safety, security and freedom of 
movement of United Nations and 
associated personnel . . . and calls 
upon all parties in Sierra Leone to 
respect fully the status of United 
Nations and associated personnel; 
14. Acting under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations, 
decides that in the discharge of its 
mandate UNAMSIL may take the 
necessary action to ensure the 
security and freedom of movement of 
its personnel and, 
within its capabilities and areas of 
deployment, to afford protection to 
civilians under imminent threat of 
physical violence, taking into account 
the responsibilities of the 
Government of Sierra Leone and 
ECOMOG; 
Protection of United Nations Staff, Facilities and 
Civilians: 
(j) to protect United Nations personnel, 
facilities, installations and equipment, ensure 
the security and freedom of movement of its 
personnel and, without prejudice to the efforts 
of the government, to protect civilians under 
imminent threat of physical violence, within its 
capabilities; 
6. Protection of United Nations personnel, 
institutions and civilians 
(i) To protect United Nations personnel, 
installations and equipment, provide the security 
and freedom of movement of United Nations 
personnel and, without prejudice to the 
responsibility of the Government of National 
Reconciliation, to protect civilians under 
imminent threat of physical violence, within its 
capabilities and its areas of deployment,  
 
Humanitarian 
and human 
rights 
8 (g) To facilitate the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance; 
17. Stresses the urgent need to 
promote peace and national 
reconciliation and to foster 
accountability and respect for human 
rights in Sierra Leone . . . 
19. Urges all parties concerned to 
ensure that refugees and internally 
displaced persons are protected and 
are enabled to return voluntarily and 
3. Support for Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Assistance: 
(k) to facilitate the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, including by helping to establish the 
necessary security conditions; 
(l) to contribute towards international efforts to 
protect and promote human rights in Liberia, 
with particular attention to vulnerable groups 
including refugees, returning refugees and 
internally displaced persons, women, children, 
and demobilized child soldiers 
6. (k) To facilitate the free flow of people, goods 
and humanitarian assistance, inter alia, by 
helping to establish the necessary security 
conditions, 
(n) To contribute to the promotion and 
protection of human rights in Côte d’Ivoire with 
special attention to violence committed against 
women and girls, and to help investigate human 
rights violations with a view to help ending 
impunity 
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in safety to their homes . . .   
Support for the 
implementation 
of the peace 
process 
(including 
elections) 
8(i) (i) To provide support, as 
requested, to the elections, which are 
to be held in accordance with the 
present constitution of Sierra Leone; 
 
(s) to assist the transitional government, in 
conjunction with ECOWAS and other 
international partners, in preparing for national 
elections scheduled for no later than the end of 
2005; 
(m) To provide oversight, guidance and technical 
assistance to the Government of National 
Reconciliation, with the assistance of ECOWAS 
and other international partners, to prepare for 
and assist in the conduct of free, fair and 
transparent electoral processes . . . 
Security sector 
reform 
23. Urges the Government of Sierra 
Leone to expedite the formation of 
professional and accountable national 
police and armed forces, including 
through their restructuring and 
training . . . 
 
(n) . . . to assist the transitional government of 
Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the 
police force of Liberia, consistent with 
democratic policing, to develop a civilian police 
training programme, and to otherwise assist in 
the training of civilian police, in cooperation 
with ECOWAS, international organizations, and 
interested States; 
(o) . . . to assist the transitional government in 
the formation of a new and restructured 
Liberian military in cooperation with ECOWAS, 
international organizations and interested 
States; 
(p) . . . To assist the Government of National 
Reconciliation in conjunction with ECOWAS and 
other international organizations in restoring a 
civilian policing presence throughout Côte 
d’Ivoire, and to advise the Government of 
National Reconciliation on the restructuring of 
the internal security services, 
(q) . . . To assist the Government of National 
Reconciliation in conjunction with ECOWAS and 
other international organizations in re-
establishing the authority of the judiciary and 
the rule of law throughout Côte d’Ivoire, 
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Table A5.2: UNMIL (and UNOCI) mandate language relating to regional and inter-mission cooperation 
S/Res Bilateral cooperation Inter-mission cooperation 
(military) 
Inter-mission 
cooperation (civilian) 
Humanitarian issues Regional cooperation 
2008 (2011)  6. Reaffirms the inter-mission 
cooperation arrangements 
provided for in 1609 (2005) 
as-needed and on a 
temporary basis, between 
UNMIL and UNOCI 
7. Further emphasizes the 
need for UNMIL and 
UNOCI to regularly 
coordinate their 
strategies and operations 
in areas near the Liberian-
Côte d’Ivoire border, in 
order to contribute to 
sub-regional security and 
to prevent armed groups 
from exploiting the seam 
of political boundaries 
8. Further emphasizes the 
need for the donor 
community to support the 
Government of Liberia, as 
well as the United Nations, 
and other humanitarian 
actors, as appropriate, in 
their response to the 
current influx of Ivoirian 
refugees; 
12. Encourages ECOWAS to 
develop, with the support of 
the United Nations Office 
for West Africa (UNOWA), a 
sub-regional strategy to 
address the threat of 
the cross-border 
movements of armed 
groups and weapons as well 
as illicit trafficking, with the 
assistance of UNMIL and 
UNOCI, as appropriate; 
2062 (2012) 18. Calls upon the 
Governments of Côte 
d’Ivoire and Liberia to 
continue to enhance their 
cooperation, particularly 
with respect to the border 
area, including through 
increasing monitoring, 
information sharing and 
conducting coordinated 
actions, and in developing 
and implementing a shared 
border strategy to inter alia 
support the disarmament 
and repatriation of foreign 
armed elements on both 
sides of the border and the 
repatriation of refugees; 
21. Endorses, with immediate 
effect, the recommendation 
of the Secretary-General to 
transfer the three armed 
helicopters, currently 
deployed in UNMIL, to 
UNOCI, to be used in both 
Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia along 
and across their border; 
19. Calls upon all United 
Nations bodies in Côte 
d’Ivoire and Liberia, 
including all components 
of UNOCI and UNMIL . . . 
to enhance their support 
for the stabilization of the 
border area, including 
through their increased 
cooperation and the 
development of a shared, 
strategic vision and plan, 
in support of the Ivorian 
and Liberian authorities; 
 20. Encourages ECOWAS 
and the Mano River Union 
to continue to develop, 
with the support of the 
United Nations Office for 
West Africa (UNOWA), a 
subregional strategy to 
address the threat of the 
cross-border movements of 
armed groups and weapons 
as well as illicit trafficking, 
with the assistance of 
UNOCI and UNMIL, as 
appropriate, and provide 
regular updates on progress 
towards the development of 
such a subregional strategy  
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S/Res Bilateral cooperation Inter-mission cooperation 
(military) 
Inter-mission 
cooperation (civilian) 
Humanitarian issues Regional cooperation 
2066 (2012) 12. Calls upon the 
Governments of Côte 
d’Ivoire and Liberia to 
continue to enhance their 
cooperation, particularly 
with respect to the border 
area, including through 
increasing monitoring, 
information sharing and 
conducting coordinated 
actions, and in developing 
and implementing a shared 
border strategy to inter alia 
support the disarmament 
and repatriation of foreign 
armed elements on both 
sides of the border and the 
voluntary return of 
refugees; 
 
14. Recalls the endorsement, 
in its resolution 2062 (2012), 
of the Secretary-General’s 
recommendation to transfer 
the three armed helicopters, 
currently 
deployed in UNMIL, to UNOCI, 
to be used in both Côte 
d’Ivoire and Liberia along and 
across their border; 
13. Reaffirms the inter-
mission cooperation 
arrangements provided 
for in its resolution 1609 
(2005) and calls upon the 
United Nations in Côte 
d’Ivoire and 
Liberia, including all 
components of UNOCI 
and UNMIL, within their 
respective mandates, 
capabilities and areas of 
deployment, to enhance 
their inter-mission 
cooperation for the 
stabilization of the border 
area, including through 
the 
development of a shared, 
strategic vision and plan, 
in support of the Ivorian 
and 
Liberian authorities; 
 
15. Calls upon the donor 
community to support the 
Government of Liberia, 
as well as the relevant 
United Nations agencies, 
and other humanitarian 
actors, as appropriate, in 
their response to the Ivorian 
refugees still present in 
Liberia; 
19. Encourages ECOWAS 
and the Mano River Union 
to develop, with the 
support of UNOWA, a 
subregional strategy to 
address the threat of the 
cross-border movements of 
armed groups and weapons 
as well as illicit trafficking, 
with the assistance of 
UNOCI and UNMIL, as 
appropriate, and requests 
the Secretary-General to 
provide regular updates on 
progress towards the 
development of such a 
subregional strategy; 
2116 
(18 Sept 2013)  
13. Calls on the 
Governments of Côte 
d’Ivoire and Liberia, 
including with the support 
of UNOCI and UNMIL and 
the two United Nations 
country teams, to 
15. Takes note of the transfer 
of three armed helicopters 
from UNMIL to 
UNOCI, to be used in both 
Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, 
along and across their border, 
and the transfer of four 
14. Reaffirms the inter-
mission cooperation 
arrangements provided 
for in its resolutions 1609 
(2005) and 2100 (2013), 
consistent with the 
conditions outlined 
16. Calls upon the donor 
community to continue to 
support the Government 
of Liberia, as well as the 
relevant United Nations 
agencies and other 
humanitarian actors, as 
19. Encourages ECOWAS 
and the Mano River Union 
to develop, with the 
support of UNOWA, a 
subregional strategy to 
address the threat of the 
cross-border movements of 
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S/Res Bilateral cooperation Inter-mission cooperation 
(military) 
Inter-mission 
cooperation (civilian) 
Humanitarian issues Regional cooperation 
further enhance their 
cooperation, particularly 
with respect to the border 
area, including through 
increasing monitoring, 
information sharing, and 
conducting coordinated 
actions, and in developing 
and implementing a shared 
border strategy to inter alia 
support the disarmament 
and repatriation of foreign 
armed elements on both 
sides of the border and the 
voluntary return of refugees 
in safety and dignity; 
armoured personnel carriers 
and affirms the importance of 
inter-mission cooperation 
arrangements as UNMIL and 
UNOCI downsize; 
therein, and calls upon 
the United Nations in 
Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, 
including all components 
of UNOCI and UNMIL, 
within their respective 
mandates, 
capabilities and areas of 
deployment, to enhance 
their inter mission 
cooperation for the 
stabilization of the border 
area, including through 
the development of a 
shared, 
strategic vision and plan, 
in support of the Ivorian 
and Liberian authorities; 
appropriate, in their 
response to the Ivorian 
refugees still present in 
Liberia; 
armed groups and weapons 
as well as illicit trafficking, 
with the assistance of 
UNOCI and UNMIL, as 
appropriate, and requests 
the Secretary-General to 
provide regular updates on 
progress towards the 
development of such a 
subregional strategy; 
2190  
(15 Dec 2014) 
18. Recognizes that the 
Ebola outbreak has put on 
hold the joint activities 
between the Governments 
of Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, 
as well as between UNMIL 
and the United Nations 
Operation in Côte d’Ivoire 
(UNOCI), calls on these 
governments to continue 
reinforcing their 
cooperation, particularly 
with respect to the border 
19. Affirms the importance of 
inter-mission cooperation 
arrangements as UNMIL and 
UNOCI downsize, reaffirms 
the inter-mission cooperation 
framework set out in its 
resolution 1609 (2005), recalls 
its endorsement in its 
resolution 2062 (2012) of the 
recommendation of the 
Secretary-General to transfer 
three armed helicopters from 
UNMIL to UNOCI to be used in 
18 (contd.) calls upon all 
United Nations entities in 
Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, 
including all relevant 
components of UNOCI 
and UNMIL, within their 
respective mandates, 
capabilities and areas of 
deployment, as well as 
the two United Nations 
Country Teams, where 
relevant and appropriate, 
to support the Ivoirian 
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S/Res Bilateral cooperation Inter-mission cooperation 
(military) 
Inter-mission 
cooperation (civilian) 
Humanitarian issues Regional cooperation 
area, including through 
increased monitoring, 
information sharing, and 
coordinated actions, and in 
implementing the shared 
border strategy to, inter 
alia, support the 
disarmament and 
repatriation of armed 
elements on both sides of 
the border and the 
voluntary return of refugees 
in safety and dignity, as well 
as to address the root 
causes of conflict and 
tension 
both Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia 
along and across their border 
and also recalls its decision in 
its resolution 2162 (2014) that 
all UNOCI and UNMIL military 
utility helicopters shall be 
utilized in both Côte d’Ivoire 
and Liberia in order to 
facilitate rapid response and 
mobility, while not affecting 
the area of responsibility of 
either mission; 
20. Recalls the proposal by the 
Secretary-General as set out 
in his report of 15 May 2014 
(S/2014/342), to establish, in 
the context of inter-mission 
cooperation arrangements 
between UNMIL and UNOCI, 
for an initial period of one 
year and within the 
authorized military strength of 
UNOCI, a quick reaction force 
to implement UNOCI’s 
mandate and to support 
UNMIL, while reiterating that 
this unit will remain primarily 
a UNOCI asset; 
and Liberian authorities; 
 19. Recognizes the 
importance of resuming 
fully and also enhancing the 
20. Affirms the importance of 
inter-mission cooperation 
arrangements as UNMIL and 
19 (contd.) calls upon all 
United Nations entities in 
Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, 
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S/Res Bilateral cooperation Inter-mission cooperation 
(military) 
Inter-mission 
cooperation (civilian) 
Humanitarian issues Regional cooperation 
joint activities between the 
Governments of Liberia and 
Côte d’Ivoire as UNMIL and 
the United Nations 
Operation in Côte d’Ivoire 
(UNOCI) downsize, calls on 
the Governments of Liberia 
and Côte d’Ivoire to 
continue reinforcing their 
cooperation, particularly 
with respect to the border 
area, including through 
increased monitoring, 
information sharing, and 
coordinated actions, and in 
implementing the shared 
border strategy to, inter 
alia, support the 
disarmament and 
repatriation of armed 
elements on both sides of 
the border and the 
voluntary return of refugees 
in safety and dignity, as well 
as to address the root 
causes of conflict and 
tension 
UNOCI downsize, reaffirms 
the inter-mission cooperation 
framework set out in its 
resolution 1609 (2005), recalls 
its endorsement in its 
resolution 2062 (2012) of the 
recommendation of the 
Secretary-General to transfer 
three armed helicopters from 
UNMIL to UNOCI to be used in 
both Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia 
along and across their border 
and also recalls its decision in 
its resolution 2162 (2014) that 
all UNOCI and UNMIL military 
utility helicopters shall be 
utilized in both Côte d’Ivoire 
and Liberia in order to 
facilitate rapid response and 
mobility, while not affecting 
the area of responsibility of 
either mission;  
21. Welcomes the full 
operationalization of the quick 
reaction force established by 
its resolution 2162 (2014) to 
implement UNOCI’s mandate 
as defined in paragraph 19 of 
its resolution 2226 (2015) and 
to support UNMIL as defined 
in paragraph 33 of its 
including all relevant 
components of UNOCI 
and UNMIL, within their 
respective mandates, 
capabilities and areas of 
deployment, as well as 
the two United Nations 
Country Teams, where 
relevant and appropriate, 
to intensify support to the 
Ivorian and Liberian 
authorities; 
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S/Res Bilateral cooperation Inter-mission cooperation 
(military) 
Inter-mission 
cooperation (civilian) 
Humanitarian issues Regional cooperation 
resolution 2226 (2015) while 
recognizing that this unit will 
remain primarily a UNOCI 
asset;  
22. Recalls its authorization, 
pursuant to its resolutions 
2162 (2014) and 2226 (2015), 
to the Secretary-General to 
deploy this unit to Liberia, 
subject to the consent of the 
troop contributing countries 
concerned and the 
Government of Liberia, in the 
event of a serious 
deterioration of the security 
situation on the ground in 
order to temporarily reinforce 
UNMIL with the sole purpose 
of implementing its mandate 
and further recalls its requests 
to the Secretary-General to 
inform the Security Council 
immediately of any 
deployment of this unit to 
Liberia and to obtain Security 
Council authorization for any 
such deployment for a period 
that exceeds 90 days; 
 
